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The Supreme Court theoretically acts as a counter-majoritarian institution 
considering its small and appointed membership.   Despite this, it largely 
makes decisions that are in line with the opinions of Americans.  This 
study examines the Roberts Court to determine the extent to which it 
references and reflects public opinion.  The scholarship on previous courts 
shows that its decisions are generally consistent with public opinion.  
Although the Roberts Court is relatively new, this study aims to shed some 
light on whether the court continues to follow its tradition of agreeing with 
the mass or more narrow public opinion.  Results were largely 
inconclusive, yet this examination shows that the Roberts Court does 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
In a 2005 paper on the relationship between the death penalty and public opinion, 
I argued that the justices “pay attention” to public opinion in their decisions about the 
death penalty.  In particular, I found that Justice O’Connor used public opinion as one 
barometer for her decisions in, but not limited to, death penalty cases.  In an audience 
with Justice O’Connor in 2006, I had that opportunity to ask her directly about the 
correlation between public opinion and court rulings.  She affirmed that while the justices 
do take public opinion into consideration in their rulings, the weight of public opinion is 
not uniformly applied by all justices in their deliberations.  This is particularly true on 
high profile cases.  Justice O’Connor went on to explain that public opinion is one 
important factor in her judicial decision making because she was a part of the society for 
which she was making rules.  The root of this dissertation is found in both the 
aforementioned paper and the revelations of my audience with Justice O’Connor.    
This dissertation will assess the decisions by the Roberts Court to test this 
hypothesis, and argue that the Roberts Court reflects public opinion on par with earlier 
courts.
1
    This study builds upon the work of Thomas Marshall, who, in two books 
(1989, 2008) argues that the Supreme Court reflects public opinion between three-fifths 
and two-thirds of the time.  In his latter book, Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, he 
studied all the opinions of the court and found 123 direct references to public opinion 
polls.  He surmised, with an average of six mentions per term, the justices were agreeing 
with public opinion relatively often.  Moreover, this percent was consistent with other 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Marshall uses the term “reflects public opinion” in his books, which is never clearly defined.  I 
argue that is using reflects in the same way that I use “agrees with and “is consistent with”.   
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historical courts.  In addition to the direct-mention model, Marshall also used the 
pairwise method, a system of matching polls to decisions, and found that the Rehnquist 
Court largely reflected public opinion between sixty and sixty-six percent of the time.   
This project is divided into three parts.  Part one deals with a general introduction 
and history of the relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court, including 
discerning the difference between narrow interests and mass public opinion.  Part one 
also contains the methodology and a literature review of the significant works on the 
relationship between Supreme Court decisions and public opinion.  Finally, part one goes 
on to examine various court cases and how they were likely influenced by public opinion.   
 Part two discusses other factors that influence the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
specifically considering ideology, the media, legitimacy and judicial activism and 
restraint; examining the influence of public opinion on these other factors that sway court 
outcomes.  Part three finishes the thesis with a discussion of the model for this project, 
the results and implications for future research.   
Marshall’s work reveals that counter to Rehnquist’s personal convictions on the 
subject, his court was, in fact, quite influenced by public opinion polls.  Long before he 
was Chief Justice Rehnquist, he was the ‘lone ranger’ of the Burger Court.  Many of the 
Burger Court’s opinions were in line with popular opinion at the time (Marshall, 1989), 
and Rehnquist often wrote the lone dissents challenging both majority opinions and the 
majority of public opinion.  He indicated at one point that “the Court’s duty is to ignore 
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public opinion and criticisms on issues that come before it.”
2
 By the 1990s, then Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had a number of ideological allies on the court.  However, and despite 
his influence over Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, upon whom Rehnquist 
generally could rely to help him reverse some rulings he disagreed with, his court 
actually fell in line with public opinion, thus contradicting his own goal to disconnect 
public opinion from court decisions.  This is largely because Justice O’Connor, who was 
the critical fifth vote and in the majority over eighty percent of the time, (Marshall, 
2008), almost singlehandedly, kept the Rehnquist Court in line with public opinion.  
   Justice O’Connor was among the justices whose voting record most reflected 
public opinion.  Marshall (2008) argues that ideological moderates like O’Connor are 
more deferential than other justices in using public opinion in their decision-making.  Her 
opinions with regard to crime and the death penalty, for example, were in line with public 
opinion eighty-four percent of the time.  Her votes on other issues, such as abortion and 
other “gender-related” policy agreed with public opinion seventy-two percent of the time.  
As the swing vote
3
 on dozens of cases in her career, she often (intentionally or not) kept 
the court from drifting out of the public mainstream (Marshall, 1989, 2008). Scholars, 
including Marshall (2008) and Behuniak-Long (1992) have posited that, as the first 
woman justice, she often defended the interests of women.  Indeed, sixty-one percent of 
the time she agreed with the majority of women, according to opinion surveys on issues 
                                                 
2
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court 
958-959. Supreme Court. 29 June 1992. Print.  
3
 The swing voter on the Supreme Court is usually defined as the median justice; the one who is closest to 
the center, whose vote could determine the outcome of case.  This person is usually the 5
th
 vote in 5-4 
cases, especially in cases where a justice can be convinced to vote in an unpredictable manner.   
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associated with cases on the court’s docket (Marshall, 2008, 61) thus implicating her as a 
centrist generally in line with public opinion.  This was reinforced by Justice O’Connor’s 
belief that the law ought to evolve parallel to the development of the country, 
underscoring the importance she placed on the role of public opinion in court rulings.  
Her philosophy contrasts with that of Justice Scalia, who argues that public opinion, 
polling or surveys have no role in the law.  Scalia and Rehnquist both agreed that juries 
and state legislatures are more reliable indicators of public opinion than are polls.   Yet 
even Scalia, according to Marshall’s (2008) analysis, agrees with public opinion fifty-
eight percent of the time and will mention public opinion when it fits his argument.    
Marshall (2008) claims that the Rehnquist Court predominately made decisions 
that were in line with public opinion.  He further contends that a three-fifths agreement 
with public opinion is largely consistent with other courts since the mid-1930s and that 
the sixty percent figure has stayed stable over time.  One exception is with First 
Amendment cases, where often the court reaches conclusions that contrast with public 
opinion (Marshall 2008, 89).  This is specific to religion cases, which, as many scholars 
of the court have noted, are unusual in that the court that is usually bucking public 
opinion, steadfastly denying efforts to insert more religion in public areas, despite public 
support for these religious initiatives.  The court’s denial of a more public role of religion 
has held true from the earliest days of polling to the current court, countering polls from 
the 1950s to the 2000s which consistently show that a majority of Americans are in favor 




1.1  Defining Public Opinion- Narrow Interest and Mass Opinions4 
There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg aspect to the relationship between public 
opinion and the Supreme Court.  Does the Supreme Court follow public opinion, or does 
the public follow the cues from the court?  Johnson and Martin (1998) and Hoekstra and 
Segal (1996), among others have argued that the court influences the public on issues 
such as gay rights and abortion.  Unger (2008) explains the public is willing to revisit 
their views in light of Supreme Court decisions.  Scholars such as Page and Shapiro 
(1992), Segal, Spaeth and Benesh (2005) and Perry (1999), have argued that there is 
some flexibility in the views of the public.  Despite the fact that only a small minority of 
people can identify members of the Supreme Court and even fewer can recognize specific 
cases before the court, the Supreme Court has the highest approval ratings among all 
government institutions, despite their declining ratings in recent years. The health care 
law affirmed in 2012 was a good example of this.  The approval ratings for the law 
increased after the ruling.
5
  It certainly possible that as the court is influenced by public 
opinion, the reverse may be as true as well, that the public concludes that if the court 
approves of the law, it must be right.  
                                                 
4
 Narrow Interest Opinion refers to groups that have one or two specialized interests they focused on and 
push to have those interests protected at the executive, legislative or judicial level.  Examples of this type of 
group include the National Rifle Association and the Chamber of Commerce.  Mass opinion refers to what 
the “average citizen” thinks about a broad range of issues.  Mass public opinion can have a robust impact 
on policy especially at the legislative level.  Since elections are a key component of both the legislative and 
executive branches, the mass public opinion’s policy preferences are often heeded.   
5
 A NBC/Wall St. Journal Poll in July 2012, taken less than a month after the June 28, 2012 ruling found 
that those agreeing that the law was a good idea jumped five points, from 35% to 40% saying it was a good 
idea twenty days later.  Notable is that the new support for the law was temporary, as support decreased 
every month thereafter until late 2013.  A similar ABC/ Washington Post poll found an eight point jump in 
support from April 2012 until June 2012.   
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Recognizing the distinction between mass public opinion and narrow interest 
public opinion is critical in gaining a complete understanding of how public opinion is 
reflected and influenced by Supreme Court decisions.  Narrow interest opinion is a subset 
of public opinion and includes elite opinion makers.  Members of presidential 
administrations, interest groups, members in academia, editors and think tanks, all of 
whom have specialized interests they want represented.  Such narrow and elite opinion 
makers often influence policy through executive and legislative action, while interest 
groups write amicus briefs and editorial boards craft editorials.   Their opinions often 
weigh heavily in the minds of decision makers, including Supreme Court justices.  
Political scientist Thomas Dye (2000) has dedicated several books to the conclusion that 
decisions in Washington DC are made by “non-profit foundations, think tanks, special-
interest groups, and prominent lobbyists and law firms”.  In contrast, Unger (2009) 
believes that despite the fact that the court has more direct access to these narrow and 
elite opinions than popular opinion, both groups can be influential.   
Mass opinion is reflected in polling and surveys conducted by media and other 
organizations.  This encapsulates the general population of citizens regardless of their 
awareness of issues before the court.  While both narrow interest groups and the mass 
populace generally hold the Supreme Court in high esteem, the general population 
usually does so without a real understanding how the court works, nor the major 
decisions that come from it.  On a very practical level, the general population does not 
need to pay attention to the court since arguably Supreme Court decisions have less 
influence than Congress or the President.  In fact, as Baum and Devins (2010) argue, the 
court does not direct opinions towards the mass public whereas their decisions have a 
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profound impact on the more narrow groups in society, largely because it is these groups 
who will be implementing the decisions.  In essence, justices and narrow interests have 
forged a reciprocal relationship that does not exist between the justices and the masses.  
As Devins and Baum put it, "Supreme Court Justices care more about the views of 
academics, journalists, and other elites than they do about public opinion."
6
   
Such narrow and elite public opinion is an important driver of information and a 
significant contributor to what the masses believe.  Zaller’s work on public opinion 
shows that most people do not have a concrete position on issues and consequently are 
more open to receiving political messages.  Thus, elites influence the masses.  Zaller’s 
RAS model reveals that the masses parrot the messages they receive and have sampled.  
They especially respond to elite messages and, while they often receive conflicting 
messages, they adhere to the ones that reflect their own preferences.    
The relationship between elite interests and mass public opinion is complicated.  
Converse (1964) found that most people’s beliefs were random and malleable rather than 
well-defined, concrete positions. The mass public picks up cues from such elite interests, 
allowing for a ‘trickle down effect’ in public opinion.  Zaller (1992) agreed, finding that 
the mass public does “not usually carry around in their heads fixed attitudes on every 
issue; instead, they construct 'opinion statements' on the fly as they confront each new 
issue.”
7
  When elite opinion is clear on an issue, the mass public conforms, accepting the 
                                                 
6
 Baum, Lawrence and Devins, Neal, "Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American 
People" (2010). Faculty, College of William and  Mary Law School. Publications Paper 1546. 
7
 Zaller, John R. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Pg. 67.  Print.  
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perceived educated view of the elites, and make it their own.  Like earlier studies on 
public opinion and the court, this thesis primarily will focus on mass opinions; although, 
narrower opinion
8
 will be addressed with special attention to the relationship between 
business interests and the Supreme Court.     
1.2  The Beginnings of the Roberts Court  
The Roberts Court began in October 2005, with the summer confirmation of D.C. 
Circuit Judge John Roberts to the Chief Justice position, formerly held by longtime Chief 
William Rehnquist.  He was the first new member on a Supreme Court that had remained 
remarkably consistent for fourteen years.  He moved on to a court that was an enigma in 
many ways.  On the one hand, the court Roberts was joining had the potential to be quite 
conservative in its many controversial cases.  Observers of the court including Robert 
Barnes of The Washington Post, Adam Liptak of the New York Times and a variety of 
blogs and scholars generally agreed that the Rehnquist Court was more “conservative” in 
its rulings than the previous Burger Court, but not nearly what it could have been.
9
 
With seven of the nine justices in the Rehnquist Court nominated by Republican 
presidents, the potential for a longtime conservative majority was ever-present.
10
  More 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8
 Narrow interests are not necessarily elite interests, nor are elite interests always narrow ones.  For the 
purposes of this study, I use the term narrow interests to describe an agenda and viewpoint that the mass 
public may or may not be aware of, but that the narrow interest group will push wholeheartedly.   
9
 In this discussion, two items are of particular importance.  The first is that most justices do not self-
identify as either conservative or liberal.  They often bristle at characterizations where they are labeled in 
such a fashion.  Second, when reflecting on a conservative or liberal justice, there are many rulings that are 
non-ideological, often technical rulings on arcane aspects of law that are not easily classified.   
10
 Scalia, O’Connor and Kennedy were nominated by Ronald Reagan.  George H.W. Bush nominated 
Souter and Thomas while Ford nominated Stevens.  Rehnquist was nominated by Richard Nixon.  
Democrat Bill Clinton nominated Breyer and Ginsburg.   
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may have expected more from the Rehnquist Court had it not been for three members 
who turned out to not follow the “predicted” path.   These three justices included John 
Paul Stevens, David Souter and Sandra Day O’Connor.  In the first instance, John Paul 
Stevens was nominated by Gerald Ford in 1975 and served for 34 years on the court.  
While having issued his share of “conservative” rulings, he has largely been a solid 
“liberal” vote.
11
  According to Marshall’s analysis (2008), Stevens voted liberally 85% of 
the time during the fourteen years of the Rehnquist Court.  David Souter, recently retired, 
was more surprising in that he more immediately voted more with the liberal block.  He 
had a 71% liberal voting record, undoubtedly disappointing those who had counted on 
him voting with the conservatives.  In addition to Souter and Stevens, the most 
maddening Justice for conservatives was Sandra Day O’Connor, who voted liberally only 
41% of the time, but had a tendency to be a swing vote, voting with the conservatives on 
some issues and with the liberal bloc on the most contentious ones.  As this report shows, 
these decisions were often done based on where the prevailing winds of public opinion 
were.   
 So in October 2005, the court was a mixed group, with four liberals, four 
conservatives (including O’Connor) and Roberts.    Despite a 5-4 conservative advantage 
in the fall of 2005, the court was quite similar to the Rehnquist Court.  Continuing with 
her tradition of being the swing vote, she was in the majority 100% of the time that fall.  
Notably, Roberts and O’Connor were both in the majority twenty-two out of twenty-four 
times.  While most of these 22 decisions were made up of technical points and 9-0 
                                                 
11
 Despite his “leftward” drift, Justice Stevens has always claimed that he has not become more liberal but 
that the Court has been steadily moving away from him.   
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decisions, Roberts showed a willingness to go against public opinion early in his tenure. 
(Marshall, 2008) 
In the fall of 2005, O’Connor and Roberts broke on two decisions.  O’Connor 
joined the liberals in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz 546 U.S. 356 (2006) 
and Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243 (2006).  In both cases, O’Connor decisions 
reflected public opinion in her decision.  The Central Virginia Community College case 
was about whether an individual could sue a state that was claiming immunity under the 
sovereign immunity statue.  Public opinion polls consistently show that the public is in 
favor of the individual over the state when the individual is wronged.  In the second case, 
O’Connor voted to uphold the right of the people of Oregon to have physician assisted 
suicide.  The voters of Oregon passed the original ballot initiative with 51.3% of the vote 
in 1994 and then upheld this right in 1997 with 60% of the vote.  These two examples 
highlight that even at the end of her term, she continued her pattern of consistency with 
public opinion. (Marshall, 2008)  These examples also show that Roberts, even early in 
his term, was willing to buck public opinion. 
1.3  Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 One example of how outside influence can make its way into Supreme Court is 
the rehearing petition in Kennedy v. Louisiana 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  This case speaks 
volumes with regard to when justices use public opinion when necessary.  Indeed, this 
case shows that justices can use the concept of public opinion when it fits their needs.   
 This was a case where the justices decided that the death penalty as a punishment 
for the rape of a child that did not end in the child’s death violated the 8
th
 Amendment.  
The ruling was based on the fact that only six states had such laws.  In this case, the 
11 
 
majority (Kennedy writing for Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens) supported their 5-4 
decision by citing that the "national consensus" was moving away from the death penalty 
for the rape of a child that does not result in death.  They bolstered their argument by 
noting that Congress had not passed a law which had the death penalty as a punishment 
for child rape.  This was found to be a mistake when, three days after the decision, a 
military court blogger pointed out on SCOTUSblog that in 2006 Congress had, in fact, 
written into the Uniform Military Code of Justice a provision that allowed for the death 
penalty in the rape of a child, thus tearing a hole in the majority’s argument of the 
Supreme Court decision.  Despite the attention of this oversight via a New York Times 
article, and with 85 members of Congress, several governors and Department of Justice 
briefs requesting a rehearing, as well as the ensuing Louisiana petition that read 
“respondent first became aware of Section 552 (b) from a legal “blog” that attracted 
subsequent commentary.”, the justices decided against re-hearing the case while 
acknowledging the factual error.     
 Justice Scalia, in his statement joined by Roberts, agreed that there should not 
have been a rehearing, and makes a mention of public opinion.  Scalia contends: 
 I am voting against the petition for rehearing because the views of the 
 American people on the death penalty for child rape were, to tell the truth, 
 irrelevant to the majority’s decision in this case. 
 
Scalia believes that he has a better pulse on American public opinion than does Kennedy.  
In fact, Scalia argues; 
 While the new evidence of American opinion is ultimately irrelevant to the 
 majority’s decision, let there be no doubt that it utterly destroys the majority’s 
 claim  to be discerning a national consensus and not just giving effect to the 
 majority’s own  preference. As noted in the letter from Members of Congress, 
 the bill providing the death penalty for child rape passed the Senate 95–0; it 
12 
 
 passed the House 374–41, with the votes of a majority of each State’s 
 delegation; and was signed by the President. 
 
The letter from Congress is also an interesting tidbit because Scalia is making the point 
that national consensus for the death penalty for child rape, as represented by Congress 
and the President, was actually in favor of the law.  As to the many state legislatures who 
do not have a law providing for the death penalty in these instances, Scalia believes that 
the actions of Congress and the President better reflect public sentiment or national 
consensus more than does state inaction.   
 The Washington Post posted an editorial which said: 
The Supreme Court’s legitimacy depends not only on the substance of its rulings 
but also on the quality of its deliberations. That’s why we think the Court needs 
to reopen this case — even though we supported its decision. The losing party, 
Louisiana, still has time to seek a rehearing, which the Court could grant with the 
approval of five justices, including at least one from the majority. The Court 
could limit re-argument to briefs on the significance of the UCMJ provision. We 
doubt the case will come out much differently; we certainly hope not. But this is 
an opportunity for the Court to show a little judicial humility. Before the Court 
declares its final view on national opinion about the death penalty, it should 
accurately assess the view of the national legislature.
12
 
 The rebuttal statements by Scalia help bolster one major argument of this paper.  
Justices will use the views of the American people when it helps reinforce their case and 
ignore it when it may not support it.  Scalia deftly uses public opinion such a fashion.  
Indeed, he is outraged by the fact that the majority ignored the views of the American 
people.  For someone who often expresses such distaste for public opinion, he certainly 
was able to use it in this case.    
 This example is designed to close out this first chapter, where the Supreme Court 
is introduced, including some of its major players, and the basic premise behind the paper 
                                                 
12
 "Supreme Slip-Up." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 05 July 2008. Web.  
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was discussed.  This chapter examined the differences between the mass and narrow 
interest public opinion and explored some of Marshall’s (2008) work on the subject.  
Finally, this chapter looked at one example at the dynamics in the relationship between 






















Chapter 2:  Methodology 
In this project, I propose to test the following hypotheses: 
H1:  The Roberts Court agrees with public opinion more than sixty percent of its 
cases in which a decision was rendered on its merits.   
H2:  Justices in the Roberts Court make indirect references to public opinion in 
their writings when there exists public opinion they believe bolsters their case.   
H3:  When narrow interests (in this case business interests) such as the Chamber 
of Commerce file amici briefs in cases or serve as a party in a case, the court is 
likely to rule on the side of these groups.   
  The methodology of this project has three components: 1) examining cases in which 
public opinion is indirectly referenced, 2) using a pairwise method created by Marshall 
(2008) which pairs court cases and polls and 3) examining the relationship between the 
court activity of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, including when the Chamber is a party 
to a case, and Supreme Court votes.  The goal is to determine whether there is enough 
evidence to support the hypotheses that the Supreme Court reflects public opinion both in 
its mass and narrow interest form.   
While many newspapers and news organizations have their own polling division, 
Gallup is an independent organization that provides polling for a number of associations 
and is generally considered one of the most respected (Glynn, 1999 and Walden, 1996). It 
operates in over one hundred and forty countries and is referred to widely by the media.  
There was an attempt to use Gallup polls whenever possible.  There are other polling 
15 
 
units that are useful, including the ABC-Washington Post, NBC-Wall Street Journal, USA 
Today, and CBS-New York Times, among others, all easily searchable in the Roper 
Archive and PollingReport.com, online databases.  The Roper Archive is one of the 
premier poll repositories available to academics.  The media often refer to these polls, 
and justices, along with their clerks, assuming that they read newspapers and watch the 
news, could thus get a sense what the country believes about high profile issues.   
2.1 Indirect Mention Model 
The methodology behind the indirect mention model is reasonably 
straightforward.  Cases heard by the Roberts Court and decided between in the 2005 and 
2010 terms were found via the Cornell University Law School Web Site.  Majority, 
minority and concurring opinions are listed in an easily searchable .pdf format.  The list 
of words that were searched was as follows:  public, opinion, survey, poll, Americans, 
national consensus, community, citizen and society.  If these words were found, then a 
more thorough review was made of the sentence and paragraph.  It was often the case that 
words that referred to the public at large did not have the proper meaning when read as a 
part of a sentence or paragraph.  I collected such phrases into a database and placed the 
expression in context of the larger opinion.   Is the mention a prominent part of the court's 
reasoning or is it more of a secondary feature?  A mention is logged and categorized if 
the phrase refers to public opinion either directly or indirectly and is used to support the 
author’s opinion.  Additionally, mining all Roberts cases for key words and phrases, I 
was able to assess distinctions in the types of opinions the court is using.  A reference to a 
legal blog, for example, may indicate a more narrow interest opinion than a reference to a 
mass public opinion poll.  Completing an advanced, substantive search of these words 
16 
 
within each of the majority, dissenting and concurring opinions provided evidence that 
the court is examining public opinion to one degree or another.  At the very least, it 
should be recognition that the court understands where the public sits on a matter. One 
key word is “public”.  If ‘public’ is used in the context "the public believes this or that" 
then it could be argued that the justices were speaking on behalf of the citizenry at large.  
However, in many situations the justices might be referring to a public entity that 
happens to be one of the principal parties in a case.  As a result, cases that had the correct 
words but not the correct context were discarded.    
I argue that the use of key words by the majority or minority indicate recognition 
of the importance of public opinion by the court.  Words and phrases used in the past by 
earlier courts have included “the public views”, “the prevailing sentiment”, “an enraged 
community”, “Americans choose”, “residents believe”, “society expects”, “interests of 
the people” and similar phrases.  These key words suggest that what ordinary people 
believe about a particular issue carries some weight amongst the justices.   
  Along this line, one of the more interesting phrases that has been used in Supreme 
Court decisions is “evolving standards of decency”.  The first incarnation of this phrase 
was seen in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), when Chief Justice Warren was 
writing about the 8th Amendment.  In Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 (2002), a death 
penalty case, Justice Stevens uses ‘evolving standards of decency’, essentially as a proxy 
for the “public opinion, in that the argument was that society had essentially decided that 
17 
 
the death penalty for the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual”.
13
 “Evolving 
standards” has become an allusion to the community view that is used by the court with 
great frequency in recent history.  That has not always been the case.  In the 1970's, when 
the court was deciding both Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), evolving standards was supposed to have an objective view based on "state 
legislation, sentencing decisions of juries and the views of entities with relative 
expertise."
14
  It could be argued that all three "objective measures' are in fact opinion 
based.  First, since state legislatures are elected by the mass electorate, states with pro-
death penalty legislatures are presumably there because the electorate is also pro-death 
penalty.  Second, juries are members of the general public and so their opinions may in 
fact reflect the views of the larger mass public and finally, entities with relative expertise 
may be anyone who has an interest in the subject, including the public at large.   
There are only a few examples where the court uses the exact phrasing of ‘public 
opinion’.  Even rarer are the words ‘poll’ or ‘survey’ mentioned openly.  However, the 
justices do speak in coded terms that suggest public desires do weigh on the justices.  
Justices, therefore, are more likely to indirectly cite public opinion in their decisions 
through either reference to societal sentiment on a specific ruling, or to the public as a 
whole.  When Justice Scalia argued that ‘most’ of the citizens of The District of 
Columbia were in favor of lifting the gun ban in D.C. v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008), he 
was arguing that the unreasonable restriction prohibited an entire class of guns that 
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  Indirect references allow justices, who otherwise might resist 
submitting to ‘public opinion”, a strategic way to circumvent contradiction their view on 
allowing public opinion a voice in court decisions.  
Justice David Souter’s opinion in Brendlin v. California 551 U.S. 249 (2007) is a 
good example of how the court is consistent with public opinion through indirect 
mentions.  In this case, the code phrase is ‘societal expectation’.  In the Brendlin case, a 
passenger in a car was arrested on a parole violation.  The passenger sued, arguing that 
the search was a violation of the 4
th
 Amendment and that the seizure rule in such an 
automobile stop is intended for the driver.  The court disagreed, 9-0, holding that all 
passengers in a car stopped are subject to search and seizure.  On page eight of the 
opinion, Justice Souter explains that it is reasonable for passengers to expect that they are 
being seized when the car is stopped.  Moreover, it is reasonable that police officers will 
not allow passengers to move around in or out of the car in ways that would endanger the 
police.  Souter contends that there is a societal expectation that the police are 
unquestionably in charge when a car is pulled over.  Reasonable people (the passenger 
and the driver) should reflect this societal expectation and know that both parties are 
subject to reasonable search and seizure once pulled over.   
 In this opinion, Souter is not pointing to any specific public opinion polls or 
surveys as the basis of his opinion.  The public sway is much more nuanced, but 
nonetheless a suggestive look into the logic of the justices.  Statements like ‘societal 
expectation’ are based on how society views the laws.  In this case, members of society 
expect a certain behavior from the police and act accordingly.  If societal expectation was 
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 The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for that lawful purpose.  DC vs. Heller. Supreme Court. 26 June 2008. Print.  
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that the police are not allowed to seize passengers, then Souter’s entire rationale might be 
different, the court might be disagreeing with public opinion, or the outcome might have 
been reversed.  This opinion was 9-0, ‘only’ thirteen pages long and relatively non-
controversial because the court was simply reinforcing a law that the public already 
expected from the police.  And because the other eight members of the court agreed with 
Souter’s rationale, it is reasonable to assume that they agree that societal expectation has 
a role in how the police should act.   
 Another example comes from a dissenting opinion in a 2007 case of Morse et al v. 
Fredrick (551 U.S. 393 (2007)), the “Bong Hits for Jesus” case, where the court ruled 
that the school principal did not violate the First Amendment in snatching a banner from 
a student and preventing it from being shown.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote that since the 
banner advocated an illegal activity, it was not a violation of free speech to have it 
removed.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that marijuana is used by thousands of 
otherwise law abiding citizens and that public opinion is evolving on this issue much like 
it did on alcohol prohibition: “The ensuing change in public opinion occurred much more 
slowly than the relatively rapid shift in Americans’ views on the Vietnam War, and 
progressed on a state-by-state basis over a period of many years.”
16
  Justice Stevens does 
not use public opinion as a direct rationale for his decision, but rather uses it in a 
supportive role, suggesting that as public opinion moves toward the legalization of 
marijuana, Roberts’ rationale for the majority opinion loses legitimacy, especially if 
marijuana use becomes legal.   
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 Common sense suggests that justices will use public opinion in their decision 
making if it supports their case and may go as far as to explicitly reference public opinion 
directly or through disguised intimations.  In the Morse case, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that polls on drug attitudes were showing more and more leniency among the 
young and the banner was promoting illegal activity that was on the rise.  Even Justice 
Scalia, who lambasted O’Connor’s use of public opinion in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, uses references to the public in his opinions District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), and Kennedy v. Louisiana 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
17
 
2.2  Pairwise Method 
To assess connections to public opinion, this study will also use the pairwise 
method, a poll-to-decision match, developed by Marshall in his two works on the 
Supreme Court (1989, 2008) including his book Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court.  
The pairwise method determines the correlation between public surveys or polls and 
Supreme Court decisions by collecting ‘matches’ between a survey or poll taken on an 
issue before the Supreme Court and decisions made by the court.  The resulting 
relationship is an indicator of whether a Supreme Court decision falls in line with public 
opinion.  Marshall used this approach as many of the country’s most pressing issues 
eventually find their way into the court system.  As Alexis de Tocqueville once noted 
about the courts, “Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not 
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resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”
18
  As the interest in cases before the 
court increases, the number of polls taken on those very issues also increases, allowing 
for a very direct comparison.  Marshall has found that most of the Supreme Courts have 
been consistent with public opinion between sixty and sixty-six percent of the time and I 
argue that the Roberts Court will continue this trend.   
This approach is one of two that has been used in comparing public opinion to the 
court.  The other approach is the trend method, made popular by Weissberg (1976), Page 
and Shapiro (1983) and Devine (1970).  In the 1990s, it became the norm in trend studies 
to use Stimson’s (1991, 1999) public mood index.  Trend studies (Flemming and Wood 
1997, Mischler and Sheehan 1996, Norpoth and Segal 1994) deal with the broader public 
mood and have assisted in the debate on the extent to which public opinion is reflected in 
the court’s decisions, while the pairwise method used by Marshall allows for greater 
specificity in cases and a more transparent assessment of whether specific issues are 
being reflected in court decisions.  The trend method is effective in reflecting how the 
public mood impacts the makeup of the court but is limited in that public mood indices 
do not necessarily contain issues that come before the Supreme Court.  When the country 
chooses a Democrat for president the trend might be that the country is moving slightly 
left.  This trend results in court appointments being more liberal leaning.  When the 
public mood is more liberal, the court can become more liberal as well.  The 2008 
election is a good example of this.  After the Bush years, the country elected President 
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Obama, paving the way for both Sotomayor and Kagan confirmations to the court, 
roughly keeping the court in the same ideological place it had been during the Bush 
years.  However, rather than the trend method, the methodology in this thesis will rely on 
the pairwise linkage model and apply it to the Roberts Court to best judge the parallel 
between specific decisions and specific polls. 
This study will employ a compilation of cases in which there is public opinion 
polls associated with the issue debated by the court.  Most of the more high-profile, 
media-saturated cases during the Roberts Court have polls associated with them.  While 
the Internet provides myriad polling ‘data’, polls from the Gallup organization are used 
when possible.  In the absence of a Gallup poll, I use ABC News, USA Today, CNN, CBS 
News, New York Times, Harris, and Washington Post polls.  If a public opinion poll 
cannot be found on the issue being debated before the court, the case will not be used.  
Court decisions dealing with more than one issue with corresponding polls on each 
subject will be treated as two matches.  Conversely, multiple court cases on the same 
issue with a corresponding poll will be treated as one case. The cases and polls will be 
cross-checked to determine their consistency with public opinion.  The majority opinions 
will be coded ‘consistent or ‘inconsistent’.  Polls on the same decision or issue that had 
opposing results will be assessed as ‘unclear’ and not used and polls that had a variety of 
responses such as ‘very likely’ and ‘likely’ will be collapsed accordingly.  Additionally, 
cases that had more than one poll attached to them will be combined into one result.  
Dissenting and concurring opinions will also be mined for similar information.  A 
consistency rate between cases and polls will be gathered and analyzed in order to assess 
the strength of the relationship.   
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The date the poll was taken is another important factor in this analysis.   Since 
polling is influenced by the court’s decision, this study will only use polls taken prior to a 
decision by the court.  It avoids the complicated issue of whether the court was 
influencing public opinion.
19
  If a poll’s outcome is consistent with the court’s majority 
opinion, it is coded as the court being consistent with public opinion.  Since the Roberts 
Court is relatively new, it will be challenging to find exact matches as the number of high 
profile cases is small.  In cases where there was no poll found on an exact case, then polls 
on the issue presented before the court will be used.  For instance, in the 2009 case 
Herring v. United States 555 U.S. 135 (2009), there is no poll specifically on this case 
before the court.  However, there were polls found on the issue discussed in the case, the 
exclusionary rule and exceptions to it, before the court ruled on its merits.   
2.3  Narrow Interest Model 
The third methodology will scrutinize the pairwise method to see if there is a 
consistency rate between what the Chamber favors for court outcomes and court 
decisions. This methodology will use both amicus briefs filed by the Chamber of 
Commerce as well as cases where the Chamber itself was a party.  The Chamber of 
Commerce was founded in 1912 as an advocacy group for American businesses.  They 
have three million members and support both large major companies such as Wal-Mart 
and smaller “Mom and Pop” stores.  While business advocacy is a large umbrella, 
business interests as represented by the Chamber are still narrow because the Chamber 
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represents and lobbies on behalf of their members (a small group compared to the general 
population) before the executive, legislative and judicial branches.  When the Chamber 
files amicus briefs supporting their constituents, evidence exists that members of the 
court and their staffs do read, pay attention to and reflect on these briefs.  There are 
several studies supporting this suggestion of the link between amicus briefs and justices’ 
votes (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997, Segal 1988, Songer and Sheehan 1993, Johnson 
2004, Caldeira and Wright 1988, Epstein 1993).   
With the data suggesting that the Supreme Court sides with the Chamber of 
Commerce when they file an amicus brief or are a party to a case, the original question 
remains:  Are the justices who side with the Chamber agreeing to something they already 
believe, or is the narrow interest view, in this case, the Chamber of Commerce, a 
roadmap for how they ought to rule in the case?   Since public opinion is often opposed to 
Chamber positions, when the court agrees with Chamber positions, it can be doing so 
against mass public opinion.  In this method, it can be identified whether the court 
decided in favor of the Chamber of Commerce and against public opinion, and by 
extension, whether the court was more consistent with narrow opinion than mass public 
opinion.   
 Amicus briefs do not represent the mass public.  As a whole, they are largely 
representative of narrow interest group opinion.  This is because amicus briefs are written 
for the benefit of a specific group rather than the mass public.  As Stephen Shapiro of the 
Supreme Court Bar asserts, "Today, organizations such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, and the AFL-CIO advocate their 
positions in nearly every Supreme Court case that impinges on their goals. To a lesser 
25 
 
extent, conservative public interest groups, such as the Mountain States Legal 
Foundation, also file amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases."
20
  Authors of amicus briefs 
generally are interested in the outcome for their specific members.  For example, while 
the mass public may be in favor of limited gun control and the National Rifle Association 
files brief on their behalf, they also do so in cases where the public may be against them.  
Their vested interest is their group and its membership first.  The fact that the public at 
large may benefit (as is the case with the ACLU) is simply a byproduct.  The mass 
public, generally unfamiliar with amicus briefs, would not be able to use this same 
communication method with the court.   
 Sometimes, narrow interest opinion makers take positions through amicus briefs 
opposed by the mass public.  The United States Chamber of Commerce is one such 
group.  It represents business interests, and while it has approval ratings hovering around 
50%, it also takes positions that the mass public often disagrees with.  In the two terms of 
2009-2011, for example, the Chamber filed briefs in eight cases and was on the winning 
side in six of them.  In those six cases, public opinion was in favor of the opposite 
position the Chamber took.  The two most notable of these cases were Lilly Ledbetter v 
Goodyear Tire Company 550 U.S. 618 (2007) and Wal-Mart v Dukes 564 U.S. ___ 
(2011)
21
 While the Ledbetter case, where the central issue concerned a women who sued 
her employer for back pay when she found out that as a manager, she was paid less than 
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 The Ledbetter case was about a woman who sued her employer for back pay when she found out that as a 
manager, she was paid less than her counterparts.  The majority ruled that the statute of limitations had 
passed and Ledbetter was unable to sue for damages.  The Wal-Mart v. Dukes case was where Patty Dukes 
attempted to make her sex discrimination part of a class action of lawsuits against Walmart.  The Court said 
that her case could not be made as such.  Both cases were decided 5-4.   
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her counterparts, was decided largely on statutory issues rather than constitutional ones, 
the minority argued that the 180 day limit on filing claims was itself wrong because 
discrimination occurs over a long period of time.  The Chamber of Commerce filed an 
amicus brief stating that Lilly Ledbetter ought not be able to sue, subsequently supported 
the Supreme Court decision, stating that the ruling "eliminates a potential wind-fall 
against employers by employees trying to dredge up stale pay claims,” and opposed a bill 
passed by the House, Senate and signed into law by the President.  Polling showed that 
sixty-six percent of Americans were in favor of the law, in stark contrast to the Chamber 
of Commerce.   
  A study by the Constitutional Accountability Center of the Chamber and 
reported on by Adam Liptak of The New York Times during the years 2005-2011 reveals 
that the Chamber of Commerce was successful either as a litigant or when it filed an 
amicus brief: 
 
The Roberts Court, which has completed five terms, ruled for business 
interests 61 percent of the time, compared with 46 percent in the last five 
years of the court led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who died in 
2005, and 42 percent by all courts since 1953.  Twenty percent of the 
cases had Chamber support through an amici filing and each one was a 
victory by the Chamber of Commerce.  Of the twenty, fifteen were 
decided by a 5-4 vote.
22
   
 
Collins (2007) suggests that amicus briefs make a “robust” difference.  He argues 
that pressure groups are effective at shaping the court’s policy outcomes and decision-
makers such as the Supreme Court can be influenced by organized interests.  Corely 
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(2008) goes a step further in suggesting that there is a connection between the language 
found in amicus briefs and the language found in majority, concurring and dissenting 
decisions.  This evidence hints at the possibility that amicus briefs are convincing enough 
to guide the court towards a decision in their favor.   There is much discussion in the 
media that some members of the court are voting with the Chamber on most or all issues.  
The consistency scores between the Chamber and some members are quite striking.  
Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas collectively voted for the Chambers 
position 74% of the time.  Justice Alito has voted consistently with the Chamber of 
Commerce 100% of the time. 
2.4 Challenges  
 The three methodologies used in this thesis each have their own set of challenges.  
Marshall (2008) found 123 direct mentions to polls or other surveys for the Rehnquist 
years.  There are only a few direct mentions thus far during the Roberts Court.  
Therefore, more coded indirect mentions need to be used.  As a result, the reading of one 
indirect mention may mean something to one person, but something else to another.  
There would be more clarity with direct mentions, but that is not currently possible.   
 The pairwise method equally can be questioned for its ability to substantially 
reflect mass opinion in the decision making of Supreme Court members.  One challenge 
is that cases are not always decided on the merits, and those cases had to be largely 
excluded.  One notable example was the case Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v Winn, 09-987 which was enticing to examine because of its First 
Amendment content.  In this case, a group of Arizona taxpayers sued based on a law, 
28 
 
which allowed tax credits for people who donated money to tuition organizations.
23
  
These organizations then would provide tuition assistance to parents who had their 
children in private or religious schools.  There was a poll done on this very case, which 
made it not only eligible for inclusion in this study, but it was exceptional in that most 
cases did not have polls that dealt with the case itself, rather they were polls that dealt 
with the issue being debated.  Despite its seemingly ideal qualities, this case was omitted 
from the study’s database as it was overturned 5-4 on a standing to sue issue rather than 
the merits of the case.  This was one of several cases that were similarly excluded.  
 Finally, there are the justices themselves, who consistently argue that they are not 
subject to public opinion.  When confronted with the idea that they are often subject to 
public opinion, they often respond negatively.   
Both O’Connor and Justice Stephen Breyer strongly resisted the suggestion by 
Larry Kramer, the dean of Stanford Law School, that the Court, self-consciously 
or not, follows popular opinion in particular cases. “We’re aware of broad 
[public] views, but to say that we read the polls is unrealistic, so the answer is 
no,” O’Connor said decisively. Kramer politely suggested that both justices were 
victims of false consciousness, noting that the empirical data about how closely 
the Court follows the public over time is too overwhelming to ignore. But, 
although O’Connor and Breyer were shocked, shocked, by the suggestion that 
they intentionally tried to mirror the views of the public, it’s true that the Court 
would be a far more centrist institution today if O’Connor were still on it.
24
 
 Another challenge with measuring the relationship between the court and mass 
public opinion is the public's relative lack of knowledge.  As Marshall (2008) pointed 
out, only half of Americans can name the country’s most significant decisions and a 
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minority of Americans can name even one justice.  Yet, the court's approval rarely falls 
below fifty percent.  Moreover, over a third of Americans polled agreed that the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions were "about right."
25
  Notably, the same poll in 2011 showed that 
thirty percent of Americans believed that the court was too liberal, in stark contrast to the 
assessment of most Supreme Court watchers.  A recent poll from a 2011 Time Magazine 
showed that only 15% of respondents followed the major decisions of the Supreme Court 
very closely.  While 54% of the respondents said that they followed the Supreme Court 
"somewhat closely", a full 30% admitted that they did not follow them closely or at all.
26
    
Further examination suggests that citizens are able to comment on the court at the 
institutional level but not able to do so at the individual level.  From 2010 with the 
confirmation of Elana Kagan being a centerpiece of the daily news cycle, 58% of 
Americans indicated that they were either not following the confirmation very closely or 
not following it at all.
27
  Sixty percent said they were either unsure or couldn't say 
whether she ought to be confirmed.  An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll illustrated that 
forty-seven percent of respondents said they did not know enough about Kagan to make a 
decision whether she ought to become a Supreme Court Justice.
28
  A National 
Constitution Center poll showed that 72% of respondents believed that the decisions of 
the court have an impact on their daily lives
29
, yet Fox News survey from June 2010 
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showed that forty percent of Americans had never heard of Kagan.
30
  A Pew Research 
Poll responded that 72% of Americans thought that President Obama's choice of justices 
was either very important or somewhat important.
31
  This demonstrates a clear disconnect 
between what Americans believe about the Supreme Court as a whole versus its 
individual parts.  They will admit that decisions coming from the court are important, but 
do not follow day-to-day events surrounding the court.   
 Despite the fact it enjoys its traditionally high approval ratings, there has been a 
recent downturn in the court's approval ratings.  Consider the chart taken from a Gallup 
Poll on approval ratings of the Supreme Court over the past several years: 
Table 2.1:  Gallup Poll of Supreme Court Approval Ratings 
Gallup Poll. Sept. 8-11, 2011. N=1,017 adults nationwide. Margin of error ± 4.           
"Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?" 
Percent approving 
 
        Approve Disapprove  Unsure          
9/8-11/11     46   40   14        
9/13-16/10 51   39   10        
8/31 - 9/2/09 61   28   11        
6/14-17/09 59   30   11        
9/8-11/08 50   39   11        
6/9-12/08 48   38   14        
9/14-16/07 51   39   10        
5/10-13/07 51   36   13        
9/7-10/06 60   32   8        
9/12-15/05 56   36   8        
6/24-26/05 42   48   10        
9/13-15/04 51   39   10        
9/8-10/03 52   38   10        
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7/7-9/03 59   33   8        
9/5-8/02 60   29   11        
9/7-10/01 58   28   14        
6/11-17/01 62   25   13        
1/10-14/01 59   34  7        
8/29 - 9/5/00 62   29   9    
 
 
With the brief exception of June of 2005, the court currently has the lowest approval 
ratings it has had since polling was conducted.  While the approval range has a median of 
55%, the 15 point drop in approval ratings since September of 2009 is notable in that the 
court has made many of its more high profile decisions during this time period.  
Moreover, the increase in disapproval ratings has also been climbing steadily during the 
same time period, from a low of 28% in 2009 to its second highest disapproval rating in 
the past eleven years in 2011.  Even in the months after the Bush v. Gore 
531 U.S. 98 (2000) decision, the court had rebounded to a 59% approval rating and a 
34% disapproval rating in the spring of 2001. 
 Chapter two is designed to explore the model that I will use to test the extent to 
which the Supreme Court reflects public opinion.  I plan to examine the words of the 
justices themselves to see if they refer to public opinion, extend Marshall's pairwise 
method to the Roberts Court between the 2005 and 2010 terms and see if the Chamber of 
Commerce's support on an issue is consistent with Roberts Court decisions.  These three 
models have challenges, most notably that cases need to be decided on the merits and that 
the court members themselves have publically claimed that they are subject to the whims 





Chapter 3:  How the Supreme Court Reflects the Popular Will 
Traditionally, the relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court has 
four streams of research.   In this chapter, I will survey these four streams in depth, and 
note why the Supreme Court even cares about public opinion at all.   Additionally, I will 
examine the role of ideology on the court within the context these four streams and see 
the extent to which the justices ever evolve in their thinking.
32
  The first stream argues 
that justices are members of the community and largely are products of the political 
process.  Assuming that they and their clerks read newspapers, listen to the news, visit the 
Internet and attend functions where opinion is meted, public opinion could have an 
impact.  This is almost a process of osmosis, where the justices are surrounded by a 
particular point of view and it seeps into decision making.  Glick (1993) has written in 
support of this view.  He argues that even with lifetime appointments, there might be a 
creeping effect of public opinion into judicial decision making.  These judges have 
children and families who are a part of the political and national conversation and 
undoubtedly share their opinions with the justices.     
The second school of thought argues that because the court often relies on the 
executive and legislative branches at federal, state, and local levels to carry out its orders, 
the court will not flow too far away from mainstream public opinion.  Dahl (1957), 
Mishler and Sheehan (1993; 1996) provide clarity on this issue.  Because the court is a 
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majoritarian institution, they argue, it needs to operate within a “zone of acceptable 
outcomes” in its decision making.
33
  If a decision is outside of this zone, public 
disapproval of the court increases.  As the public disapproval increases, pressure for 
lawmaking bodies to react increases.  As a result, reaction by the people to a Supreme 
Court decision is often reflected by pressure on Congress.  For example, with the eminent 
domain case (Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005)), this decision arguably 
fell outside the ‘zone.’  Public opinion at that time showed strong majorities generally 
opposed to the government taking private land in order to give it to another private entity 
for economic development.   As a result, Congress and several localities introduced 
legislation prohibiting localities from taking private property for economic 
development.
34
   Justice Souter’s house in New Hampshire, for example, was threatened 
by a group of advocates who disagreed with his majority vote.  While the town eventually 
voted against confiscating Souter’s residence, New Hampshire went on to pass a law 
which banned the practice of taking property for commercial development.
35
  Another 
case with this same dynamic was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. ___ (2010), where the court ruled against a prohibition on labor unions and 
corporations from making independent expenditures in elections.  The outcry has been 
palpable, with President Obama addressing the court directly in his 2010 State of the 
Union Address.  Some members of Congress, including Representative Chris Van Hollen 
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(D-MD) and Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), threatened to “rectify” this situation 
during the 2010 legislative year and every subsequent year until a new law is passed. 
The court also reflects the public when it chooses cases.  Since it self-selects, it 
often chooses ones that have both percolated up through the system and remain in the 
mainstream of public debate.  Two examples support this theory.  With eighty percent of 
people in a 1965 Gallup poll across the country approving the availability of 
contraceptives, the court overturned, in Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a 
ban on the practice.  While it could be argued that the Court simply brought Connecticut 
into line with the rest of the states, the eighty percent figure is significant in its 
robustness.  The court also appeared to be reflecting public opinion in the case of Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) where the court overturned an Idaho law that preferred men to 
women in the administration of estates.  Public opinion across the nation as measured by 
a Gallup Poll showed a vast majority of people in favor of expanding women’s rights 
(Marshall, 2000, 32).   
 The third theory of public preferences and the court is found in the nomination 
process.  Certainly the president has to take public opinion into account in his choices 
(Johnson and Roberts, 2004).  If the nominee is outside the mainstream on policy views, 
then the potential for rejection is raised.  Chief Justice Robert’s confirmation vote was 
78-22, for example, as his hearing was viewed as being relatively smooth and without 
controversy.  The Senate Judiciary Committee vote was 13-5 in favor, easily clearing the 
way for him to be confirmed by the larger body.  Three liberal members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Russell Feingold and Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin and Patrick J. 
Leahy of Vermont all voted for Roberts.  This indicated that Roberts, even though widely 
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recognized as conservative, was well within the mainstream (Hoch, 2006).  A second 
example with the opposite outcome was Robert Bork, who was defeated by the Senate 
58-42, after a contentious confirmation fight.  The conventional wisdom is that Bork was 
defeated after Senate Democrats were successful in painting Judge Bork as being outside 
this mainstream (Ogundele and Keith, 1999).  Senator Edward Kennedy took to the floor 
forty-five minutes after Bork was announced to denounce his nomination (Marshall, 
2000, 120). Because it took the Reagan administration two months to organize and 
respond, the Democrats had the advantage going into the confirmation hearings.  The 
nomination and confirmation process keeps the court within a certain parameter, in that 
more extreme nominees have a tougher time getting through the Senate Judiciary 
committee.  Most nominees who are likely to be rejected pull out of the process before 
the Judiciary committee has a chance to act.  Harriet Myers is a more recent example of 
this phenomenon.  She was unable to pass congressional scrutiny in her early meetings 
with Senators.   
A fourth line of research deals with references to the actions of state legislatures 
with regard to specific legislation.  If the majority of states, for example, were to have 
laws on gun control or execution methods, the court can and does make reference to these 
laws in their rulings.  This would reveal that justices are informed by amicus briefs, 
clerks and litigants about how the state legislatures dealt with similar issues (Peters, 
2007).  Notable examples include the juvenile death penalty, child rape laws and the 
execution of the mentally retarded.  The court overturned both laws with the majority 
opinion noting that there were so few states that had the law that it made it cruel and 
unusual and was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  References to state legislatures 
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can arguably serve as a proxy for public opinion because if enough states have the same 
law, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of people of those states support that 
legislation.  In many cases, the phrase ‘evolving standards’ is used as a surrogate term for 
a change in public opinion.     
 If state legislatures indeed act in a majoritarian fashion, does the same logic apply 
to Congress?  If Congress passes a law, to what extent does the court defer to the 
legislative branch?  The debate here is a bit clouded.  Any student of the court system 
first learns that Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) is where the court 
established the power of judicial review.  Counter to popular notions, the court actually 
invalidates very few federal laws.  It does make an effort to respect the laws passed by 
Congress (Peters, 2007).  The court in these cases serves its purpose of being a check on 
the legislative branch.  Take the case of the line item veto, a circumstance where the court 
ruled that Congress overreached by allowing the president to have this power.  A 1995 
Gallup poll showed that the majority of people who knew about the bill did support it.  
Regardless, the court rejected the law as being a violation of the separation of powers 
principle (Kline, 2000).  This judicial ‘respect’ for Congress has ebbed and flowed 
through the years.  The Warren Court was well known for the broad policies that came 
from its rulings while the Roberts Court appears to be making its opinions as narrow as 
possible in order to allow Congress to make new laws as necessary.  Both the National 
Law Journal and The Washington Post have recently run articles articulating this point.
36
  
Anecdotal evidence of these rulings includes the Voting Rights Act reauthorization 
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(Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. ___ (2009),) and 
when the court upheld the partial birth abortion ban in Nebraska (Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124 (2007)).  Many newspapers and legal blogs have referred to the Roberts 
Court as the minimalist Court (Sunstein, 2006), as the court moves incrementally by 
deferring decisions to the other branches.   
 Ultimately, public opinion is often fluid and justices try to “split the difference” as 
best they can.  A case in point comes from the Rehnquist Court.   The Rehnquist Court 
was a split-the-difference kind of court, where attempts were made at preventing the 
court from doing away with precedent while at the same time bowing to public opinion.  
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, in his piece “Rehnquist Court at Twilight” argues that in 
controversial cases, the court has a tendency to “thread the needle” between public 
opinion and in doing so, “splits the difference on contentious social issues”. The court 
was in “sync with the views of most Americans” and “in the place that most Americans 
preferred.” despite the fact that the Rehnquist Court has been called by Keck (2005), the 
most activist Supreme Court in history.  A‘twilight’ Rehnquist case highlight this 
mentality.  In Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v Bollinger 539 U.S. 
306 (2003), the court cut the case in the middle as tightly as possible.  On the one hand, 
they ended the affirmative action system at the University of Michigan, arguing that the 
point system in place was unconstitutional.  On the other, the court ruled that race could 
be used as one factor in admissions.  The outcome in the case pleased no one, and both 
sides claimed victory.  Many conservative commentators, who believed that the time was 
right to end affirmative action, decried the decision because of its split nature.  Notably, 
however, the court, with Justice O’Connor in the lead, did exactly what the American 
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people wanted them to do.  Polls taken just days before the decision was announced 
showed two contradictory attitudes.  In one, sixty percent of Americans were against 
affirmative action and in favor of merit with regard to getting into college.  However, in 
the same poll, close to eighty percent made the contradictory argument that it was 
important that college campuses have some diversity.  Neither side could claim full 
victory, but that is exactly what the people wanted.   
 The Roberts Court, especially in the last several years, is showing itself to not 
have the same “ear” towards public opinion as did the Rehnquist Court.  Indeed, the cases 
that come from the Roberts Court appear to be less splitting-the-difference.  The cases 
that the court has been deciding lately show perceptible movement especially when it 
comes to business and criminal cases.  Whereas the Rehnquist Court saw the middle 
ground to be its foundation, the Roberts Court appears to be deciding cases in a way that 
chips away at many rulings from the 1960’s.  The most recent example of this is the 
Miranda warning case of Berghuis v. Thompkins 560 U.S. 370 (2010), where the court 
ruled 5-4 that the right to remain silent must be expressly stated rather than implied after 
the Miranda warnings were given.  While it is a clarification of the Miranda warning, 
doing anything that changes Miranda is risky with regard to public opinion, as more than 
80% regard it a good procedure.  The Roberts Court’s conservatives voted in favor of the 
change while the liberals voted against it.  The ruling arguably restricts the rights of 
defendants in a way that the public would not necessarily approve of.  Contrast this 
decision with the Rehnquist decision in 2000, where the Miranda warnings were upheld 
by a 7-2 decision.  In Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the court refused 
to overturn Miranda, arguing that the warnings were both constitutional and part of the 
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national culture.  Both Kennedy and O’Connor were in a majority on Dickinson.  It has 
been widely reported by authors such as John Yoo and Kathleen Parker that Rehnquist 
joined the majority when he realized that he was going to be in the minority and he 
wanted to craft the opinion as narrowly as possible.
37
   
 So what was the difference between the two decisions?  Certainly, the cases were 
different, but more importantly, the makeup of the court was different.  In Berghuis v. 
Thompkins 560 U.S. 560 (2010), Kennedy voted to restrict the protections in Miranda.  
So what accounts for the change in attitude towards Miranda?  It is possible that he may 
not agree with the broad protections of Miranda, but was unwilling to do away with the 
law completely.  That might explain how he voted to keep it intact in one case and then 
vote to restrict it seven years later.  Or is it possible that Kennedy saw this as a middle 
ground, like O’Connor did, understanding that the public had no interest in doing away 
with Miranda?   
3.1 Why the Court Cares About Public Opinion 
 I would argue that Roberts Court follows mass public on par with other Supreme 
Courts.  The mass public is not directing what the justices ought to do from case to case, 
but the public’s preferences are reflected in both cases the court accepts and its outcomes.  
Logic suggests that decisions mirror mass public opinion in part because the Court 
desires respectability and legitimacy.  Barry Friedman writes in his book The Will of the 
People that the relationship consists on two levels.  The first level is that the court is 
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directly responsive to the public, either through appointments or through public pressure.  
The second level of this relationship is more complicated in that the public expects the 
court to disagree with them from time to time.  The public expects the court to make 
unpopular decisions from time to time.  Therefore the popularity of the Supreme Court 
exists on two levels as well.  On the one level the court’s popularity ebbs and flows with 
popular decisions that emerge.  The Bush v. Gore and Citizens United cases speak to this.  
Inevitably the court will continue to be subject to the political ups and downs.  On the 
second level, the court has a deep level of credibility that allows it to make unpopular 
decisions from time to time.  Much of that institutional credibility has been built up 
throughout history and often is combined with a lack of knowledge about the court. As 
several researchers (Caldeira and Gibson 1992) show, there exists a “reservoir of 
goodwill” towards the court.  But despite the idea that the court can turn to this good will 
when they make unpopular decisions, does the court actively seek legitimacy?  There is 
some evidence to support this assertion.  Both Souter and O’Connor were concerned 
about what the politicization of the court in Bush v. Gore 531 US 98 (2000) was going to 
mean for the court’s legitimacy, and in more recent times, Scalia and Breyer show their 
concern for legitimacy as they fight against cameras in the courtroom.   
  Another recent example of where the court appeared to be weighing legitimacy 
concerns was Newdow v. United States Congress, Elk Grove Unified School District, et 
al., 542 U.S. 1 (2004).  The case dealt with whether the phrase ‘Under God’ in the Pledge 
of Allegiance constituted a violation of church and state.  A 2003 poll from the First 
Amendment Center indicated that “68% of adults believe that teachers who include ‘one 
nation under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance were not violating the principle of 
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separation of church and state.”
38
  The same poll found that “73% of respondents said 
that the pledge, including the ‘under God’ phrase is "primarily a statement related to the 
American political tradition."
39
  On a technicality, the court allowed “Under God” to 
continue in the pledge.  Despite its dismissal on standing-to-sue grounds, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion discussing the merits of the case.
40
  In his 
opinion, he references the public’s willingness to go along with the pledge, saying,  
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge, and who have 
no access to, or concern with, such legislation or legislative history, 
"under God" might mean several different things: that God has guided 
the destiny of the United States, for example, or that the United States 
exists under God's authority. How much consideration anyone gives to 
the phrase probably varies, since the Pledge itself is a patriotic 
observance focused primarily on the flag and the Nation, and only 
secondarily on the description of the Nation. 
By referencing the millions who take the pledge every day, Rehnquist implied that they 
are willing, thereby in favor of, the continuation of the pledge in its current form.  The 
court would certainly be concerned about a loss of legitimacy if it overturned such a 
respected and valued American tradition.  To date, this issue has yet to come up before 
the court again.    
 Despite the capital that the court has built up over the years, there is some 
evidence that the reservoir might be draining a little. For many years, the Supreme court’s 
approval ratings have hovered between fifty and sixty percent, but recently, the approval 
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ratings have been slipping.  From highs in 2006 of sixty percent and sixty one percent as 
recently as 2009, the court stood between fifty one percent in 2010 and at forty six 
percent in 2011.  As Justice Roberts himself said in an interview with Jeffrey Rosen, "If 
the Court in [Chief Justice John] Marshall's era had issued decisions in important cases 
the way this Court has over the past thirty years, we would not have a Supreme Court 
today of the sort that we have." "That suggests that what the Court's been doing over the 
past thirty years has been eroding, to some extent, the capital that Marshall built up."
41
 
 As Justice Breyer noted in his book, the court’s “infirmity” shows that its 
legitimacy in the public’s eyes “cannot be taken for granted.” His pragmatic means are 
intended “to help maintain the public’s trust in the court, the public’s confidence in the 
Constitution, and the public’s commitment to the rule of law.”
42
  The court was being 
questioned in this manner before the Obamacare decision was handed down.  Adam 
Liptak of The New York Times weighed in with this:  "Should a bare majority of justices 
composed solely of the court’s Republican-appointed members strike down a Democratic 
president’s signature legislative achievement, the public perception of the court may be 
altered.”  Moreover, “… some scholars are already wondering how much damage, if any, 
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3.2 Role of Ideology 
One aspect of the relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court can 
be explored through an examination of the court members and their ideological leanings.  
While both liberal and conservative justices might be individually consistent with public 
opinion, their collective leaning can either reflect mass opinions or ignore them.  The 
Roberts Court is a good place to begin the discussion.  Chief Justice Roberts was the first 
new member on a Court that had been remarkably stable for the previous fourteen years.  
One major concern at the time was the direction that Roberts planned to take the Court.  
The just-completed Rehnquist Court was more conservative than previous ones, but it 
was not as conservative as the nominating presidents may have wanted.  In the Rehnquist 
Court, seven of the nine justices were nominated by Republican presidents, yet many 
decisions that were in conservative crosshairs ended up being protected.
44
  Members of 
conservative groups had been expecting more from the Rehnquist Court but for two 
members who voted more liberally than anticipated.  One, John Paul Stevens, has always 
claimed that he has not become more liberal but that the court has been moving to the 
right.
45
  According to Marshall’s analysis (2008), Stevens voted liberally 85% (Marshall 
2008, 79) of the time during the fourteen years of the Rehnquist Court.  David Souter, 
recently retired, was more of a surprise in that he almost instantly turned out to vote more 
with the liberal block.  He had a 71% liberal voting record, undoubtedly disappointing 
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those who wished to see the court move right.  In addition to Souter and Stevens, the 
most maddening justice for conservatives was Sandra Day O’Connor, who voted liberally 
only 41% of the time, but had a tendency to be a swing vote, voting with the 
conservatives on some issues and with the liberal bloc on others.  According to Marshall 
(2008), this was often done based on where the prevailing winds of public opinion were.  
O’Connor was astutely aware of where the country stood on many issues and voted 
accordingly.   
 With John Roberts taking over for William Rehnquist and Samuel Alito taking 
over for O’Connor, the court has begun another ever-so-slight move to the right, in spite 
of the recent election of Democrats to all levels of the federal government.  With the 
retirement of Justice O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy has moved to the center of the court.  
But where O’Connor voted 59% of the time with conservatives, Kennedy has voted 68% 
of the time conservatively (Marshall, 2008).  Moreover, when public opinion was liberal 
on a pending decision, O’Connor voted with that group 59% of time.  In the same 
circumstances, Kennedy voted with that group only 42% of the time (Marshall 2008, 78). 
This means that if Kennedy is now considered the median point, the court has moved 9% 
to the right.  In the 2008-2009 term, this rightward movement has become even more 
pronounced.  One third of the cases were decided 5-4, with Kennedy being in the 
majority in 75% in these cases.  This move to the right was reflected in the Ledbetter case 
on sex discrimination (Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)), 
the New Haven, Connecticut firefighter case (Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. ___ (2009), 
the Voting Rights Act case (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 
557 U.S. ___ (2009),) along with several others.  It is possible that if Justice O’Connor 
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was still on the court, each case might have turned out differently.  But with O’Conner 
being replaced by the more consistently conservative Alito and with Kennedy voting 
more conservative than O’Connor, the court undoubtedly yet steadily moved to the right.  
Yet, the court is also moving incrementally on purpose, students-of-the-court, such as 
Jeffrey Toobin (2007) have argued, so as to not upset public opinion.  As Iiya Shaprio of 
the Cato Institute points out in a Washington Post article, “One thing I think is going on 
is that the chief justice has a devotion to the institution of the Supreme Court, and not 
wanting to get it out on a limb in front of public opinion.”
46
  If Shapiro is correct, then the 
Roberts Court will continue to respect public opinion as did the Rehnquist Court.   
 One of the most fascinating relationships between a justice and public opinion is 
with Justice Anthony Kennedy.  He has used public opinion in his writings several times, 
most commonly in dealing with the death penalty.  As many court watchers can attest, 
Kennedy often spends his off time in Europe, and according to Toobin (2007), his legal 
views have evolved from these visits.  In particular, his references to international law in 
dealing with the death penalty have drawn both praise and scorn.   
An indication of how the court views themselves was seen in a recent interview of 
Roberts, who was discussing the most monumental case in Supreme Court history.  In 
explaining that the Dred Scott v Sanford (60 U.S. 393 (1856).) case was the most reviled, 
he argued that Roger Taney’s mistake was that he decided that since the other branches 
did not want to deal with the slavery issue, he was going to take care of it.  In attempting 
to do so, he made the situation much worse. He should have decided the case on "much 
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narrower grounds, which would have preserved the court above the fray."
47
  The “fray” to 
which Roberts refers is the political one, where public opinion has a significant and 
lasting role.  Most justices prefer to stay above politics and Justice Roberts appears to 
agree that this is how he views the court.    
3.3 Do Justices Evolve Their Thinking? 
One of the more lasting questions regarding justices is whether they have the 
ability to change with their years on the court.  In other words, is there a chance that 
justices become less ideological over the years?  Some justices have been remarkably 
consistent over the years, with recent examples being Justice Thomas, Scalia and 
Rehnquist.  Others have moved politically left over the years, including Justices Warren 
and Blackmun, who were both appointed by conservative presidents.
48
  Sandra Day 
O’Connor, John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy are three contemporary examples of 
justices who have drifted more liberally in some of their rulings.  More historical 
examples include Justices Blackmun and Powell, who were both appointed by Richard 
Nixon.  On certain issues, there is evidence of these justices’ conservative values, but 
often, on the most contentious of issues, there is also little doubt of the leftward leanings. 
This is not to say that every shift is to the left.  Those who drifted rightward over the 
years have included Byron White, Hugo Black Robert Jackson and Antonin Scalia.    
Epstein, Martin, Segal and Quinn (2007) have written about this concept of ideological 
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drift, where all justices since 1937 have either grown more conservative or liberal over 
the years.    
 What accounts for this left and right shift?  Might public opinion play a role in 
shifting a justice’s position through the years?    One theory is that justices who were 
former politicians are better in assessing where the public’s opinion is on an issue and 
whether a particular ruling is going too far.  In addition to O’Connor, another well known 
example of this phenomenon is Earl Warren, who deftly engineered court opinions while 
recognizing where the country stood.  This theory has contemporary followers in Senator 
Harry Reid, who has pined for justices who are non-judges.  "I think what we need are 
people on that bench who have been legislators, people who are lawyers, people who are 
academics. You look at our Supreme Court and all these people, all they know is working 
with people in black robes. We have got to change that."
49
  Reid and others have used this 
argument in the most recent Supreme Court nominee, Elana Kagan, who was not a judge.   
 One challenge with the politician-as-justice theory is that it tends not to explain 
drifting of justices from one end of the spectrum to another.  Rather, it only explains a 
back and forth fluxuation that a justice may have.  Several justices, however, have shifted 
from right to left.  David Souter, who had reasonably conservative track record at the 
beginning of his tenure, became more liberal over the years.  According to Epstein 
(2006), justices have a tendency to vote with the political philosophies of the presidents 
who appointed them for five to ten years.  After that, the association becomes much 
weaker, meaning that justices have a tendency to be more independent.  This 
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independence could mean more of a willingness to include other factors in their decision 
making that may not have been as important in earlier years on the court.   
 Robert Bork, who famously was rejected by the Senate in 1986, argued that 
justices “tend to drift to the left in response to elite opinion.” According to his theory, 
judges come to associate with and respond to “the intellectual class . . . dominant in, for 
example, the universities, the media, church bureaucracies, and foundation staffs.”  
According to this theory, a justice’s attitudes become “the intelligentsia’s attitude, which 
is to the cultural left of the American people.”  With regard to presidential appointments, 
“it's hard to pick the right people in the sense of those who won't change, because there 
aren't that many of them. … So you tend to get people who are wishy-washy, or who are 
unknown, and those people tend to drift to the left in response to elite opinion.
50
"    
 Journalist Dahlia Lithwick pointed out that author Max Boot tried to explain this 
by arguing that Anthony Kennedy "is no Warren or Brennan, to be sure, but whenever he 
has a chance to show the cognoscenti that he's a sensitive guy—not like that meany 
Scalia—Justice Kennedy will grab at it."
51
  Justice Silberman of the DC Court of Appeals 
called this the Greenhouse Effect, named after the New York Times reporter who 
Silberman believed some justices were trying to impress.  This theory brought out a 
rebuke from Justice Kennedy, who lashed out at the media by saying that they often 
misinterpret the “reasoning” of the court.  This theory is fundamentally based on the idea 
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that the justices like to be liked and, as Dahlia Lithwick argues, have one eye on 
history.
52
   
 A second theory espoused by Mark Tushnet of Georgetown University has to do 
with Justice Scalia, who argues that Justice Scalia’s rebukes and sometimes bitter 
opinions may drive colleagues into the liberal camp, especially Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy.  The assumption with this theory is that the opinions of Scalia are influential 
enough on a professional and personal level that the other justices are unable to come to 
their own opinions. 
 The third theory on why justices generally move more left is called the 
compassionate theory by Geoffrey Stone.
53
  The justices, as they get older, become more 
compassionate and understanding of the world around them.  As a result, their views 
change accordingly.  Stone theorizes that "[j]ustices are continually exposed to the 
injustices that exist in American society and to the effects of those injustices on real 
people. As they come more fully to understand these realities, and as they come to an 
ever-deeper appreciation of the unique role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional 
system, they become better, more compassionate justices."
54
   
 The final theory that is used to explain a leftward drift has to do with the 
confirmation process.  Scholars have pointed to this theory as explaining the swing of 
Justice Souter to the left in his years on the bench.  While most have argued that Souter 
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was a closet liberal or a stealth candidate who hid his real views before coming to the 
court, the evidence shows this to not be the case.  Indeed, in his early years on the court, 
he was a relatively reliable conservative.  His attitude started to change however, not 
because his real views were coming to the front, but because he was essentially learning 
on the job.  He did not have the judicial background that many judges had and therefore 
had less of a paper trail by which the Democrats could knock down.  In contrast, justices 
Alito, Roberts, and Sotomayor have had Congress controlled by the same party as the 
president, inevitably making their confirmation process easier.  Without the lengthy 
experience that many judges bring to the confirmation process, some have to develop 
their views while in the job.   
 This discussion of ideology is critical in two ways.  First, there is anecdotal and 
journalistic evidence that the justices do care about what others think about their views.  
It may be being part of the elite of society, being at the best parties, or a self-awareness 
about their role in society, but views are arguably shaped by outside forces.  Second, 
many justices have moved leftward and rightward along the continuum, and their votes 
change as a result.  Indeed, the evidence suggests that at least some Justices (Kennedy 
and formerly O’Connor and Souter) have changed in profound ways with their years on 
the bench.    
 In conclusion, chapter three looked at the various ways in which the Supreme 
Court reflects the popular will, including reflecting the times in which they live and 
operate, how and why the court cares about public opinion and the relationship between 
justice’s ideology and public opinion.  Ideology on the court is not stagnant, however, 
sometimes drifting left and right depending on the justice.   
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Chapter 4:  Literature on Public Opinion and the Supreme Court  
The idea that the Supreme Court follows public opinion is largely counter-
intuitive.  In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argues that the Supreme Court is 
designed to be the weakest of the three branches.  It has neither the power of the purse 
nor power of the sword.  Hamilton saw the court as an important part of the government, 
but unelected and life-term judges were necessary to prevent the other branches from 
overly influencing their decisions.  Moreover, unelected judges were an “excellent barrier 
against the ill humors or dangerous innovations of public opinion” (Marshall1989, 192).  
There is much written that argues that the court is insulated from political pressure 
(Bishin, 1977, Choper, 1980).  It is not a legislative body, nor does it have enforcement 
powers. It counts on other branches to carry out its rulings.  The lifetime appointments of 
the justices, arguably, works counter to basic democratic concepts of representative 
democracy.  This counter-majoritarian quality of the Supreme Court often troubles 
political theorists.  When it invalidates federal law, the court is obstructing the public 
will.  Who are these nine individuals who are able to sit in judgment on behalf of the 
entire nation?  “The root difficulty” according to famed political thinker Alexander 
Bickel, "is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.... [W]hen the 
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; 
it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it”
 
(Bickel, 16-
17).  The assumption that Bickel makes, of course, is that the legislatures are static and 
do not change.  One year a legislature may not be reflecting the popular will, but in 
subsequent years it might.  In this chapter, I will investigate literature on the relationship 
52 
 
between public opinion and the Supreme Court, exploring scholarship that explains how 
and why the court might be influenced or even interested by mass public opinion.  This 
chapter will also look at the scholarship on the role of amicus briefs on the Court 
members.   
Serving as a bulwark against the ‘tyranny of the majority’, however, is one of the 
major roles of the court.   Lifetime appointments are designed to insulate justices from 
the whims of public opinion.  Justices are rarely impeached (none has ever been 
removed) and are careful to remain above the political fray.  Public opinion polls of the 
court show it to be the most trusted and least political of the three branches.  As Justice 
Scalia has pointed out several times, the court does not need public opinion to do its 
constitutional duty.
55
  Justice Stevens, agreed, saying that sometimes the Supreme Court 
must ignore public opinion for the good of the country.  Moreover, while there is 
evidence that individual members respond to public preferences, the empirical record is 
mixed.  Both supporting and contradictory evidence exists (Stimson, MacKuen, and 
Erikson 1995, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).  Some scholars have examined the 
indirect evidence of mass influence (McGuire and Stimson 2004, Murphy 1964, Dahl 
1957, Gates 1987, Marshall 2008) and concluded that public opinion is not divorced from 
the court but that the influence is indirect at best.  The court needs the public’s support 
(through their elected officials) in order to keep legitimacy and enforce rulings.  If the 
public is unsupportive of the court, decisions are unenforced.  Many decisions during the 
Civil Rights movement confronted this problem.  The ruling in Brown v. Board of 
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Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decreeing that African-American children could go to 
school with white children was unenforced for years in the South.   The Court’s rulings 
were ignored by localities.  Notably, the court recognized this problem in Brown II, 
decreeing that desegregation ought to occur with ‘all deliberate speed’ rather than a set 
timetable that many were hoping.  It took up to ten years or more for some rulings to be 
enforced (Kluger, 1976, Bell, 1978).  While Gallup polling right after the decision 
showed that the vast majority (80%) of non-Southerners and (58%) of a whole were in 
support of the ruling, that support dropped to 54% support at the end of 1954.  The 
decline of support suggests that the public may have been influenced by more narrow and 
elite opinion makers.  Governors from several states including Virginia, North Carolina 
and Mississippi made passionate statements about how they would do their best to fight 
any attempt to desegregate the schools.  Senators and representatives from all around the 
South argued against desegregation.  One possibility may be that the public took cues 
from its elected officials that it was acceptable to oppose the law.   
This historical example lends credence to the argument that the Supreme Court is 
often not the most effective agent for immediate social change especially if there is a lack 
of public support for the ruling.  While the common perception is that the court is the 
arena of last resort for unpopular decisions, Rosenberg (1991) argues that the court can 
only enact social change when barriers such as a lack of enforcement are minimized.  In 
other words, Brown v. Board highlights an issue that will repeat itself throughout this 
project.  The Supreme Court needs support in other branches and amongst the people in 
order for its rulings to be effectively carried out, and thus, its legitimacy is closely tied to 
public opinion.  It was not until the integration of Central High School in Little Rock 
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Arkansas in 1957, when it became clear that federal institutions were siding with the 
Supreme Court that public opinion began once again to move in favor of desegregation.   
Segal and Spaeth (2002) contend that the court is unresponsive to public opinion.  
They point to research by Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995) and posit there is little 
evidence to support a direct association between public opinion and the court’s decisions.  
Segal and Spaeth use their well-regarded public mood index to study its longitudinal 
effects on the court.  They found over the time period 1956 to 1989, the public mood was 
irrelevant to court decisions, but that the effect was indirect and dependent on presidential 
changes to the court.  Flemming and Wood’s model (1997) finds that a 29% change in 
public opinion influences the court in the same direction by only 1%.  They declare, “by 
any reasonable interpretation, this is substantively meaningless” (Segal and Spaeth, 233). 
They declare that the relationship between public opinion and the court is spurious at 
worst and an “association” at best.    
The challenge for arguing the position that public opinion has a direct effect on 
the court is that it fails to account for societal movement or changes in the public mood.  
In other words, is the court out front of public opinion, guiding it, or did society’s opinion 
change and the court followed along?  Indeed, the court may move with public opinion, 
but not because of it.  Judges can be affected by “real-world” events but then move 
because of what they see, rather than what the public sees.  The court and the public were 
both moved by the events of 9-11, for example, and subsequent rulings may reflect new 
attitudes toward terrorism or terrorists on either side of the debate.  Which had the more 
lasting effect?  Current modeling does not provide an answer.   
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  An important consideration of any discussion of the effect of public opinion on 
the court is the fact that it does decide cases contrary to public opinion.  Most of the civil 
rights cases were decided contrary to the majority of Southern sentiment, including 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).  In both cases, the court reversed legal, majority-passed statutes and southern 
opinion.
56
  Other high profile cases where the court acted counter to majority opinion 
dealt with abortion rights and school prayer.  In Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
support for abortion (as measured by Gallup polls in 1973) was under fifty percent, but 
the court ruled to outlaw restrictive bans.
57
  And while support for prayer in public 
schools has stayed steadily above seventy percent since Engle v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 
(1962) was decided in 1962 and reaffirmed in 2005, the court has steadfastly blocked 
attempts by schools to circumvent the ban.
58
  Prayer has been denied at graduation (Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)) and at football games in Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Jane Doe 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  In both cases, the court upheld the principles 
of Engle even in the face of overwhelming public sentiment
59
.  A more recent example of 
this was the Westboro Baptist Church ruling, where the Supreme Court decided to allow 
the members of the aggressively anti-gay church to continue to protest the funerals of 
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slain servicemen.  As with Brown II, however, the court recognized that there exists the 
potential public outrage to rulings.  As almost a nod to the localities that had to deal with 
the church, Roberts’ opinion also listed several options towns had in dealing with the 
Phelps’.     
There are myriad problems in determining the relationship between public 
opinion and the Supreme Court.  The primary problem is direction; which is the 
influencing body, the public or the court?  It is probable that the relationship is reciprocal.   
In the case of Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for example, public support for first 
trimester abortions rose after the ruling.  A second challenge is measurement.  Public 
opinion polls can be skewed by several factors, including how the question is worded, 
how quickly opinion changes and the public’s knowledge about the issue in general.  
When the Supreme Court’s name is mentioned in a poll, the percent of respondents who 
agree with the court often goes up compared to a generic question on the same topic.  
Polls are reflective of public opinion on higher profile issues.  This creates a particular 
challenge when trying to make generalizations about the public impact on decisions.   It 
is difficult to differentiate whether public opinion is informed and since many issues 
before the court primarily deal with complicated legal matters, they do not measure well, 
if at all, in polls.  When more people can identify Judge Judy from television than can 
name one member of the court, expecting the public to be knowledgeable or even aware 
of highly specialized cases that come before the court is unreasonable.  It becomes 
complicated to argue that public opinion has a major impact on the overall direction of 
the court when the public may only be pay attention to one or two cases per term.  Polls 
show that much of the public is unable to name more than one or two historical cases and 
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cannot name members of the court at all.  In a 1989 survey only nine percent could 
identify William Rehnquist as the Chief Justice and less than one percent could correctly 
name John Paul Stevens as a member of the Court (Marshall, 2008, 108).   
4.1 Majoritarian Court  
 Robert Dahl (1957) is the main architect of the argument that the Court is 
majoritarian.  He posits that the court is a political institution in addition to being a 
judicial one.  He claims that because the President nominates justices, he will nominate 
only those who are generally in step with his ruling coalition.  These coalitions are 
generally center-right to center-left, but within the political mainstream.  Since the Senate 
confirms justices, the justices should not be too far out of sync with the public.  Dahl 
believes the Supreme Court is “inevitably a part of the dominant political coalition [in 
American government] and inevitably supports the major policies of the alliance” (Dahl, 
293). Because the court is part of the mainstream political system, they are invariably 
affected (albeit indirectly) by public opinion.  Dahl’s position finds support from Barnum 
(1985), Marshall (2008), and Page and Shapiro (1983), who all make the argument that, 
as a result of this mainstream approach, most of the court’s decisions are reflective of 
public opinion.   
Dahl’s stance finds additional support in Sheehan and Mishler (1993, 1996) who 
examine the prospect that the court “can and does” respond to public opinion even 
without a change in its makeup.  Their model, known as the “political adjustment 
hypothesis,” operates on the concept that the court operates effectively only when it has a 
high legitimacy factor.  They argue that shifts in public opinion do show up in the Court’s 
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decisions, although often there is a lag time, sometimes upwards of five years.  Mishler 
and Sheehan (1993) refer to this as the Dahl-Funston hypothesis (1957, 1975).  It takes 
time for shifts in public opinion to reach the presidential level, for the president to make 
changes on the court for legal challenges to legislation to make it to the Supreme Court 
and for the court to subsequently recognize a shift in public mood.  The court has a 
lasting representation of past ruling coalitions but cannot shift quickly to the impulses of 
public opinion.   
The debate over the extent to which the court acts in a majoritarian manner is 
framed by Dahl (1957), Casper (1976) and Funston (1975), the court’s role in the 
overturning of laws at the national, state and local level.  All three attest that when the 
court overturns laws, they are indirectly opposing public opinion.  The logic is that since 
the legislature directly is impacted by public opinion and represents the public’s wishes 
through elections, by overturning laws, they are in fact preventing the will of the 
majority. 
One example where it appears the court was moved by mass opinion was in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  David 
Souter, joined by Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, claimed that to overturn 
the precedent of Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) would make the court seem “political” 
and therefore “lose legitimacy.”  Being concerned with legitimacy suggests that the court 
is paying attention to the public perception.  In fact, Justice O’Connor not only made that 
statement, but also said that the court ought to be attentive to the public when faced with 
a decision to overturn precedent.  She points out that the segregation laws that were 
reversed in both Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 
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300 U.S. 379 (1937) were overturned, in part because public opinion on race relations 
had changed dramatically during that time in other parts of the country other than the 
South.  With abortion, O’Connor commented, “The Court’s power lies….  …in its 
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s 
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s laws mean and to 
declare what it demands.”
60
 Justice Scalia took O’Connor to task for making this 
argument:  “I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by the Court’s suggestion that the 
decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly 
influenced- against overruling, no less- by the substantial and continuing public 
opposition the decision has generated.”
61
 For Scalia, using public opinion as a barometer 
for maintaining a decision is a violation of court norms.  Notably, just eight years later, 
the Court decided to accept Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000), bringing up the very 
legitimacy questions that Souter et al. brought up.  Notably, in the continued face of 
public outcry over the politicalization brought about by the case, Scalia has continually 
made the comment that the country ought to “get over it.”
62
   
Another model for studying public opinion and the court is the granting of writs 
of certiorari.  On the one hand, the court is not afraid to grant certiorari on cases in which 
there are contradictory laws or rulings at the lower level. Perry (1995) is a proponent of 
this view.  The Roberts Court recently took on contradictory legislation when it agreed to 
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accept, and subsequently ruled on, the D.C. handgun ban.  The District of Columbia and 
Chicago had outlawed the ownership of handguns, yet other states such as Virginia allow 
ownership including carrying concealed weapons.  Despite the court’s willingness to take 
on some issues, it has also shied away from, made contradictory rulings, or have 
sidestepped altogether cases that are highly controversial.  Examples of cases like these 
include gay marriage and “under God” in the pledge of allegiance.
63
   
4.2 How the Court Comes to Decisions 
 One challenge with the relationship between public opinion and the Supreme 
Court is its difficult-to-quantify nature.  Decisions are tricky to measure and case studies 
are complex enough that projection is impossible.  But occasionally series of events 
transpire in sequence that suggests that outside forces are having an influence on the 
court.  The court in 2003 and 2004, for example, granted certiorari on several cases 
dealing with the “Global War on Terror”.  The most significant of these were Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Padilla v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 426 (2004) both argued 
on April 28, 2004.   In the Hamdi case, a series of unusual events occurred between oral 
arguments and the decision.  The very evening of the oral arguments, the news program 
60 Minutes II televised the now famous photos showing the abuse of the prisoners at the 
Abu Ghraib faculty in Iraq.  The subsequent media coverage was quite intense and 
negative towards the interrogators in the Army.  Only adding to the confusion was the 
previous release of June 2004 torture memo, where two Justice Department lawyers 
argued that the bar for what constituted torture was higher than what was being done at 
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Guantanamo and around the world.  Moreover, the argument went, because the war on 
terror was such a non-traditional and asymmetrical war that the executive had inherent 
powers to fight it any way he saw fit, including authorizing enhanced interrogation 
techniques.    
 Both the revelations of abuse and the torture memo were revealed after oral 
arguments, when the cases were relatively unknown, and before majority and dissenting 
decisions were released.  In a largely unpredicted move, the court ruled 6-3 that the Bush 
administration had erred in the Hamdi case.  Justice O’Connor noted that despite the 6-3 
vote, “eight of the nine justices of the Court agreed that the Executive Branch does not 
have the power to hold indefinitely a U.S. citizen without basic due process protections 
enforceable through judicial review.”  Scalia and Stevens, on opposite sides of issues 
more than 90% of the time, joined a dissenting opinions that went further than 
O’Connor’s plurality.  The dissent argued that the Bush administration really had only 
two choices when it came to the ability to hold someone indefinitely; Congress should 
either suspend the writ of habeas corpus as they have the power to do in times of invasion 
or rebellion or two, try him under normal criminal law.     
 In this case, it is certainly possible that the court would have decided against 
Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration without the negative publicity that the case 
provided.  Yet, if it is to be accepted that the court often acts within the attitudes of the 
time they are operating, it is possible that the court might have recognized the brewing 
backlash and partially ruled against the Bush Administration as a result.   Certainly this 
theory is pure speculation, but it is one feasible explanation for a surprising result.   
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4.3 Amicus Briefs, Narrow Interest Opinion and the Court 
     If the media (and cameras) potentially have an impact on the court, are there 
other such influences?  One theory worth exploring is through the submission of amicus 
briefs written by narrow and elite opinion makers on behalf of positions they endorse.  
Link (1995) showed that elite public opinion has an effect on decisions, especially in 
areas of criminal law.  As political scientist James Q. Wilson argues, “though not elected, 
judges read the same newspapers as members of Congress and thus they too are aware of 
public opinion, especially elite opinion” (2006, 314).   Public opinion is woven into 
legislation passed by Congress, actions of state legislatures or juries, and editorial pages.  
Songer and Sheehan (1993) claim that the Supreme Court actively seeks outside opinion 
on the “preferences of other actors” through the solicitation of amicus briefs from the 
Solicitor General.  Research by O’Connor and Epstein (1981), Songer and Sheehan 
(1993), Bailey, Kamoie and Maltzman (2005) and Kearney and Merrill (2000) all argue 
that briefs can have measurable impact on the court’s decisions.  
 The research on the influence of amici briefs on the court is extensive.  Among 
the scholarship includes O'Connor and Epstein (1982, 1983), Ivers and O'Connor (1987), 
Kearney and Merrill (2000), Epstein (1993), Heberlig and Spill (2000), Collins (2004), 
Songer and Sheehan (1993), Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1997).  Despite the broad consensus 
that amici briefs guide the court, there is general disagreement on the form of that 
guidance, especially with regards to the merits of any particular case.  The measurement 
of this influence is difficult to quantify effectively.  According to Collins, the most 
common method of measuring influence has been to “calculate the proportion of winning 
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litigants with amicus briefs supporting their position.”(2008, 56).  “Typically speaking, 
this is simply the number of times the litigant with amicus support prevailed divided by 
the total number of times that litigant participated in the Court.”   This method has been 
used by Morris (1987), O'Connor and Epstein (1982), Kearney and Merrill (2000), 
Rushin and O'Connor (1987), McLauchlan (2005), and Songer and Sheehan (1993).  
Collins identifies that the problematic nature of this relationship is the current model fails 
to control for ideological factors (Songer and Sheehan, 1993 and Marshall, 2008).  As a 
result, it is still unclear the extent to which the amici briefs made a difference.  
Nevertheless, this model does at least identify positions narrow interests often take. 
 These measurement challenges notwithstanding, the larger issue is the extent to 
which amici briefs represent mass opinions.  On most every level, the answer to this is 
no.  Marshall (2008) argues that there are many considerations other than mass public 
opinion to determine whether an interest group is going to pursue a brief.  These include 
the importance of the case to their particular needs, the amount of money available and 
whether or not the case has significant policy implications on the interests represented.  
Interest groups will certainly use public opinion as part of their brief if it helps support 
their position, but by and large, interest groups operate in a vacuum outside of the public 
view.   
 While interest groups often have little interest in the particular case, they may 
have a significant investment in the precedent set by the case.  Take the case of Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010).  Of the hundreds of 
amicus briefs filed on either side of the case, the push was not for the right of Citizens 
United to show the Hillary Clinton campaign documentary, but rather the long term 
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implications of ruling that the law banning corporate donations was unconstitutional.  
Certainly the issue in the case was narrowly-orientated and the amici briefs reflected that 
fact.  But while interest groups are not representing public opinion, the side they 
represent may, in fact, be supported by the mass public.  As Marshall points out (2008), 
the interest groups whose position is supported by public opinion are significantly more 
likely to win cases but only because the amici briefs and mass opinion are on the same 
side.   
 On the aggregate level, there is evidence that supports the arguments that the 
court is influenced by amicus briefs.  On the individual level, is there similar evidence 
that amicus briefs make a difference?  Scholars (Epstein and Knight 1999, Collins; 2004) 
have pointed out both that justices used amicus briefs to find out information that they 
otherwise may not research.  In addition, amicus briefs serve a similar function as 
lobbyists.  Much like lobbyists attempt to influence lawmakers’ policy choices, amicus 
briefs try to persuade a justice to their side of the law.  The challenge for amicus briefs, as 
is for lobbyists, is the extent to which they effectively sway targeted justices to deviate 
from their normal policy preferences.  In the halls of Congress, for example, the NRA 
would have a difficult time lobbying against gun control laws to liberal members of 
Congress from a city district.  In fact, the member would be unlikely to waste their time 
meeting with the NRA.  Likewise, the NRA would not invest effort lobbying against a 
lost cause.  In the same way, it is logical to argue that members of the court, while having 
the option of reading any of the briefs, are more likely to read ones that reflect their 
policy positions.   
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 Several justices have argued that amici briefs serve an important function.  During 
a speech in 2006 at the Henry Clay Foundation award ceremony, Justice O’Connor 
remarked that "the 'friends' who appear today usually file briefs calling our attention to 
points of law, policy considerations, or other points of view that the parties themselves 
have not discussed. These amicus briefs invaluably aid our decision-making process and 
often influence either the result or the reasoning of our opinions."
64
  Justice Breyer shared 
a similar sentiment in a speech in Philadelphia in 1998, “[amicus] briefs play an 
important role in educating the judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping 
make us not experts, but moderately educated lay persons, and that education helps to 
improve the quality of our decisions"
65
.  One expectation here is that the court members 
are willing to view both conservative and liberal amici in order to find out which case has 
more credibility.  In fact, there is evidence that a better argument both in amicus briefs 
and oral argument does have some weight with the members.  Spriggs and Wahlbeck 
(1997) found that briefs from the Solicitor General had more influence than other such 
briefs.  Lindquist and Klein (2006) argue that “if” members are interested in “legal” 
decisions (ones that are determined on points of law rather than policy preferences), then 
amicus briefs have the most influence.  The challenge with amicus briefs and the legal 
model is that the justices often use ideology more than legalism in order to come to 
decisions.   
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 To highlight the apparent influence of amici briefs on members of the Supreme 
Court, one needs to look no further than the University of Michigan law school 
affirmative action case of Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  Twenty-nine former 
leaders of the United States military filed an amicus brief arguing that affirmative action 
as a policy was beneficial to the advancement of individuals in all branches of the armed 
forces.  Among the two hundred plus briefs filed, clearly this one stood out amongst the 
others.  It is apparent by all sides that the brief, filed in 2003, made an impact on the 
justices.  By the time oral arguments started in April of 2003, it was clear that the justices 
had read the brief.  Justice Ginsburg demonstrated her knowledge when she asked 
Solicitor General Ted Olson whether he was aware that all of the service academies had 
racial preferences in their admission policies.  When the decision came out upholding 
affirmative action as a general policy, Justice O’Connor noted that "High-ranking retired 
officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that ... a 'highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principal 
mission to provide national security.’”
66
  The fact that O’Connor directly referred to the 
brief speaks volumes of their potential effect.  Moreover, the sheer number of amicus 
briefs filed showed its potential power.  In the Michigan cases, a record 107 amicus briefs 
were filed.  However, Corely (2008) noted that O’Connor often was an outlier when it 
came to using amicus briefs in opinions.  She was, by far, the most willing to do so.   
 As with most cases before the Supreme Court, there is generally no obvious 
evidence that the court is using amicus briefs as a guide to decision making.  However, 
there exist tantalizing anecdotes such as the aforementioned case that suggests the court 
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is looking at them.  As many scholars have found, however, it was an area of confusion 
as to whether it was an effective way of getting a message across.  As a result, the amicus 
argument is one that deserves further examination, especially as watchers of the court 
notice the increase of briefs.  As R. Reeves Anderson and Anthony Franze (2011) point 
out in their commentary on the Court, in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), the 
court "based its decision on an argument raised exclusively in an amicus brief."  Justice 
Thomas rejected this notion, noting in his dissenting opinion that departing from the 
"wise and settled general practice of this Court not to consider an issue in the first 
instance, much less one only by an amicus."
67
  In Anderson and Franze's examination of 
the 2010-2011 court, they conclude there has been, indeed an increasing number of briefs 
filed by friends of the court.  "The upward trend continued last term, with 93% of the 
cases with signed opinions including at least one amicus brief at the merits stage" 
68
 
 The Supreme Court finds itself consistently being criticized for deciding cases on 
behalf of the business community.  This critique is not without merit, especially when the 
Chamber of Commerce files an amicus brief on behalf of one political party.  A New 
York Times editorial identifies the Supreme Court as "reflexively pro-business".  One 
such study shows that when the Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief, sixty-four 
percent of the time there was at least a five justice majority voting in their favor.  While 
the makeup of four of the justices is hardly surprising--Alito, Roberts, Scalia and 
Thomas, it is more unusual to find Kennedy being in the majority sixty-seven percent of 
the time on Commerce-amicus-filed cases.  While it is not clear that the justices are 
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swayed by the brief per se, it suggests that when the Chamber files an amicus brief, they 
can be confident that they have a better than average chance of winning.   
 Jeffrey Rosen, law professor at George Washington University, noted in his piece 
about the relationship between the justices and the Chamber of Commerce that in 2007-
2008, when the Chamber filed amici briefs, they "won" 13 out of 15 cases, a winning 
percentage of 87%.  Rosen hints at the growing relationship between the court and the 
business community, 
 What should we make of the Supreme Court’s transformation? 
 Throughout its  history, the court has tended to issue opinions, in areas 
 from free speech to gender equality, that reflect or consolidate a social 
 consensus. With their pro-business jurisprudence, the justices may be 
 capturing an emerging spirit of agreement among liberal and 
 conservative elites about the value of free markets.
69
   
  
In a similar study, between 2006 and 2009, when the Chamber of Commerce filed a brief, 
they were successful 65.2% of the time.  And while remarkably consistent over the years, 
it palls in comparison to the success rates that the United States government has when it 
files an amicus brief in a business related case.  In that situation, the Supreme Court sides 
with the Solicitor General over 91% of the time.  The significance of this rate over a three 
year period hints that not only do the justices find favor when the Chamber of Commerce 
files an amicus brief, but they overwhelmingly side with business community when the 
United States also files a brief.  Notably, when the government and the Chamber had 
competing briefs supporting different sides, the government's side won over 92% of the 
time.     
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The fact that all the justices mention amici briefs in their opinions at one point or 
another further illustrates the point that they have some influence on the members.  In the 
2010-2011 term, Anderson and Franze found that the justices had between a 12% 
mention-rate (Scalia) to a 70% mention-rate (Roberts).  Certainly it is possible that court 
members are citing those briefs that support their position rather than being influenced by 
them, but it is also possible that the argument laid out in the brief may have been an 
understanding of a point of law that the Justice had not thought of themselves.  Then the 
argument becomes one of influence. 
There is a good deal of scholarship about the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and the narrow opinions found in amicus briefs, most arguing that these briefs are 
effective in position-taking and pointing out issues that the court may not have been 
aware of.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the Roberts Court is passively inviting 
more such briefs to be filed.  When Roberts mentions amici in 70% of his opinions, he is 
certainly inviting more participation in these discussions, including business interests
70
.  
Moreover the government's involvement in a case as an amicus participant almost 
guarantees a victory.  This points to the role of the Solicitor General in the relationship 
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with the court and prompts the question whether this "tenth justice"- as they are often 
known, represents mass public or narrow opinion in some fashion.
71
 
 Is there any support under the Roberts Court for the argument that the number of 
briefs filed may not be as important as who files them?  In the case of the Michigan 
Affirmative Action cases, it could be argued that the former General’s briefs were 
influential to the point where Justice O'Connor was willing to put them in her opinion.  
Indeed, noted legal scholar Jeffery Toobin has argued that this particular brief was the 
most important in Supreme Court history.
72
 Examining Graham v Florida, 560 U. S. 
____ (2010)
73
 there were high profile groups filing briefs on both sides of the debate.  For 
the petitioner wishing to reduce the sentence, there was the American Psychological 
Association and the American Bar Association in addition to various churches as well as 
the NAACP.  For the state of Florida, there were sixteen members of the House of 
Representatives as the most prominent groups. 
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 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010)
74
, there 
were also prominent groups lined up on both sides of the issue.  Senate Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Federation of 
Labor all lined up for the appellant while Senators McCain, Feingold with Former 
Representatives Shays and Meehan filed briefs on behalf of the appellee.   
 In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
75
, the petitioner briefs 
included the NAACP, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, the City of Chicago, 
the American Bar Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, all supporting the District of Columbia.  Filing against the District 
were briefs from the National Rifle Association, fifty five members of the Senate 
including the President, and two hundred fifty of the House of Representatives and thirty 
one states.  Notably, there was also a filing from eleven generals from the military 
branches.   
 From these three examples, it becomes clear that it is possible that the justices 
looking at the briefs might be indirectly influenced by who files them.  It might be easy, 
for example, for the Court members to minimize filings from members of Congress, but 
arguably less so with organizations such as the American Bar Association or the 
American Psychological Association
76
.  That being said, when fifty-five members of the 
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Senate and two hundred fifty members of the House of Representatives file a brief to 
overturn a law, that is a reasonably strong motivator as to the mindset behind Congress if 
they had the opportunity to vote on DC’s ban.  Furthermore, if members of Congress are 
willing to go on record for such an issue, it also provides strength that they are serving as 
a proxy for the American public.   
 Of course, it is logical to conclude that ideological beliefs and the law both will be 
greater factors than amicus briefs when it comes to influence on Supreme Court 
members.  However, I suspect that the number of amicus briefs and the filers will 
reinforce what the justices believe about an issue.  To the conservative justice, seeing 
most conservative leaning organizations line up on one side of an issue will reinforce 
what that member already believes about how to decide.   In conclusion, while the 
Supreme Court is insulated from public pressure, there is scholarship that argues that the 
court is responsive to both the mass public in some cases and more narrow opinions in 
others.  There are vehicles, notably amici briefs, through which organizations try and 
reach the court.  The impact of amici briefs on the court's decision making is a 
particularly robust area of study.   
 In chapter four, the heart of the relationship between the court and public opinion 
is placed in historical context, exploring the varied and abundant literature on the subject, 
some arguing that the court is responsive to public opinion, while other literature shows 
no such link.  This chapter reveals how scholarship of this kind is difficult to quantify and 
yet numerous attempts are made to link these two seemingly contradictory concepts.  
Finally in this chapter I explored the role of the amicus brief and examined the 
scholarship behind the most direct communication between the court and outside groups.  
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There is conflicting evidence here as well, where some members of the court have 
admitted that they are informative and thought provoking without being overly 
influential, yet other studies show that narrow, including elite opinions, like the kind 






















Chapter 5:  How the Public Learns About the Court 
 Chapter five examines the relationship between the Supreme Court and the media, 
and introduces the readers to the debate over cameras in the court.  The media have a 
dwindling number of exclusive court reporters, and information that comes from the 
court is sometimes misinterpreted in the desire to get the story out first.
77
  Despite the fact 
that members of the court are wary of the media, many court watches, including 
prominent members of Congress, are eager to have cameras to shed some (alleged) 
transparency on its interworkings, to the consternation of the court members.  As a 
whole, this chapter will explore the relationship between the media and the Supreme 
Court to the extent that it impacts how substantively the public understands both the court 
dynamics and the decisions that come from it.   
5.1 Role of the Media 
 Beyond examining the relationship between the court and public and narrow 
opinion, it is important to scrutinize the quality and quantity of media coverage of the 
court to determine how informed public opinion may be regarding court decisions, and its 
subsequent influence over those decisions.  Decreasing coverage may be reducing public 
awareness of court decisions, making it less likely to have an informed public opinion.  
Additionally, by self-admission, at least some justices conduct research using popular 
media websites.  Justice Kennedy has admitted that he has used the Internet on occasion 
for such research.  According to one Stanford Law Review article (Lee, 2009), 
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SCOTUSblog is apparently being read inside the Court, as IP addresses from the court 
have been seen logging on to the popular blog.  Is this a clue that public opinions (either 
narrow or mass) are directly making their way into the court?  Is modern technology 
reaching inside justices’ chambers?  The evidence does not always lend itself to empirical 
analysis, but enough may be there to propose that the public and the court are growing 
closer, thereby adding support to the contention the court generally follows the public.   
A careful examination of how the court deliberations and its subsequent decisions 
reach the public is a critical element in assessing whether public opinion might have an 
influence on the Supreme Court.  The on-going debate over cameras in the courtroom 
plays a central role in the court’s continued concern over its legitimacy and the extent to 
which the media itself introduces bias into the coverage of decisions of the court. 
Since court proceedings are not carried live and television coverage is not allowed 
in the Supreme Court, accounts filtered through media is the only avenue through which 
the public learns about the Court.  While The Washington Post, The New York Times, Los 
Angeles Times and NPR have dedicated Supreme Court reporters, the number of outlets 
which rely on pool reports and part time reporters is increasing.  The Supreme Court is 
covered the least of any of the branches, (Franklin and Kosaki 1995), and the coverage is 
incomplete and many cases are not covered at all (Ericson, 1977).   As a result, the 
relationship between the public and the court is generally limited as is the literature on 
this set of issues.  The most prominent studies (Graber 1989, Davis 1987, 1994, Slotnick 
and Segal 1998) show that the coverage is sporadic at best and not a prominent feature of 
newspapers or television programs.  Studies by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 1995) 
and Spill & Oxley, (2003), show that the coverage of the court is largely apolitical in 
76 
 
nature.  The findings are a mixed bag however.  Baird and Gangl (2006) argue that when 
the press portrays the court as acting politically, then public confidence of the institution 
goes down.  They additionally suggest that if the media consistently portrayed the court 
as being political in nature, there would be long term negative effects.  As Baird and 
Gangl (2006) themselves point out, however, there are other scholars who actually find 
the opposite results.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that the public’s disgust of 
the political side of Congress is the fact that they are so often debating in their own best 
interest.  Even if somewhat political, the court appears insulated from such charges as 
members of the court do not seek re-election or overtly act with material goals in mind. 
With newspaper and local television stations losing money, the coverage of the 
Supreme Court is generally thin.  Usually only a small fraction of its decisions is covered 
and then only superficially.  This only adds to the convoluted nature of the relationship 
between media coverage and public opinion.  In the other branches of government, for 
example, framing policy that comes from Congress or the Presidency is a time consuming 
effort often used to promote or demonize the other branches, especially if they are held 
by a rival party.  Unlike these institutions, which rely on elections and thus, public 
opinion, the court allows others to frame their decisions.  As a result, the media play an 
oversized role in telling the story coming from the court (Franklin & Kosaki, 1995).  
Some of the most covered topics on the news often deal with crime and criminal matters 
(McManus 1994, and O'Callaghan & Dukes, 1992).  And, as Slotnick and Segal argue, 
content in the coverage is often factually wrong (Slotnick & Segal, 1998).  Finally, as 
Clawson, Strine and Waltenburg (2003) argue, “mainstream media coverage of the Court 
tends to emphasize the legal basis of its decisions, and because public knowledge about 
77 
 
the Court is largely determined by the press, it stands to reason that those most 
knowledgeable are influenced by the apolitical frame.”
78
  So if the court is defined by the 
media, and the media often get the court wrong, is there any basis for concern as it relates 
to public opinion reflecting back on the court?   It is striking that the members of the 
court, interested in public legitimacy and dependent on the public for ultimately abiding 
by its rulings, (although implementation is often done by elites in other parts of the 
government and society) are so unconcerned about their portrayal in the media.  After all, 
how can the court’s decisions reflect public opinion if the relationship is so indirect?   
While it is clear, according to Lee (2008), SCOTUSblog is being read by someone inside 
the court, it is uncertain what information justices or their clerks glean from blogs.  
Ultimately, this demonstrates the narrow, and almost insular, influence of the court by 
small slice of the public. 
 Returning to the Kennedy v. Louisiana case once more, according to Lee (2008), 
the most notable aspect of this case was not the factual error made in the case, but the 
speed and intensity at which the error traveled, underscoring the marriage between 
technology and the media and its potential impact.  The fact that there are those bloggers 
or erstwhile reporters eager to fact check court decisions can only make the process more 
transparent and open.  Yet, there is a suspicion that bloggers might have a broader role 
than being relegated to fact checker.  In the age of instant communication, where the 
emphasis is on getting the story out first, bloggers are at risk for errors themselves.  
Supreme Court decisions are complicated and the ramifications not easily digested, thus 
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the potential for misreading decisions and long term implications during the rush of the 
“break the story first” mentality creates the possibility of influence based on inaccuracies.  
Bloggers and readers alike need to be aware of the potential harm that wrong information 
may bring.   
Despite concerns about the inaccuracy of information, instant blogging could 
potentially serve as a proxy for public pressure.  Ex parte communication could be used 
as a means to influence decisions in an incipient manner, given the indication there might 
be active reading of blogs inside of chambers.  It is not too farfetched for a clerk of the 
court to use a blog as a measuring stick for the general mood of the public and 
subsequently convey that sentiment to a justice.  The only justice to publically admit 
using the Internet thus far is Justice Kennedy, who said on April 12, 2005 during a House 
Appropriations Committee Hearing that he sometimes did legal research this way.  On 
some level, justices surfing the Internet for information may be a function of the age in 
which we live, the byproducts of which are not yet fully explored.   
 Legal blogs are easily accessible.  Many attorneys follow SCOTUSblog, for 
example, because of its access to its “inside-baseball” coverage and observations about 
the court.  As shown by Lee (2008), the SCOTUSblog has indisputably breached the 
court with readers inside the Court and justices themselves using information from blogs 
in their opinions.  One such example is the 2005 decision of United States v. Booker 543 
U.S. 220 (2005) where Justice Stevens referred to a document that was found on a blog.  
While the dissent was not based on the blog per se, the fact that information is so readily 
available via blogs and referenced by a justice speaks to its potential power.   
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Understanding that blogs are potentially being read has titillated members of the 
SCOTUSblog community because they could use this medium to try and influence things 
from case outcomes to cert acceptance.  And while many blogs include entries by simple 
observers of the court, there are occasions where blogs are used as a communication 
method with the court after oral arguments as seen in the Kennedy case.  Court rules, for 
example, forbid the introduction of amici briefs after oral argument but the rules are 
silent with regard to ex parte blogging by parties involved in the case.  Several lawyers 
have blogged about their experience before the court and discussed the merits of the 
arguments only hours after they were presented.   
While there may be no sinister motive in blogging about the experience, Lee 
points out, “Nonetheless, the power to potentially reach the justices with one more 
presentation of the best arguments for a side—particularly a version crafted after the 
insight that oral argument offers into the justices’ concerns—could be invaluable to 
litigants.”
79
  Communication with the court after oral arguments irrefutably violates 
norms and rules, yet a blog post falls into a gray legal area because while attorneys are 
not overtly reaching out to communicate with the court, they could use this medium often 
read by legal insiders, potentially to include court members and their staffs.  It is a 
reasonable assumption to argue that ex parte messages and other Internet-based chatter 
could find their way into chambers in the judicial purgatory between oral arguments and 
a decision, creating new court customs and allowing for an evolution in Court-public 
communication.  As members of the court become more astute with technology, blogging 
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after oral arguments and before conference could have an impact upon decision-making, 
allowing an element of the public opinion a voice in the outcome.   
Studies have clearly shown the weight of amici briefs in influencing justices, and 
while there is currently no hard evidence suggesting blogs hold the same power, the 
circumstantial evidence indicates the possibility that the blogs eventually may have serve 
as a guiding role in future justice evaluations of cases.  The court is increasingly 
populated with tech savvy law clerks, forcing the court to recognize the technology 
reality of our modern world.  Some justices have demonstratively acquiesced as both 
justices Souter and Kennedy have quoted Internet sources in their opinions.  Justice 
Thomas was a major force behind the launching of a Supreme Court website.  With four 
new justices named to the court in the last several years (Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor and 
Kagan), the court is becoming younger and has a greater awareness of the tools that the 
Internet can bring.  In fact, at her hearings, Justice Sotomayor claimed, “The Internet is 
“revolutionary” and affects all areas of the economy and society.”  As a result, the 
Internet and the corresponding legal blog world may ultimately force the court to reflect 
on the different ways in which it gathers information upon which it makes decisions.   
5.2 Cameras in the Courtroom 
 One stumbling block in the relationship between the public and the court is that so 
few decisions are publically known.  One controversial measure, which is gaining 
momentum in the court community to address this concern, is to allow cameras in the 
courtroom.  Each member of the court has weighed in on the issue.  A sampling of their 
views shows they generally are against it: 
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Anthony Kennedy:   
“Our dynamic works. The discussions that the justices have with the 
attorneys during oral arguments is a splendid dynamic. If you introduce 
cameras, it is human nature for me to suspect that one of my colleagues 
is saying something for a sound bite. Please don’t introduce that 
insidious dynamic into what is now a collegial court. Our court 
works…We teach, by having no cameras, that we are different. We are 
judged by what we write. We are judged over a much longer term. We’re 
not judged by what we say. But, all in all, I think it would destroy a 
dynamic that is now really quite a splendid one and I don’t think we 





There's a concern (among justices) about the impact of television on the 
functioning of the institution. We're going to be very careful before we 




I think there are good reasons for it and good reasons against it. The best 
reason against it is the problem that we could become a symbol since we 
are the Supreme Court, and if it was in our court, it would be in every 
court in the country, criminal cases included…When you have television 
in some, not all, criminal cases, there are risks. The risks are that the 
witness is hesitant to say exactly what he or she thinks because he knows 
the neighbors are watching. The risk might be with some jurors that they 
are afraid that they will be identified on television and thus could become 
the victims of a crime. There are risks involving what the lawyer might 
or might not be thinking…Is he influenced by that television when he 
decides what evidence to present? So what you have in me and the other 
judges, is a conservative reaction, with a small "c." We didn't create the 
Supreme Court…But we are trustees for that reputation, a reputation of 
great importance so that government will work fairly in America…And 




 Antonin Scalia: 
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"Not a chance, because we don't want to become entertainment. I think 
there's something sick about making entertainment out of other people's 
legal problems. I don't like it in the lower courts, and I don't particularly 




If the cameras are unobtrusive and are not making sound that is 
distracting, that's one thing. There is still a risk…Cameras which are 
obtrusive to oral argument so that they really do distract your attention. 





Some of these arguments are coded because justices simply do not want to be on 
television.  The justices are concerned about grandstanding by members of the court, 
members of the community playing to the camera and most significantly, reducing their 
statements from the bench to sound bite that may make the member look poor on the 
evening news.  It could also be surmised that the court is also concerned about the impact 
of public pressure that may come as a result of cameras in the courtroom.  It is notable 
that the court members, so insulated in much of their legal world, are concerned about the 
public’s view.   
 Some in the Congress are clearly for cameras in the courtroom, arguing that the 
Supreme Court should be open to more transparency.  Former Senator Arlen Spector, 
then Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said in 2006 that if the court was going to act 
like a ‘super-legislature’ in its rulings, then it ought to open itself up to the public.  “The 
public has a right to know what the Supreme Court is doing”, he argued.  The Judiciary 
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Committee passed along a bill 12-6 which would allow cameras in the courtroom for all 




 The issue of camera in the courtroom has been seen at the Supreme Court level 
before.  In 1965, the Court ruled in Estes v Texas 381 U.S. 532 (1965) that cameras in the 
courtroom had distracted jurors, judges, defendants and the witnesses and ordered a new 
trial as a result.  Yet in 1981, the Court ruled 8-0 in Chandler v Florida 449 U.S. 560 
(1981) that the media in the form of radio, TV and still photography could be used in a 
criminal trial even if the defendant objected.  They also said that the court in Estes had 
not indicated that it was unconstitutional for the media to be in courtrooms.  Moreover, 
the right of defendants to due process was not jeopardized by cameras in the courtroom.   
 While many state courts used cameras in the courtroom, the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, which oversees the federal court system, has repeatedly denied 
requests for cameras in the courtroom, arguing that they still serve as a distraction, 
diminish the dignity of the court and even risks the fairness of the trials.   Justice Thomas 
has argued that televising the oral arguments might create a security situation because 
judges may lose some anonymity and therefore be potential targets.
86
 In the wake of 
recent shootings of judges, this notion may constitute a real fear for judges.   
Justice Breyer went as far as to argue that any bill that allows cameras in the 
courtroom is a violation of separation of powers.  He stated that because the court does 
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not tell Congress how to do its job, they ought to not tell the court how to do theirs.
87
  
Ironically, this issue may become confrontational in that if Congress were to pass a law 
that forced cameras in the courtroom, the court could declare such law unconstitutional.   
 Following David Souter’s retirement announcement, there has been a 
reawakening of this issue from both lawmakers and court watchers.  After a successful 
fight to have cameras in the House of Representatives and the Senate, Brian Lamb, the 
founder and CEO of C-Span, asserted the Supreme Court will inevitably submit to the 
presence of cameras in the courtroom: “The Supreme Court and the Congress will have 
about as much luck keeping public scrutiny out of our deliberations as we would trying to 
control the wind,” he said. “It’s a public setting where the public is invited to attend. 
There is no logical distinction between opening up a public oral argument to 100 
members of the public versus 300 million.”
88
 
 There are several studies pertinent to this debate that highlights the education-
versus-entertainment argument.  One such prominent article deals with public perception 
of the branches of government and media reporting.  While the Supreme Court has 
consistently had higher approval ratings than the other branches, much of that perception 
comes from the relatively positive media attention that the court gets (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995:32).  Indeed, its general non-political rulings are by and large well 
perceived by the public.   As Vinson and Ertter (2002) point out, the Supreme Court 
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needs public support.  In the absence of public support, the other branches may be less 
inclined to carry out enforcement of its decisions.   
 In the Supreme Court case Chandler v. Florida 449 U.S. 560 (1981) the Court 
argued “at present no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient to establish 
that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect” on due 
process.  Moreover Vinson and Ertter (2002) found that media coverage, despite pressure 
for ratings, was not presented primarily as entertainment, but rather, was presented as 
news more often than not.  C-SPAN-esque coverage is what many pro-camera members 
are arguing for, with the ability for the viewers themselves to judge what is happening in 
the courtroom without much editorializing.    
  The fact that the court is currently so vehemently against cameras in the 
courtroom has raised suspicions from the other branches and the public at large, and 
elicits questions about the influence a more informed public might have over a more 
accessible and transparent Supreme Court. The argument is that the court hides behind a 
veil, shielded from broad public scrutiny, and the resulting ratings, due to the absence of 
live coverage, a luxury not afforded to any other branch of government.  A court 
preoccupied with its legitimacy as measured by public approval would fight to maintain 
the mystery.  They are unwilling to allow themselves individually or collectively to be 
delegitimized by cameras in the courtroom.  Keeping cameras out inevitably raises the 
stature of the court, where the Court remains a mystery to most people, albeit a legitimate 
and serious one.   
 What of the justices themselves?  While much of this argument has dealt with the 
public’s impact on justices, have the justices made attempts to communicate their 
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thinking to the public beyond their opinions?  Was the 2010 State of the Union exchange 
between Justice Alito and President Obama a sign of things to come or just an once-in-a-
lifetime occurrence?  "This court is probably more active in speaking outside the 
courtroom than any other court has been," said former solicitor general Gregory G. Garre. 
"The court is becoming more public."
89
  As the court becomes more open to technology 
and its capabilities, the court members themselves have also become more comfortable in 
the public arena, as the digital age has demanded more transparency.   
 In concluding chapter five, it is important to be reminded that the Supreme Court 
does not have to follow public opinion in any way.  In fact, as chapter four will highlight, 
to do so goes against the idea that the court members are, on-purpose, insulated from 
public opinion pressure with lifetime appointments.  Media reports on decisions are often 
thinly covered or not at all.  However, the combination of the traditional media with the 
Internet age has placed pressure on the court to be more media friendly.  Moreover there 
are areas where the media catches errors by the court and the court has responded.
90
  The 
court can and does ignore the cry for cameras in the courtroom, but most agree that as a 
new generation of members takes their place, cameras is a question of when rather than 
how.   
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Chapter 6: Results 
 This section deals with the results of all three models; the indirect model, the 
pairwise model and the Chamber of Commerce model.  Each model is designed to see if 
the court is reflecting public opinion in some way.  One of the models examines the 
words of the members themselves, one compares opinions to polls, while the last one 
explores business cases and their impact on the court.  The models are inconclusive but 
suggest that members of the Roberts Court may reflect public opinion when it helps their 
argument.   
6.1 Methodology 1:  Indirect Reference Model   
Completing a query search of these words in each of the majority, dissenting and 
concurrent opinions provided evidence that the court mentions public preferences from 
time to time.  When the court does this it is recognizing that the court understands where 
the public is on a matter.  The indirect model has some tantalizing results for hypothesis 
one.  There were occasions where the justices made comments that assumed that they 
were speaking on behalf of a majority of Americans.  Table 1 shows the cases where 
these references exist.   
Table 6.1  Indirect Mentions by Justice 2005-2010 
Case       Opinion Mention Author 
Morse v. Frederick     Dissenting Indirect  Stevens 
Uttecht v. Brown     Dissenting Indirect  Stevens 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission  Dissenting Indirect  Stevens 
District of Columbia v. Heller    Majority Indirect  Scalia 
       Dissenting Indirect  Stevens 
Kentucky v. King     Majority Indirect  Alito 
McDonald et al. v. City of Chicago, Illinois et al. Majority Indirect  Alito 
       Concurring Indirect  Scalia 
       Dissenting Indirect  Stevens 
Nasa v. Nelson      Concurring Indirect              Scalia 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum   Majority Indirect              Alito 
88 
 
Caperton et. Al. v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,   Majority Indirect            Kennedy 
   Dissenting Indirect            Roberts 
Graham v. Florida     Dissenting Indirect            Thomas 
Sorrell, Att. Gen. Vermont v. IMS Health Inc.  Majority Indirect            Kennedy 
       Dissenting Indirect            Kagan 
Kennedy v. Louisiana     Majority Indirect            Kennedy 
 
Several specific examples from the chart are seen below: 
In the Citizens United case, Justice Stevens wrote in dissent: 
● Our “undue influence” cases have allowed the American people to cast a wider 
net through legislative experiments designed to ensure, to some minimal extent, 
“that officeholders will decide issues . . . on the merits or the desires of their 
constituencies,” and not “according to the wishes of those who have made large 
financial contributions”—or expenditures—“valued by the officeholder.”   
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 153.63 
● Most American households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as 
mutual funds and pension plans, see Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor? 95 
Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2009), which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to 
alter particular holdings.   
● At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the 
American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from 
undermining self government since the founding, and who have fought against the 
distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of 
Theodore Roosevelt. 
● A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe 
laws are being bought and sold. 
● When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an election and hear 
only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to 
influence public policy. 
● The majority declares by fiat that the appearance of undue influence by high-
spending corporations “will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our 
democracy.” Ante, at 44. The electorate itself has consistently indicated 
otherwise, both in opinion polls, see McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 
557–558, 623–624 (DC 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.), and in the laws its 
representatives have passed, and our colleagues have no basis for elevating their 
own optimism into a tenet of constitutional law. 
 
What can be concluded by his statements?  First, it shows that Justice Stevens, while not 
expressly admitting that he is being influenced by mass public opinion, he is at least 
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reflecting on public opinion and how decisions made by the court will impact Americans.  
For example, in these statements, Stevens is playing the populist role, arguing that with 
the ruling, Americans cannot get a fair shake in the system created by Citizens United 
and lose faith in it as a result.  He is writing about the American people and their 
influence, contrasting his opinion with that of the decision.  Stevens is arguing that the 
majority was ruling in a way that was against public opinion or at least the desires of 
average citizens.  In this sense, he is indirectly using public opinion, but using it 
nonetheless.  In the last point, found in a footnote, Stevens makes his most compelling 
argument saying that the electorate is against such high spending corporations as the ones 
who would be unburdened by the majority ruling.   
 In Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. ___ (2010), a case where life sentences for 
juveniles was declared unconstitutional, Justice Thomas had a good deal to say in his 
minority opinion regarding the decision: 
● ...the Framers did not provide for the constitutionality of a particular type of 
punishment to turn on a “snapshot of American public opinion” taken at the 
moment a case is decided.   
● Although the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this 
sentencing practice, and although it would not have offended the standards that 
prevailed at the founding, the Court insists that the standards of American society 
have evolved such that the Constitution now requires its prohibition. 
● The fact that the laws of a jurisdiction permit this sentencing practice 
demonstrates, at a minimum, that the citizens of that jurisdiction find tolerable the 
possibility that a jury of their peers could impose a life-without parole sentence 
on a  juvenile whose non homicide crime is sufficiently depraved 
● The integrity of our criminal justice system depends on the ability of citizens to 
stand between the defendant and an outraged public and dispassionately 






Justice Thomas goes on to say: 
The Court has nonetheless adopted categorical rules that shield entire classes 
of offenses and offenders from the death penalty on the theory that “evolving 
standards of decency” require this result. Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court has offered assurances that these standards can be 
reliably measured by “ ‘objective indicia’ ” of “national consensus,” such as 
state and federal legislation, jury behavior, and (surprisingly, given that we 
are talking about “national” consensus) international opinion. Ante, at 10 
(quoting Roper, supra, at 563);see also ante, at 8–15, 29–31. Yet even 
assuming that is true, the Framers did not provide for the constitutionality of 
a particular type of punishment to turn on a “snapshot of American public 
opinion” taken at the moment a case is decided. Roper, supra, at 629 
(SCALIA, J., dissenting). By holding otherwise, the Court pretermits in all 
but one direction the evolution of the standards it describes, thus“ calling a 
constitutional halt to what may well be a pendulum swing in social attitudes,” 
 
In his opinion, Justice Thomas both uses public opinion and derides his colleagues for 
using it at the same time.  At times he makes the case that the founders would have not 
had a problem with life sentences for juveniles despite the snapshot of public opinion 
which he argues is the basis of this decision. Several paragraphs later, Thomas makes the 
case that the reason that the practice remained because citizens are tolerant of juries who 
give these sorts of punishments.   
 The Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. ___ (2010) case highlights a common thread in 
the indirect mention model.  Most justices will use such justification when it fits their 
argument.  In Citizens United, Thomas voted with the majority who, according to 
Stevens, were thwarting the will of the majority.  Thomas appears to be interested in the 
majority (of people) in Graham yet disagrees with them in Citizens United.   
 Probably the most prominent example of where public opinion has been used to 
justify decisions of the court appeared in the gun cases.  Gun cases are among the most 
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well-known that the Supreme Court has dealt with through the years and polls quite well.  
A recent example of such polling includes the following: 
 




Copyright © 2011 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. The content is used with permission; however, Gallup 
retains all rights of republication. 
 
Seventy-three percent of respondents agreed that handguns should not be banned.  As far 
as public opinion goes, this position is relatively strong.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
refers to public opinion in gun cases more than any other and the gun cases specifically 
bring out the vitriol in majority and dissenting opinions.   
Majority Opinion by Justice Alito in McDonald v. Chicago (561 U.S._(2010), 
● (noted that handguns are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] 
lawful purpose” of self-defense)  
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● (“[T]he American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential 
self-defense weapon”).  Thus, we concluded, citizens must be permitted “to use 
[handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” 
● Municipal respondents point out—quite correctly—that conditions and problems 
differ from locality to locality and that citizens in different jurisdictions have 
divergent views on the issue of gun control.  Municipal respondents therefore 
urge us to allow state and local governments to enact any gun control law that 
they deem to be reasonable, including a complete ban on the possession of 
handguns in the home for self-defense.  
● If, as petitioners believe, their safety and the safety of other law-abiding members 
of the community would be enhanced by the possession of handguns in the home 
for self-defense, then the Second Amendment right protects the rights of 
minorities and other residents of high-crime areas whose needs are not being met 
by elected public officials. 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia –  
● Even though he does “not doubt for a moment that many Americans . . . see 
[firearms] as critical to their way of life as well as to their security,” 
 
From the dissenting opinion: 
Justice Stevens: 
● Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that, if anything, American 
lawmakers tend to under regulate guns, relative to the policy views expressed by 
majorities in opinion polls. 
 
● The Court hinges its entire decision on one mode of intellectual history, culling 
selected pronouncements and enactments from the 18th and 19th centuries to 
ascertain what Americans thought about firearms. 
 
● In considering whether to keep a handgun, heads of households must ask 
themselves whether the desired safety benefits outweigh the risks of deliberate or 
accidental misuse that may result in death or serious injury, not only to residents 
of the home but to others as well.  Millions of Americans have answered this 
question in the affirmative, not infrequently because they believe they have an 
inalienable right to do so—because they consider it an aspect of “the supreme 




Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer –  
● Moreover, every State regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is 
sharply divided on the appropriate level of regulation. 
● A citizens committee spent months gathering information about handguns.  Id., at 
21.  It secured 6,000 signatures from community residents in support of a ban.  
Id.,  at 21–22.  And the village board enacted a ban into law.  Id., at 22. 
 
In both DC v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, the justices tugged back and forth on 
what Americans believed about guns and gun control.  Writing that Americans (or 
citizens) were in favor or against gun control was used prominently and liberally 
throughout the decisions.  The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the justices saw 
it as important to put what Americans 'considered', 'expressed', 'ask-themselves' or 'chose' 
into their opinion to bolster their case.  Clearly the majority (and those agreeing with the 
majority) are using the sixty-one percent as leverage for their argument.  I find it notable 
that Justice Scalia is particularly vehement in his defense of guns, especially as he has 
said time and time again that public opinion has little value in Supreme Court decisions.   
The justices rarely use the term 'public opinion' or 'survey' in their opinions.  I would 
suggest that the reason is that the members of the Court do not wish to appear political or 
overtly following public opinion, yet when it is convenient, justices do manage, as seen 
above, to get it into their opinions.  
 Starting in Chief Roberts first term of 2005-2006, there were seventeen majority, 
concurring or dissenting opinions where the Court was inferring public opinion (often in 
more than one place). In Marshall’s 2008 analysis, such indirect mentions are not used, 
but with the smaller sample size, combined with the fact that indirect mentions have 
value, leads me to include them in the analysis.  The scope of these “mentions”, are wide 
ranging and the justices of all ideological stripes use them.  A typical example beyond 
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what was earlier presented comes from a dissenting opinion in a 2007 case of Morse et al 
v. Fredrick, the “Bong Hits for Jesus” cases, where the court ruled that the school 
principal did not violate the First Amendment in snatching the banner from the student 
and preventing it from being shown.  Chief Roberts wrote that since the banner argued 
for the use of an illegal activity, it was not a violation of free speech to remove it.  Justice 
Stevens countered that the use of marijuana is being done by thousands of otherwise law 
abiding citizens and that public opinion is evolving on this issue much like it did on 
alcohol prohibition: “The ensuing change in public opinion occurred much more slowly 
than the relatively rapid shift in Americans views on the Vietnam War, and progressed on 
a state-by-state basis over a period of many years.”  In this case, Justice Stevens does not 
use public opinion as a direct rationale for his decision, but rather uses it in a supportive 
role, suggesting that as public opinion moves toward the legalization of marijuana, the 
majority decision would no longer be valid because it would not be advocating an illegal 
activity.  Mentions such as this are critical in exploring the relationship between the court 
and public opinion.  I found that Justice Stevens had the most direct mentions with six, 
while each of the others had lesser amounts.  The chart below highlights the number of 
instances:   
Table 6.2  Number of Opinions where Indirect Mentions Were Made by Justice, 
2005-2010 
 
Justice   Number of Opinions  
 
Stevens   5 
Alito    3 
Scalia     3 
Kennedy    3 
Roberts   1 
Kagan    1 




What might account for Justice Stevens’ use of public opinion, when he had many fewer 
mentions in the years prior to the Roberts Court?
92
  In five separate opinions Stevens felt 
comfortable speaking on behalf of Americans, especially in his dissenting opinions.  The 
forcefulness of his dissenting opinions often claimed that the majority was wrong.  An 
example of the forcefulness of Stevens’ positions in seen in Uttecht v. Brown 551 U.S. 1 
(2007), where in his first sentence, he states "Millions of Americans are against the death 
penalty."  He goes on to say in the next sentence, "A cross section of virtually every 
community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust 
but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases.”  The references 
are indirect, yet helpful in Stevens’ attempt to show that public opinion is on his side.  
Taken as a whole, the indirect mention model is one that lends itself to the argument that 
the court members, who themselves may reject that public opinion plays a role in their 
deliberations, do look at how Americans feel about certain issues.  And while they are not 
mentioning polls or surveys per se, they do speak on behalf of all citizens at times and 
show repeatedly they are reflecting on public opinion.    
 In examining the data, it becomes clear that the types of cases and the potential 
robustness of the public opinion may make a difference whether it is going to be used in 
an opinion.  It is likely that the cases which have indirect public opinion mentions are 
high profile, where the public has weighed in strongly on one side or the other.  It is 
reasonable to assume that issues which these cases discuss need to be prominent ones, 
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otherwise mentioning public opinion will have little bearing.  In order to test this theory, 
the following table highlights the issues the cases discussed. 
Table 6.3  Number of Indirect Mentions by Issue 
Issue        Number of Mentions 
Gun Control Cases      5 
First Amendment       5 
Death Penalty       3    
  
 Not surprisingly, the most media-covered cases are the ones that received the 
most mentions.  It is certainly possible that the data cannot be extended to the court as a 
whole because of the particular times in which cases appear.  The type of case can 
determine whether the members will use public opinion.  The predictability of this model, 
therefore, is limited by the cases.  It is possible that in any given year that the court 
members will not mention public opinion either directly or indirectly.   
6.2 Methodology 2:  The Pairwise Method 
 The second methodology employed involved a poll to decision match.  Using this 
method, I discovered that the Supreme Court reflected public opinion more than sixty-
three percent of the time.  In other words, the Supreme Court’s decisions were consistent 
with mass public opinion (when decisions were granted on the merits of the case), over 
sixty-three percent of the time.  Finding polls that matched decisions of the court proved 
tricky, and many potential polls were not used because they were found to be 
unscientific.  Moreover, the small sample size proved problematic with regard to any 
overarching conclusions.  As is stands, between the 2005 and 2010 terms, there were 
sixty-three matches made.  Some matches were easy to make and had several polls 
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attached to them.  In those cases, I usually looked at several to ensure that they were 
consistent.  The most vexing problem was when the wording of the question led to 
contradictory answers.  One such example was finding polls dealing with the Citizens 
United case.  When the question asked “should corporations be allowed to donate to 
political campaigns”, the number of negative responses was usually well over fifty 
percent.  But when the question asked, “Should corporations have the right to free speech 
as it relates to political campaigns”, the positive respondents were also well over fifty 
percent.  In these cases, I usually tried to see if the majority of polls indicated support one 
way or another or I coded the case as undetermined and left out the match altogether.  In 
the Citizens United example, most polls were inconsistent with the ruling when the poll 
asked about the case itself.   
 In the cases that were matched, it appears that the court is continuing the 
Rehnquist tradition of reflecting public opinion.  The most reasonable explanation is that 
the Chief Justice was helping keep the court within the mainstream of public opinion.  
While he is only one vote, when he is in the majority, his ability to influence opinions 
through the assigning of opinions allows him to keep some control over what the majority 
or minority is saying.  The fact that Roberts has been in the majority over ninety percent 
of the time during this five year span speaks to this power.  A second explanation is with 
Anthony Kennedy being the court’s center; he is finding his way as the median and swing 
jurist.  Perhaps, like O’Connor before him, he is showing the ability and desire to read the 
“tea leaves” of public opinion. 
 A note of caution is warranted comparing these findings to those of Marshall.  
First, with sixty three matches, it is almost half of the number examined by Marshall in 
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only five years.  I would suspect this is due to the proliferation of polls, but since it is 
only half the number Marshall compared; perhaps the Roberts Court will be less 
reflective of public opinion in the next nine years.  Second, a more accurate comparison 
between the fourteen years of each court might yield similar or very different results.   
 In examining the Roberts Court in its early years, one pattern has emerged; the 
court has ruled on behalf of business interests.  In thirteen cases, the justices ruled the 
same way that the Chamber of Commerce ruled the case a success on their litigation 
website.  Decisions that fell this way include Citizens United, the Lilly Ledbetter case and 
the Dukes case.
93
  These three cases were high profile and polling was found to be 
inconsistent with the majority decision.  This is not to say that every business case was 
found to be inconsistent with public opinion, but several high profile ones were.   Both 
the Citizens United case and Wal-Mart vs. Dukes were 5-4 decisions that had many in the 
media proclaiming that the court was currying favor with the business community.  And 
despite that accusation, the court has continued that trend of favoring business interests 
over those of the mass public.   
 The area where the court continues to be most in line with the public is with 
criminal cases, specifically with the Fourth Amendment.  There were 18 cases dealing 
with one or more aspects of privacy and the court agreed with public opinion more than 
85% of the time.  I would suspect that the court is extremely reticent in restricting these 
rights, knowing that the outcry would be palpable and potentially de-legitimizing.  Recent 
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examples of cases like this include Miranda warning laws that have stood since the 
1960’s.
94
   
In the pairwise method, I discovered that the Supreme Court has decreased its 
consistency rate with the public since the time of the Rehnquist Court.  In its first five 
years, the court has an overall rate of 63.49% consistency with public opinion, slightly 
lower than the 66% of the Rehnquist Court.    In the 63 cases where the outcome was 
decided on the merits, and with  cases in which polls could be identified, there were 40 
determined to be consistent and 23 deemed inconsistent.  The macro breakdown is seen 
in the following chart:   
Table 6.4  Supreme Court Percentage Consistent with Public Opinion 
Year           Percentage Consistent with Public Opinion   N      Percent of Total Cases 
2005-2006    73.33%  15  17.6% 
2006-2007    66.67%  9  12.0% 
2007-2008    60.00%  10  13.7% 
2008-2009    80.00%  10    12.0% 
2009-2010    66.67%  6  6.5% 
2010-2011    38.46%  13            15.29% 
Overall Percentage:   63.49%  63          12.85%
95
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percentage of total cases decided in that term is large enough.  The Percent of Total Cases column is a list 




The cases examined that were matched up with polls are listed below with the split by 
case: 
Table 6.5  Cases with Decisions and Consistency Rates 
Case           Decision       Consistent/ Inconsistent    Term  
Hamden v Rumsfeld 5  3 Inconsistent 2005 
Garcetti v. Ceballos 5 4 Inconsistent 2005 
Jones v. Flowers 5  3 
 
Consistent 2005 
Day v. McDonough 5  4 Consistent 2005 
Holmes v South Carolina 9 0 
 
Consistent 2005 
Brigham City v. Stuart  9 0 Consistent 2005 
Hudson v Michigan 5 4 Inconsistent 2005 
Oregon v. Guzek 9 0 Consistent 2005 
United States v Grubbs 8 0 Consistent 2005 
Zedner v. United States 9 0 Consistent 2005 
Davis v. Washington 9 0 Consistent 2005 
Burlington Northern v. White 9 0 Consistent 2005 
Kansas v. Marsh 5 4 
 
Consistent 2005 
Gonzales v Ocentro  8  0  Consistent  2005 
House v Bell 5 4 Inconsistent  2005 
     Gonzales v. Carhart 5  4 
 
Consistent 2006 
Brendlin v. California 9 0 
 
Consistent 2006 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life 5 4 
 
Inconsistent 2006 
Scott v Harris 8  1 
 
Consistent 2006 
Morse v. Frederick 5 4 
 
Consistent 2006 
Philip Morris v. Williams 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2006 
Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 5  4 
 
Consistent 2006 
Panetti v. Quarterman 5  4 Consistent    2006 
Ledbetter v Goodyear 5 4 
 
Inconsistent 2006 
     
                                                                                                                                                 
percentage of the whole yet, not small when compared to the number of cases that are either in the media or 
attached to a poll.   
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Kimbrough v United States  7  2 
 
Consistent 2007 
DC v. Heller 5  4 Consistent     2007 
Kennedy v. Louisiana 5  4 Inconsistent     2007 
US v Williams 7 2 
 
Consistent 2007 
Munaf v. Green     9 0 
 
Inconsistent 2007 
Snyder v. Louisiana 8 1 
 
Consistent 2007 
Baze v. Rees 7 2 
 
Consistent 2007 
Crawford v. Marion County 6 3 
 
Consistent 2007 
Boumediene v. Bush 5 4 
 
Inconsistent 2007 
Exxon Shipping v. Baker 5  3 
 
Inconsistent 2007 
     District Attorney's Office v. 
Osborne 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2008 
Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum 9 0 
 
Consistent  2008 
Ricci v. DeStefano 5  4 Consistent     2008 
Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District No. 1 v. Holder 8  1 Consistent     2008 
Federal Communications 
Commission v. Fox Television 
Stations 5 4 Consistent     2008 




Massachusetts 5  4 
 
Consistent 2008 
Herring v. United States 5 4  
 
Inconsistent 2008 
Safford Unified School District 
v. Redding 8  1 Consistent     2008 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 5  4 
 
Consistent  2008 
     Sullivan v Florida, Graham v 
Florida 6  3 Consistent      2009 
Citizens United v. FEC 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2009 
McDonald v. Chicago 5  4 Consistent     2009 
Salazar v Buono 5  4 
 
Consistent 2009 
Padilla v Kentucky 7  2 
 
Consistent 2009 
US v Stevens 8  1 Inconsistent     2009 
     
     Abbott v. United States 8 0 
 
Consistent 2010 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth 6  2 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
Michigan v. Bryant 6  2 
 
Consistent 2010 
Snyder v. Phelps 8 1  
 
Consistent 2010 
Connick v. Thompson 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
Brown v. Plata 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association 7  2 
 
Inconsistent 2010 





Pliva v. Mensing 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
Walmart v. Dukes 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
ATT v. Conception 5  4 
 
Inconsistent 2010 
Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting 5  3 
 
Consistent 2010 




Note:  Of the twelve cases that were highlighted in the indirect mention model, seven 
were also included in the pairwise model.   
 The highest rate of consistency with public opinion was 80% seen in the 2008 
term, where eight out of ten cases were decided consistently with public opinion.  Cases 
that were argued and decided in that term included two cases on the first amendment 
(Pleasant Grove City v. Summun and FCC v. Fox), three cases concerning criminal issues 
(Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Herring v. United States and Safford Unified School 
District v. Redding), one death penalty case (Harbison v Bell), one Affirmative Action 
case (Ricci v. DeStefano) and one terror case (Ashcroft v. Iqbal).  Several of these cases 
registered quite strongly in public opinion polls, notably Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, where over 80% of people polled before the case was argued agreed with the 
court’s eventual reasoning that not every religious group has a right to put their creeds in 
the town square.
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  The second case which registered quite robustly was the Ricci v. 
DeStefano case, a high profile decision about the rights of white firefighters who believed 
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that they had been denied a promotion because the city of New Haven Connecticut 
believed that the test was racist.
97
   
 Was there anything particular about the justices that year that might give a clue as 
to the high consistency rate?  If anything, 2008 was the fourth straight year of high 
consistency rates for the Roberts Court so it is unlikely that any pattern could be found 
there.  Most likely, the small number of cases makes the comparison tricky.   
Interestingly, there was not a great deal of agreement on the court during that term in the 
paired cases, with six 5-4 splits, one 7-2, two 8-1 and one 9-0 cases amongst those 
studied. 
The other year that clearly jumps out over the others is the 2010-2011 term, where 
the justices only had a 38.46% consistency rate with public opinion.  This means that the 
Supreme Court was inconsistent with public opinion over sixty-one percent of the time.  
One question to consider is whether this latest year was simply an outlier or something 
more tangible.  Taking the 2010 term out of the aggregate calculations yields a 71% 
consistency rate with public opinion, higher than the average during the Rehnquist years.  
This relative drop between the years 2005 and 2010 indicates, I would presuppose, that 
the Roberts Court is now comfortable with taking the court in a direction that may be 
more independent of public opinion.  Consider this data from SCOTUSblog, noting the 
direction that the court is heading.   
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Year  Conservative Direction Consistency Rate 
 
2005  45%    73.33%    
2006    54%    66.67%    
2007    33%    60.00%    
2008    48%     80.00%    
2009  50%    66.67%   
2010  63%    38.46%    
 
The percent of decisions that went in a conservative direction hovered roughly around 
50% between 2005 and 2009 (2007 notwithstanding) while the percent of conservative 
decisions jumped 13% in one year and 30% since 2007.   
The trend suggests that when the court is consistent with public opinion, the court 
is relatively moderate, that is, deciding cases in roughly an equal number of liberal and 
conservative decisions.  However, it also becomes clear that in 2007, when the court 
decided cases more liberally, they were being relatively inconsistent with public opinion 
compared to other years (although still at 60%).  Likewise, in 2010, the court moved 
more dramatically in the conservative direction and the consistency rate changed as well.  
These results suggest that the public is showing that it is ideologically moderate in most 
situations.
99
   
It is possible that this model is showing the consistency rate with public opinion 
decreasing as the Roberts Court gets older.  The term that finished in 2011 shows the 
lowest consistency rate in the six years examined, even though it is currently an outlier.  
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It can be argued, in the words of the New York Times, that “after four new members in 
five years, the court has entered a period of stability.
100
”  Is it possible that Roberts has 
now found its comfort zone, far more willing to go against public opinion than in 
previous years?  Perhaps the Roberts Court and John Roberts as Chief Justice in 
particular, is becoming increasingly comfortable with making decisions that may be 
inconsistent and potentially unpopular with the public. Perhaps the consistency rate has 
been impacted by several new appointments.  What might new justices bring to the court?  
Consider the following table with the court membership listed: 
Table 6.7.  Rates of Consistency Compared to Court Makeup 
 
Year    Members     Percent Consistent 
2005-2006  Stevens, Scalia, Roberts, Souter   73.33% 
   O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
2006-2007  Stevens, Alito, Roberts, Souter   66.67% 
   Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
2007-2008  Stevens, Alito, Roberts, Souter   60.00% 
   Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
2008-2009  Stevens, Alito, Roberts, Souter   80.00% 
   Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
2009-2010  Stevens, Alito, Roberts, Sotomayor   66.67% 
   Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
2010-2011  Kagan, Alito, Roberts, Sotomayor   38.46% 
   Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 
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Further study might reveal if the new members of the court are moving the court either 
away from or closer to public opinion.  The current data hint at the new members pushing 
the court away from public opinion rather than towards it, but it is still too early to 
determine that conclusively.  Of course, the nature of the cases has an important impact 
on this piece of the puzzle as well.   
Table 6.8   Each Justice Consistency Rates Between Terms 2005-2010. 
Consistency rate with public opinion: 
 
Notes:  Kagan began her first term in the 2010 term, and Sonia Sotomayor began hers in 2009.  






Justice Roberts Kennedy  Ginsburg Stevens  Breyer Scalia Alito Thomas Souter 
Term 
2005 80 66.67 80 73.3 73.3 66.67 72.7 66.67 80 
2006 55.5 66.67 66.67 55.55 66.67 66.67 55.55 66.67 55.55 
2007    80  60  30   60   50   70 77.78   60    20 
2008    70  70    60   60   60   70   60   60   70 
  2009 50 66.67 50 50 50 33.33 66.67 33.33 SS  50 
2010 46.15 38.46 78.60 EK 76.9 75.00 38.46 38.46 53.85   SS  76.92 
Average 63.61 61.41 60.88 59.77 
 
62.49 57.52 61.86 54.18 56.39 
      EK76.9                                                                SS 63.46 
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Ranking the justices by agreement rate reveals the following: 
Table 6.9  Percentage Agreement with Public Opinion by Justice.   
Justice   Percent Agreement    N 
 
Kagan   76.9%      8 
Sotomayor  63.46%     19 
Roberts  63.61%     62 
Breyer   62.49%     63 
Alito   61.86%     58 
Kennedy  61.41%     63 
Ginsburg  60.88%     63 
Stevens  59.77%     51 
Scalia   57.52%     63 
Souter   56.39%     44 
Thomas  54.18%     63 
 
Kagan’s percentage is the highest, but is only based on eight cases.  Her percentage will 
undoubtedly go down as she rules on more cases.  Chances are Sotomayor’s rates will be 
reduced to around the sixty percent mark similar to justices with longer terms on the 
court.  Of the top four justices consistent with the court, three of them (Roberts, Kagan 
and Sotomayor) are all new to the court and four of the top six consistent justices have 
been on the court six years or less (as of 2011).  While only six years of data have 
rendered these conclusions inconclusive, it still remains probable that the Supreme Court 
will remain consistent with public opinion even as more cases get added to the list.     
  6.3 Year by Year Analysis of the Court Members 
Justice Roberts 
 Justice Roberts year by year analysis reveals that the Chief Justice had one of the 
more inconsistent years on the court, starting with an 80% consistency rate, dropping to a 
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55.5% consistency rate in year two, then moving to an 80% rate in year three and a 70% 
rate in year four, then dropping to 50% again before becoming 46.15% rate in his sixth 
year.   Is there anything to be gathered by the up and down nature of his consistency rate?  
More importantly, is the fact that he had an average 48% consistency rate in the 2009 and 
2010 terms an indicator of anything?  It is reasonable to argue that Roberts 80% approval 
rating and the 71.37% average in his first four years is a function of his newness to the 
court, perhaps combined with the selection of non-controversial cases.  And while 
Roberts likely did not take public opinion into account directly when he decided or took 
cases, it is possible that he was aware, that as new Chief Justice, public legitimacy was 
important and getting too in front of public opinion too early in his term might hurt his 
legitimacy.  The more recent incarnation of Justice Roberts perhaps shows a justice more 
willing to buck public opinion or at least take on more controversial cases that might 
force him to be less in line with public opinion.  Finally, John Roberts is a conservative 
and is showing a willingness to go along with conservatives on issues, even if the 
decisions are against public opinion.  Perhaps his ideology is showing now that he is 
more comfortable in his shoes. 
Roberts’ Martin Quinn scores have borne this out about Roberts, consistently 
showing that Roberts is conservative, although less so than Rehnquist was in his first 
term as Chief Justice.
101
  Since 2005, he has consistently become more conservative, 
despite several high profile defections from the conservative side of the political 
spectrum.  Consider his Martin-Quinn scores from the 2005 to 2010 terms.   
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Table 6.10  Justice Roberts Martin-Quinn Scores, 2005-2010
102
 
2005  1.815    
2006  1.899    
2007  1.99    
2008  2.165    
2009  2.287    
2010  2.497    
With the exception of the 2009 to 2010 term, the Martin-Quinn scores show Roberts 
becoming more conservative since his confirmation.  Comparing the Martin-Quinn scores 
with the public opinion agreement scores gives this result: 
Table  6.11  Comparison Between Chief Robert’s Martin-Quinn Scores and Public 
Opinion Agreement 
Year  MQ Score  Agreement Percent 
2005  1.815   80 
2006  1.899   55.5 
2007  1.99   80 
2008  2.165   70 
2009  2.287   50 
2010  2.497   46.15 
While there are some subtle differences between the two sets of scores, most notably 
between 2006 and 2008, where Roberts went up in 2007 and down in 2008 but continued 
to be conservative in the MQ scores, the overall trend is that as Roberts becomes more 
conservative, the less agreement there is between his votes and agreement with public 
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opinion.  This relationship is statistically significant at the <.05 level and shows a 
correlation of -.69, meaning that as he votes more conservatively, he has been less in 
agreement with public opinion.  This data reveals that as time has gone on, Roberts has 
voted more conservatively and that his votes have moved him away from public opinion, 
at least for the votes examined in this method. 
As commented on by Nate Silver of The New York Times, “although Chief Justice 
Roberts is not especially more conservative than Chief Justice Rehnquist under their (the 
Martin Quinn score) system, chief justices can sometimes exert an overall pull on the 
court based on the way they manage it, and this may be one of those cases.”
103
  In 2009 
and 2010, Roberts dissented only twice in the pairwise model, siding with the 
conservatives in Brown v. Plata and Sullivan v. Graham.  These two years provided a 
large swath of business cases where Roberts sided with business interests over the 
individual (Pliva v. Mensing, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes and ATT v. 
Conception), the state over the criminal (Connick v. Thompson) and protecting free 
speech (Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, United States v. Stevens and 
Citizens United v. FCC).  Those are generally the votes of a conservative and perhaps 
Justice Roberts is just more comfortable with his role.  Overall, and in spite of the last 
two terms studied, Chief Justice Roberts has one of the highest consistency rates amongst 
all the justices.   
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 Anthony Kennedy had a very consistent six year span during the years studied.  
He had a 66.67% consistency rate for three of the six years, a 50% and 70% rate, and 
most recently, a 38.46% rate during the 2010 term.  The average rate of 66% without the 
2010 term included is higher than his Rehnquist-years rate of 60%.  His consistency rate 
during the 2010 term was identical to that of Roberts with the exception of his vote in 
Brown v. Plata, in which Kennedy joined his liberal colleagues in voting to forcibly 
reduce the prison population of California.  In all the other cases in 2010, Kennedy voted 
with his more conservative colleagues, but largely against public opinion.  It was the only 
criminal case in that term in which Kennedy voted against public opinion.  Kennedy 
voted with business interest in each of the five business cases that term, three of which 
were against public opinion.  Similar to many other members, Justice Kennedy’s 
consistency rate is well within established norms.   
 After examining Justice Kennedy’s voting records and comparing it to public 
opinion, two things are clear.  First, he is in majority much of the time, more than 96% of 
the time in this model (61 out of 63 cases).  Second, with a public opinion consistency 
rate of 61%, he is less inclined to go with public opinion on cases than Sandra Day 
O’Connor was during her tenure.  Despite his relative high consistency rate, he is only 
middle-of-the-pack with regard to the Roberts Court.  In other words, when it comes to 
being the swing voter in the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy may indeed play that role 
that O’Connor once did, but Kennedy is no O’Connor when it comes to public opinion.  
In fact, the 30% gap between Kennedy’s majority vote rate and his 61% consistency rate 
indicates that he may be in the majority much of the time, but possibly lacks the political 
112 
 
acumen that O’Connor had throughout her career.  Comparing his MQ Scores with 
percent of agreement shows the following: 
Table 6.12.  Comparison Between Justice Kennedy’s Martin-Quinn Scores and 
Public Opinion Agreement 
Year  MQ Score  Agreement Percent 
2005  .55   66.67 
2006  .605   66.67 
2007  .609   60.00 
2008  .988   70.00 
2009  1.236   66.67 
2012  1.521   38.46 
 
There is no overall statistical correlation between the two scores, but as Justice Kennedy 
has voted more conservatively between the 2008 and 2010 terms, his consistency rate has 
also decreased.   Being the court’s swing voter has not prevented him from a 
corresponding slide in a consistency rate. It is possible that Justice Kennedy’s increasing 
conservatism has moved him away from the political center.  Further study will reveal the 
extent to which this slide is an anomaly or a new pattern.  
Justice Ginsburg 
On the aggregate level, the years of 2005-2010 were a typical one for Justice Ginsburg.  
She is a reliable liberal vote and her votes were consistent with that direction.  With a 
60.88% consistency rate, her ranking was right in the middle.  She remained consistent 
with her earlier terms under Rehnquist and was a leader of the liberal wing of the court.  
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On closer inspection, she had an 80% rate in 2005, but also had three years in a row 
where she was at 60% or under.  In 2007, she had a 30% consistency rate.  Her 
consistency rate fell and rose as the court moved liberal and conservatively.  In 2010, the 
year which had very low consistency rates amongst conservatives, she scored the highest 
rate of 78.60%.  She dissented eight times in the term, and was mostly positively 
reflecting public opinion at the time.  One pattern that emerges with Justice Ginsburg is 
one that seems to be a pattern.  When the court lurches either in a conservative or liberal 
direction, the justices consistency rate drops or rises depending on their ideology.      
Justice Stevens 
If there is any justice who had motivation to vote according to his own preferences it was 
Justice Stevens.  He retired after the 2009 term and left a significant legacy for others to 
follow.  He had a rate of 59.77% in his last five years on the court.  During his years on 
the Rehnquist Court, he had a consistency rate of 50 percent.    Twice, Stevens had below 
60%, 55.55% in 2006 and once a rate of 50% in 2009.   Justice Stevens was appointed by 
Gerald Ford in 1975 as an Associate Justice and confirmed by the Senate 98-0.  During 
his years on the Seventh Circuit of Appeals, Stevens was generally a reliable conservative 
and he continued that record in his early years on the court.  He voted both to reinstate 
the death penalty in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia and voted against affirmative action in 
Regents v. Bakke in 1978.  In the ensuing years, Justice Stevens’ positions changed on 
several issues, to the point where he was considered one of the more liberal members of 
the court.  He always maintained that it was not he who was moving away from the 
conservatives but the conservatives were moving away from him.  And while his MQ 
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scores do show him becoming more liberal over the years, he continues to argue that the 
court's median continues to move in a conservative direction.
104
   
 One aspect of Justice Stevens’ tenure on the court is the fact that he understood 
the political nature of the Court and the role it plays in society.  Time and time again, 
Stevens understood the impact of decisions on the credibility of the court.  He was 
concerned that certain cases, like Bush v. Gore, had the chance to destroy this 
relationship: 
I think that it had an adverse impact on the public's regard for 
the independence of the court. Over the years, the court has 
survived that unfortunate mistake and still has a high standing. 
But I do think that it suffered a rather serious temporary setback 
as a result of that case.
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In his dissent in that very case he commented: 
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the 
Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence 
in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would 
make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed. 
Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The 
endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can 
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work 
of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and 
women who administer the judicial system that is the true 
backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the 
wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today’s 
decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may 
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner 
of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is 
                                                 
104
 Justice Stevens, MQ scores, 1975 .029 to -0.531 in 2009.  Martin, Andrew D.  and Quinn, Kevin M. 
"Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-
1999." Political Analysis. 10:134-153.  2002.  Web.   
105
 Zalan, Kira.  "Justice John Paul Stevens on How the Supreme Court Works."  US News and World 
Report.  23 Jan.  2012.  Web.   
115 
 
perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an 




Justice Stevens was concerned about how the public might view judges, understanding 
that much of their power is derived from the people themselves.    
Justice Thomas  
 All eleven justices examined in this study had consistency rates within ten 
percentage points of each other (Justice Kagan being the exception).  This relative 
consistency between justices is testament to the fact that the public was relatively 
unpredictable in where it weighed in on cases.  There were cases where the public sided 
with conservatives and ones in which it sided with liberals.  As the data are examined, a 
pattern of agreement emerged where the liberals on the court were consistent with public 
opinion on business cases and the conservatives on the court were consistent with the 
public on criminal and gun cases.  As a result, both groups had cases in which they could 
be consistent with public opinion with similar rates.  It is also true that these rates were 
consistent with rates found during the Rehnquist era.  Justice Thomas had the lowest 
public opinion agreement rate of any of the justices studied.  He had two 66.67% 
agreement years (2005, 2006) but then tied the lowest agreement score in 2009 with 
33.33%.  Having the agreement lowest scores amongst all the justices gels with the 
reputation that Thomas (and Scalia) have gained on the court, that they are consistent in 
their beliefs, regardless of where the mass public might be at on an issue.  It is argued as 
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evidence, for example, by Adam Liptak of The New York Times and Dahlia Lithwick of 
Slate, that Thomas' silence during oral argument (he has said one line in several years and 
recently made news when he made a joke during oral arguments) could be seen as a snub 
to the American people, as oral arguments are the only setting where the American public 
gets to see the justices in action.  As Lithwick recently stated, "If you believe it shapes 
judicial opinions, or telegraphs important areas of concern to counsel, or allows the 
justices a forum in which to bridge the differences among themselves, then Thomas' 
decision not to participate feels like an insult. If you believe it's the sole opportunity for 
the court to interact formally before the American public, it can seem like a deliberate 
snub."
107
  And yet, it is not as if Thomas is a recluse.  He is often seen speaking to 
various organizations and his presence is often seen at conservative events.  As Lithwick 
implies, Justice Thomas' selective silence is troublesome (he is rarely in attendance at the 
State of the Union) in that he chooses not to engage the mass public.  In this light, it is not 
unusual that Justice Thomas' has a low public opinion consistency rating.    
Justice Scalia 
 Similar to Justice Thomas, Scalia had a consistency rate of 57%. This rate was 
slightly higher than Thomas, but the second lowest of any justice.  The data on Scalia in 
the early years of the Roberts Court suggests that he was largely in sync with public 
opinion (66.67, 66.67, 70 and 70 respectively between 2005 and 2009).  His votes largely 
mirror those of Kennedy and Thomas during that time period.  His consistency rate, 
however, drops dramatically in the 2009 and 2010 terms along with Thomas, Roberts and 
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Alito (33.33 and 38.46%).  Such low rates imply that Scalia is willing to make voting 
decisions that are against public opinion.  While this pattern may self-correct in the next 
few years, it is worth noting that Scalia often likes to vote independently of public 
opinion and likely sees it as his job to do so.  Voting consistently with public opinion 
might be simply a coincidence.  That being said, Justice Scalia understands that some 
cases can go beyond what is acceptable to public opinion.  Consider his comments to a 
gathering at a law school in Chicago in 2011: 
My court has, by my lights, made many mistakes of law during 
its distinguished two centuries of existence. But it has made very 
few mistakes of political judgment, of estimating how far … it 
could stretch beyond the text of the constitution without 
provoking overwhelming public criticism and resistance. Dred 
Scott was one mistake of that sort. Roe v Wade was another … 
And Kelo, I think, was a third.
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Even Justice Scalia, who seemingly has no relationship with public opinion, understands 
the potential backlash of cases that go too far in the public's eye.    
Justice Alito 
 Justice Alito, like Justice Roberts, had a high consistency rate with public opinion 
during his first term (72.7%).  He recused himself on several cases but was largely the 
Justice that the media and scholars thought he would be.  His rates mirror that of Roberts 
more than they do Scalia and Thomas, but by every account, he is a reliable conservative 
when it comes to his votes.
109
  He is a bit hard to pin down, however, when it came to 
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being consistently for or against public opinion.  In 2009, where the other ‘reliable’ 
conservative justices had low consistency rates (Roberts, 50%, Thomas 33.33%, Scalia 
33.33%), Alito scored a 66.67%, tied for highest with Kennedy.  His overall rate was 
much closer to Kennedy (61.67 to Kennedy’s 61.79) than it is to either Scalia or Thomas.  
This implies that Alito was more in tune with public opinion (like Kennedy is "supposed" 
to be as the swing justice) than Scalia and Thomas, at least in the early part of his tenure.  
One notable "criticism" of Alito is that he has never voted against the Chamber of 
Commerce in a case in which the Chamber was either a party or filed an amicus brief and 
this study bolsters that argument.  Alito’s consistency rate would be much higher were it 
not for business cases, in which he voted for the business interests 100% of the time 
between 2005 and 2011.  Future years will certainly reveal more about any relationship 
between public opinion and Alito’s decisions.  
Justice Breyer   
Justice Breyer’s consistency rate is similar to that of Justices Roberts and Stevens, 
scoring a 62.49%, which is the fourth highest score in the six year span and the highest 
amongst justices who have been on the court more than two years.  What jumps out in 
comparing Breyer to Roberts is that, unlike Thomas and Scalia, they do not vote together 
that often, yet they have almost identical rates.  This can be explained by the fact that 
when Roberts’ rates are lower, meaning he was voting in cases that went against public 
opinion, Breyer was voting consistently with public opinion.  Likewise, when Breyer’s 
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scores were lower, Roberts’ were higher.  This dichotomy allows for two “almost 
opposite” justices to have scores quite similar.  This means that Justice Breyer and Justice 
Roberts have two high consistency scores but on opposing cases.   
David Souter 
Of all the justices who may have felt unencumbered during the last few years, David 
Souter is probably the most prominent.  He had within a four year period an 80% 
consistency rate in 2005 and then a 20% rate just two years later.  In his last year on the 
court, he had a 70% rate.  Is there anything about Souter retiring that had something to do 
with his lowest-among-justices 56.39% agreement rate?  Perhaps he was willing to go it 
alone in the final years, free with the knowledge that his days on the Court were 
numbered.  For example, in 2007, in which the conservatives had an above 60% 
agreement rate and the liberals had a below 60% agreement rate, Souter's 20% stands out.  
The cases that Souter disagreed with public opinion that year were District of Columbia 
v. Heller, Kennedy v. Louisiana, United States v. Williams, Baze v Rees, Crawford v. 
Marion County, Boumediene v. Bush, and Exxon Shipping v. Baker.  These cases spanned 
the gamut of topics, including general criminal, business, gun, child rape, child porn and 
death penalty cases.  The only cases he agreed with public opinion were Kimbrough v. 
United States and Snyder v. Louisiana.  Souter's agreement rate in 2007 reveals a justice 
who is as willing to go against public opinion as he was willing to go with it in 2005 
when he had an 80% consistency rate.  As there was consistency between Thomas and 
Scalia, there was similar consistency between Souter and Ginsburg across the entire 2005 
to 2011 time period studied.  As the two more liberal justices, this is not all that 




One pattern that is surprising is what is called the Newness-to-the-Court model.  
Regardless of the ideology, during the 2005 to 2011 terms, the longest serving members 
of the court had lower consistency rates than did the newest members.  Of the top six, 
only Breyer and Kennedy were veterans of the court, while the other four were the 
newest justices to the Court (Kagan, Sotomayor, Roberts, Alito).  The other five made up 
the lowest consistency rates (Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, Scalia and Thomas).  While 
these results rest on a the small sample size, the data hints at the possibility that members 
might be more in tune with public opinion in their first years rather than their subsequent 
ones.      
 Table 6.13 shows that three of the four new justices since 2005 had higher public 
opinion agreement in their first term than their overall agreement rate. 
Table 6.13  First Term Agreement Compared with Overall Agreement with Public 
Opinion 
Justice   Overall  First Term  
Roberts  63.61%  80% 
Kagan   76.9%   76.9%  
Sotomayor  63.49%  50% 
Alito   61.86%  72.7% 
 
 In three of the four cases, the justices had an equal or higher rate in their first term 
than their overall consistency rate.   Might this suggest that justices are more centrist in 
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their decisions so as to establish themselves on the court?  Is it possible that new 
members of the court are staying in the middle of the court with regard to public opinion?   
 In this pairwise model, the 2010-2011 term had the lowest consistency rate across 
the six terms studied. There are three possibilities that may explain such a low 
consistency rate.  The first is that the Roberts Court was purposefully carving out a new 
path, independent of public opinion.  The second is that the court took up two types of 
cases that year, ones that were low profile and others that were media blockbusters, with 
a few types of cases in between.  Perhaps the court was in much higher agreement with 
public opinion, but the cases which may have concurred did not register with a matching 
poll.  The third possibility is that this term is an outlier.  While the court does self select 
cases it will hear, it only can do so once the cases have percolated up through the system.  
It is possible that the court had a number of high profile, unpopular cases that, if 
presented in a different year, might have produced a more varied result.  It is not as if the 
court has been time and again declining in its consistency rates.  In several years, the 
percent of agreement went up, then back down, most probably based on the idea that the 
court only can act on those cases brought before it.   
Assuming for a moment that one reason for the drop in public opinion agreement 
is that Roberts is more comfortable in his role as Chief Justice, it still does not explain the 
up and down nature of the court as compared to public opinion.  Perhaps, as some have 
opined, there simply is no relationship.   
 Might there be something different with the willingness of Roberts, as say 
compared to Rehnquist, to go against public opinion?  From the many assessments of the 
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Rehnquist Court, it is clear that Rehnquist may have wanted to push the court in 
directions that happened to be against public opinion, but there were other factors that 
kept the court from doing so.  Rehnquist rarely had the fifth vote to overturn popular 
rulings and Roberts potentially does have that vote.   As a result, Roberts could be 
achieving what Rehnquist could have only dreamed about.    
6.5 Outliers  
 Examining the consistency rates for each justice reveals that they are, on average, 
generally between 55% and 78%.  There were several outliers.  The most notable of these 
was the 2010 term, in which three justices (Scalia, Kennedy and Altio) had agreement 
rates of 38.46% and one (Roberts) with a rate of 46.15%.   
 A second group of outliers is the 30% and 20% agreement rate seen by both 
Ginsburg and Souter in the 2007 term.  Both justices were against public opinion on 
average 75% of the time.  Contrast those numbers with the Marshall analysis of the 
justice with the lowest consistency rate during the Rehnquist Court being William 
Brennan, who had an average consistency rate of 35%.  During the Rehnquist Court, 
Ginsburg and Souter were remarkably similar, having an agreement rate of 50 and 51% 
respectively.  During the Roberts Court through 2011, Ginsburg had a 61% consistency 
rate and Souter a 56% consistency rate (although his last term was 2008-2009), but 
neither ever had anything close to a 20% rate at any time during their time on the 
Rehnquist Court. It is challenging to explain such a low rate during the 2007 term, other 
than to suggest that the cases that were before the court were ones they disagreed with.  
The ones she and Souter both disagreed with (and had perfect agreement amongst 
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themselves) were DC v. Heller (handgun possession in DC), Kennedy v. Louisiana (death 
penalty for child rape), US v. Williams (First Amendment and child pornography), 
Virginia v. Moore and Crawford v. Marion County (photo ID to vote).  The only case that 
Ginsburg and Souter voted with public opinion was Snyder v. Louisiana (race, juries and 
the death penalty).  The case they disagreed with was Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
(business case).  All of these cases were high profile, controversial cases that had high 
profile polls associated with them.   And while the Rehnquist Court rarely topped a 67% 
consistency rate, there were two instances where the Roberts Court was topping 70% 
(2005 term with 73.33% and 2008 term with 80%).  Is there an explanation of this 
variance or is it by chance?  Notably, whereas the Rehnquist Court never fell below 50% 
approval rating, the Roberts Court has fallen from time to time below a 41% approval 
rating.   
 Such a low consistency rate by two of the court’s reliable liberals indicated that 
the sharp polarization that the court managed avoid in the early years of the Roberts 
Court came out strong in 2007.  Contrast Ginsburg and Souter’s rates in 2007 term with 
those of Alito and Roberts, who had scores of 66.67% each during the same term.  The 
disparity is striking, especially when the ideology is considered.  The four liberals 
(Breyer, Soyter, Ginsburg, Stevens) on the Court had a 40% consistency rate while the 
five conservatives (Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and Roberts) had an average rate of 
69.6% agreement with public opinion, a difference of 29.6 percentage points.  At least 
where public opinion was concerned, the 2007 term had the most disparity between 




 Is it possible that decisions of the court can be turned by one justice?  Would the 
Roberts Court have made different collective decisions if President Obama had not won 
election in 2008?  This idea can be explored using Mishler and Sheehan’s political 
adjustment hypothesis which states that the indirect movement of the court is seen 
through new justices on the court.
110
  Conversely, the court moves in response to losing 
justices as well.  For example, when Justice O’Connor left the Court, Justice Kennedy 
became the swing or median justice.  And because Kennedy is more conservative than 
O’Connor was, the court is more conservative as a whole.  “She was the swing vote on 
what SCOTUSblog.com publisher Tom Goldstein calls the "highest profile, most 
consequential social questions" that touch every person's life.’”
111
 
 One way to explore this further is by asking what would O’Connor have done if 
she was on the court instead of Justice Alito.  In one such example, after Citizens United, 
Justice O’Connor gave a speech in which she said she was troubled by the court’s action, 
specifically the section of the ruling that dealt with donating corporate money to judicial 
campaigns.  Since retiring from the court, she has been an advocate for the elimination of 
judicial elections, arguing that when judges are beholden to special interests, they cannot 
be impartial.  In an interview to Jeffrey Rosen, she indicated, “Citizens United concerned 
me because what it did was to recognize corporations as being fully protected by the First 
Amendment,” she said. “I sort of thought the framers of the Constitution were talking 
                                                 
110
 See Mishler and Sheehan (1996). 
111
 Lawrence, Jill. "Sandra O'Connor's Choice: What Her Missing Supreme Court Vote Means to Women 
and America." Politics Daily. AOL, Inc., 2010. Web. 
125 
 
about the rights of individuals, not corporate entities. So I’ve been pretty concerned about 
the whole approach.”
112
   
 Citizens United is not the only case that may have been different if she was on the 
court.  In other decisions, according to Jill Lawrence of Politics Daily, she would have 
likely ruled the following ways
113
: 
 For the defendants in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, No. 10-238, and 
McComish v. Bennett, No. 10-239.  Her fifth vote would have upheld the law 
restricting outside money to campaigns. 
 Gonzales v. Carhart. Partial birth abortion where she would have voted to 
eliminate the ban.   
 Affirmative action in Seattle would have been upheld, as opposed to it being 
dropped 5-4. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1. 
 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire would have been allowed to go forward. 
 Upheld the State of California in the Brown v. Entertainment case.114 
The analysis done by Lawrence and others is often framed as what-would-O’Connor-
done-versus-Alito, but the other question is an O’Connor vs. Kennedy debate.   When 
compared to O’Connor, Kennedy is less in line with public opinion than was O’Connor.  
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The practical implication of this theory suggests that Kennedy is less willing on some 
issues than O’Connor was to be the public barometer.  In other words, whereas O’Connor 
was well known for ‘knowing the temperature’ of the country, Kennedy may not either 
be as interested or knowledgeable.  In either event, a swing jurist like O’Connor can 
make a sizable difference in the percent of decisions that agree with public opinion.  By 
several accounts, Kennedy plays that role, but in fewer cases than did O’Connor.   
6.7 Types of Cases and Public Opinion 
Is there any evidence that the types of court cases have an impact on the 
consistency rate with public opinion?  Are liberals more likely than conservatives, for 
example, to be consistent with public opinion when it comes to criminal cases?  The 
argument might go something like this:  The mass public has become used to the rights 
that were provided by the Warren and other courts, from rights like Miranda to the 4
th
 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule.  Mass public opinion have high degrees of approval for 
rights that conservatives are against.  Therefore, when the conservatives “win” a case that 
restricts such rights, to what extent are they acting contrary to public opinion?  To test 
this question, just criminal cases were queried and compared to decisions. The death 
penalty was not included in these results because conservatives generally line up with the 











Table 6.14  Non-Death Penalty Criminal Cases Compared with Public 
Opinion Consistency 
 
Court Case                        Decision           Consistent/Inconsistent   
 
Holmes v South Carolina         9-0                  consistent 
Brigham City v. Stuart             9-0                  consistent 
Hudson v Michigan                 5-4                   inconsistent    
 United States v Grubbs            8-0                  consistent 
Zedner v. United States           9-0                   consistent 
Davis v. Washington               9-0                   consistent 
House v. Bell                           5-4                   inconsistent 
Brendlin v. California              9-0                  consistent 
Scott v Harris                           8-1                  consistent 
Kimbrough v United States     7-2                  consistent 
Virginia v Moore                     9-0                  inconsistent 
District Attorney's Office  
v. Osborne                                5-4                   inconsistent 
Melendez-Diaz v.  
Massachusetts                          5-4                 consistent                                               
Herring v. United States          5-4                  inconsistent 
Safford Unified School  
District v. Redding                   8-1                 consistent 
  Sullivan v Florida                     6-3                 consistent 
  Padilla v Kentucky                   7-2                 consistent 
  Abott v. United States              8-0                 consistent 
  Michigan v. Bryant                   6-2                 consistent 
  Brown v. Plata                          5-4                 inconsistent 
 
Of the twenty criminal cases decided from 2005-2011, eight of them were unanimous (9-
0 or 8-0) and consistent with public opinion.  This is a full forty percent of the criminal 
cases.  Second, there were many more decisions that were consistent with public opinion 
than might have been thought otherwise.  Fourteen out of twenty (70%) were consistent 
with public opinion.  However, there were six decisions (30%) that were decided by a 5-4 
count and five of these (25%) were both inconsistent with public opinion and where the 
majority was made up of the five conservatives.  The sixth was 5-4 case consistent with 
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public opinion where the majority included the four “liberals” and Clarence Thomas.  
Going back to the original question, the conservatives were inconsistent 30% of the time 
in criminal matters (there was a 9-0 inconsistent case) while the liberals were inconsistent 
with public opinion 10% of the time.  This finding implies that when it comes to non-
death penalty criminal cases, conservatives are less likely to be consistent with public 
opinion than liberals.  The data supports this conclusion.  As the Roberts Court continues, 
it will be interesting to see if this pattern continues.     
 This chapter has presented data which supports the idea that the Roberts Court is 
generally in line with public opinion on a variety of issues.  Both the indirect mention 
model and the pairwise model imply a connection, at least when the members believe that 
they have public opinion on their side. There will be much more discussion of this data 
later in the paper, but despite the small number of cases overall, the data suggests the 











Chapter 7:  The Narrow Interest Model As Represented by the 
Chamber of Commerce 
Here in chapter seven, the scope of the project narrows to discuss narrower 
interests.  The Chamber of Commerce was chosen as a body that best represents business 
interests, sometimes in agreement with the mass public, but often not.  The argument for 
their narrow status comes from two main sources.  First, the Chamber of Commerce’s 
own statements often portray themselves as narrow, specialized interests arguing against 
larger populist movements.  In response to the anti-corporate populism that enveloped the 
2008 presidential election season, for example, Chamber President Tom Donohue 
indicated, "I'm concerned about anti-corporate and populist rhetoric from candidates for 
the presidency, members of Congress and the media.  It suggests to us that we have to 
demonstrate who it is in this society that creates jobs, wealth and benefits -- and who it is 
that eats them."
115
  The Chamber also has an anti-populist stigma attached to it.  As 
liberal columnist Dana Milbank points out, “Listed as members of the chamber's board 
are representatives from Pfizer, ConocoPhillips, Lockheed Martin, JPMorgan Chase, 
Dow Chemical, Ken Starr's old law and lobbying firm, and Rolls-Royce North America. 
Nothing says grass-roots insurgency quite like Rolls-Royce -- and nothing says populist 
revolt quite like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.”
116
.  Second, the Chamber of 
Commerce often represents positions that are against mass public opinion.  Among the 
thirteen cases relating to the Chamber of Commerce examined in the pairwise study, 
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every position taken by the Chamber was opposed by mass public opinion.   The 
Chamber of Commerce often represents large business interests, ones that have 
unfavorability ratings among the masses.  Notably, in the Occupy movements held across 
the country in 2011 and 2012, much of their ire was directed against the Chamber of 
Commerce, accusing them of being representatives of the 1% the movement has been 
fighting.  Occupy DC members, for example, disrupted a Chamber of Commerce 
luncheon in November 2011 and did the same to the Chamber’s holiday party in 
December 2011.  Other such disruptions of Chamber of Commerce events took place in 
far flung places as Little Rock, Arkansas.  Not only has the Chamber been active at the 
Supreme Court level, but they have lobbied against many laws that came out of the 
financial collapse in 2008.  These laws included the Banking and Accountability Act of 
2008, a law that was quite popular when polled.   
 There are many anecdotal examples in which the Supreme Court has appeared to 
side with narrow interests over the masses.  Certainly the Citizens United case qualifies 
as one which had the potential for this accusation.  Other such cases include the death 
penalty, where 60% of the country supports the death penalty, yet the court has moved 
toward restricting the ultimate penalty for minors, child rape and for the intellectually 
disabled.   In two of these cases, the court has rejected public opinion outright, siding 
instead with the body of evidence presented by child and developmental experts rather 
than by what the public desires.    The other area where the court has a tendency to side 
with narrower interests over the masses is with church and state issues.  The public is 
largely in favor of closing the gap between church and state, but the court had often sided 
with the academic and cultural interests on this issue.   
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 The case for the argument that the Supreme Court cares about narrow elite 
interests is made by Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins in their article from 2010, “Why 
the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People”.  They call attention to 
several factors that lead to the court being concerned with elites, including the idea that 
justices are interested in winning favor from audiences they care about as well as self 
preservation.
117
  There are both policy and social reasons for why members decide cases 
the way they do.  Most significant of these, the Supreme Court concerns itself with 
making legal policy and needs the elite public’s approval in order to legitimate and carry 
out that policy.  If the elite public does not accept the outcomes of a decision, the policy 
and the court itself become potentially less effective.  And while mass public opinion 
may be ignored from time to time, elite opinion is needed by the justices in order to move 
decisions from opinion to policy.  They need the other branches, bureaucracy, academics, 
think tanks and the like to interpret, disseminate, and to follow their decisions in order for 
them to have the desired impact. 
 As a result the justices need their peers.  Indeed, when justices say they are not 
influenced by public opinion, they may be referring to only mass public opinion.  But to 
phrase the question differently:  “To what extent are the justices influenced by their 
peers?” brings up a series of other issues.  In other words, are the justices influenced by 
groups of which they are members?  Or at least, are they influenced by their intellectual 
peer group.  Baum and Devins (2010) posit that there exists enough evidence that 
suggests that the Court is moved in various directions by elites.  Obviously, not every 
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justice responds to elites consistently and it is possible that justices who are the most 
consistent with elite opinion are the swing justices because they want to be considered the 
most “right” by their peers.  Justice Kennedy, by that logic, could be the most likely to 
follow elite opinion.   
 This concept of elite leadership is not a one way street.  With the confirmation of 
Elana Kagan in 2010, there was some discussion in the media about the elitism of the 
court relating to the colleges the justices attended.  With the addition of Kagan, every 
member of the court attended either Harvard or Yale Law School, sparking a rash of 
articles pointing to the dearth of other law school being represented.  As Jonathan Turley 
from George Washington University laments in journalist Tim Padgett’s article about the 
current pattern:  "It's deleterious to the court," he argues, "because it artificially limits the 
pool of candidates and inevitably removes better qualified candidates. The U.S. has the 
world's best legal education system, yet we turn to an absurdly minute corner of it for our 
Supreme Court justices. The high court is a cloistered enough institution as it is — so 
why risk making it even more detached from the rest of us by turning it into a Harvard-
Yale Law Review reunion? A court that draws from outside those two institutions would 
be part of a less insular conversation in its deliberations.” 
118
   
 Does having members of the court exclusively from Harvard and Yale restrict 
their views on issues?  Yes, says other scholars.  Justices from the eastern part of the 
country, for example, may not necessarily have the breadth of knowledge about water 
rights, an issue which is paramount in the central and western part of the United States.  
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In essence, limiting the court to Harvard and Yale restricts the views of the membership 
and adds to the belief that the justices are out of touch with the masses.   
One avenue where narrow interests communicate their beliefs directly to the 
justices is through the filing and examination of amicus briefs.  As addressed in the 
beginning, amicus briefs serve as a main conduit between narrow views and the court 
members.  So it follows that if the Chamber of Commerce uses the method of amicus 
briefs to communicate to an attentively business-orientated Supreme Court, then the court 
should be responsive to the their concerns.  This is exactly what the amicus brief model is 
based upon.   
While in the model there were a small number of cases, there was enough to draw 
some implications for further research.  Out of sixty three cases studied, there were 
thirteen matches where the Chamber of Commerce’s National Litigation Center filed an 
amicus brief or supported the business side of a case.  These cases are listed as follows; 
Table 7.1  Cases in Pairwise Model Where Chamber of Commerce was Party or Filed 
Amicus Brief 
2005 Burlington Northern v. White 
2006 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
2006 Philip Morris v. Williams 
2006 Ledbetter v Goodyear 
2007 Exxon Shipping v. Baker 
2009 Citizens United v. FEC 
2010 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth 
2010 Pliva v. Mensing 
2010 Walmart v. Dukes 
2010 Brown vs. Entertainment Merchants Association 
2010 ATT v. Conception 
2010 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 




 One challenge with matching business cases as a whole and Chamber of 
Commerce cases in particular with public opinion is that they are some of the ones least 
likely to appear in polling because they often concern narrow interests.  The salience of 
business cases is often difficult to ascertain for the average individual.  Yet despite the 
limited sample size, the data tell an interesting story.  Of the fifteen paired cases that 
appeared in Roberts first term, there was only one that the Chamber of Commerce filed a 
brief.  By the 2010-2011 term, there were seven cases out of thirteen matched that the 
Chamber of Commerce weighed in.  This increase in cases suggests that either the cases 
were of a higher profile than ones in the past or that business cases in general are polling 
better among the public.  Table 16 shows the year by year breakdown of cases: 
Table 7.2  Pairwise Model Chamber of Commerce Cases- 2005-2010 per Term.     
Term  N   Percent 
2005:  1 out of 15 cases 6%  
2006:  3 out of 9  33% 
2007:    1 out of 10  1% 
2008:    0 out of 10   0% 
2009:    1 out of 6   16.7% 
2010:    7 out of 13  54% 
 
Beyond the increase in the number of Chamber of Commerce-business cases that 
polled in the 2010 term, all but three of the cases were inconsistent with public opinion.  
The court backed the Chamber of Commerce’s decision in ten out of thirteen cases.  
Since the number of cases that could be matched with public opinion is so small, it is 
difficult to argue anything conclusive about these cases, but considering that the court has 
an overall consistency rate of over 63% with all cases, a 23% consistency rate in 
Chamber of Commerce-business cases suggests that the court may be agreeing with 
corporate interests.    
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 Polling reveals that the public is generally anti-corporation.  Corporate interests 
tend to poll lower than other issues and for the most part, people identify with the mass 
public over business interests.   
Consider the following poll questions: 
Table 7.3  Gallup Poll on Major Corporations 
Gallup Poll. Jan. 7-9, 2011. N=1,018 adults nationwide. Margin of error ± 4. 
              
"Next, I'm going to read some aspects of life in America today. For each one, please say whether 
you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied. How 
about the size and influence of major corporations?" 
  









    % % % % % 
  1/7-9/11 5 24 31 36 4 
  1/10-14/01 7 41 31 17 4 
              
"Now here are some questions concerning where you stand on some of the issues we just talked 
about. Would you like to see major corporations have more influence in this nation, less 
influence, or keep their influence as it is now?" 
  
    More Less Same as now Unsure   
    % % % %   
  1/7-9/11 12 62 24 2   
  1/10-14/01 10 52 36 2   
 
An October 2011 polls reveal the following about Wall Street: 
Table 7.4  Gallup Poll on Wall Street Bankers and Brokers  
Overall, how much do you trust Wall Street bankers and brokers to do what is best for the 
economy-- a great deal, somewhat, a little, or not at all? 
Oct. 14-16 2011 
 
A great deal  3% 
Somewhat  20% 
A little   22% 
Not at all  54% 





Please tell me whether you think each of the following descriptions apply or do not apply to 
Wall Street bankers and brokers:  
 
Intelligent   82%  
Greedy   80%  
Overpaid   77%  
Dishonest   65%  
Community minded  24%  
The point of these polls is that the public does not trust the business community.  The 
Occupy Wall Street movement is one such manifestation of what the polls are showing.  
If the movement were to spread beyond the fringe and enter the mainstream, more 
business-orientated court decisions may reduce the popularity of the court.   
What is quite surprising about the Chamber of Commerce model is that the court 
is so inconsistent with public opinion on this one issue.  Consider the percentage of 
agreement with the public on issues as a whole: 
 
Table 7.5   Supreme Court Agreement with Public Opinion by Types of Cases 
 
Type of Case  Number of Cases  Percent Agreement 
 
Religion:  3 cases    100% 
Speech:             5 cases    60% 
Criminal:  21 cases   76.2% 
Business:          13 cases   23% 
Death Penalty:  8 cases    75% 
Terrorism:  3 cases    33% 
State   2 cases    50%  
Abortion  1 case    100% 
AA   2 cases    100% 
Gun Control  2 cases    100% 
Voting   3 cases    67% 
 
 The justices between 2005 -2009 had a consistency rate of 23% with public 
opinion, the lowest consistency rate among all types of cases in the pairwise method.  It 
means that the court sided against mass public opinion 77% of the time.  While the small 
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sample size prevents drawing any solid conclusions , these findings replicate what other 
studies have shown and hint that further study may support the assertion that the court is 
receptive to the Chamber of Commerce’s position.     
Journalistic evidence also supports the argument that the justices are receptive to 
the arguments of the Chamber of Commerce.  According to the New York Times, the 
Roberts Court ruled for business interests sixty one percent of the time, compared to a 
forty-two percent rate since 1953.   According to the Chamber’s most active practitioner, 
“I know from personal experience that the chamber’s support carries significant weight 
with the justices,” he wrote. “Except for the solicitor general representing the United 
States, no single entity has more influence on what cases the Supreme Court decides and 
how it decides them than the National Chamber Litigation Center.”
119  
Justice Breyer has objected to the accusation that the Supreme Court is biased 
towards the Chamber of Commerce.  In an interview with Bloomsberg TV in 2010, he 
said: “I looked back”, and “I couldn’t find a tremendous difference in the percentage of 
cases. They’ve always done pretty well.”
120
   Moreover, the Chamber does not always 
“win” before the Court.  Massachusetts vs. EPA (2007), Wyeth v, Levine (2009) and 
Williamson v. Mazda (2011) are three cases in which the court ruled on behalf of the 
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“masses’ over the Chamber.  As Damon Root of Reason magazine argues, “the allegedly 
pro-business Supreme Court has repeatedly made big business very unhappy.”
121
 
 The Constitutional Accountability Center released a study in 2010 comparing the 
Roberts and Burger Courts as they voted on cases in which the Chamber of Commerce 
had an interest.  They found that the Burger Court agreed with the Chamber only 43% of 
the time with no notable division amongst liberals and conservative and the Roberts 
Court’s rate is much higher.
122
   
The Roberts Court’s conservative members voted with the Chamber 74% of the 
time, whereas the liberal members supported the Chamber only 43% of the time.  From 
early 2006 until June of 2010, the CAC found that the Court gave a success rate of 68% 
to the Chamber.  The study additionally showed that the justices who served under 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were all less likely to support the Chamber of Commerce 
than their counterparts in the Roberts Court.  The CAC showed that even Justice Stevens, 
who served under Roberts, Burger and Rehnquist supported the Chamber’s position (40% 
to 32%) during the Roberts terms.
123
   
The study found the following level of support for the Chamber of Commerce for 
the period between 2006-2011.  In descending order,  Alito (78%), Scalia (75%), Roberts 
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(72%), Thomas (71%), Kennedy (70%), Breyer (48%), Souter (48%), Stevens (40%), 
Ginsburg (40%).  These numbers are similar to the level of support that the Chamber of 
Commerce received in the pairwise matches. 
Table 7.6  Justice Consistency Rate With Chamber of Commerce In Pairwise 
Method 
 
Justice  Rate   Cases  CAC Rate Over All Cases 
 
Kennedy   77%   13       70% 
Roberts    77%   13       72%  
Alito        75%   13       78% 
Scalia       69%   13       75% 
Thomas    61%   13       71% 
Breyer      23%   13       48% 
Ginsburg   15%   13       40% 
Stevens    0%   13       40% 
 
While the numbers are similar with the CAC study, the gap in the level of support 
between “conservative” members of the Court and the “liberal” ones is somewhat 
striking.  Where the CAC report looked at all Chamber of Commerce cases, this research 
only examined a relatively small sample (13 cases), but it still provides enough for a 
comparison.  In the CAC study, Alito had a 78% support rate and ranked first, while in 
the pairwise study he had a 75% rate and ranked third, behind Kennedy and Roberts 
(ranked first and second at 77%).  Kennedy and Roberts had a 70% and 72% support rate 
respectively in the CAC report and ranked third and fifth.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, the liberals in the CAC report had a 48% support rate (Breyer and Souter) and 
two with a 40% rate (Ginsburg and Stevens).  In the pairwise study, the four liberals were 
also at the bottom of the support listing, with Breyer (23%), Souter, Ginsburg (15%) and 
Stevens (0%) being at the bottom.  In essence, conservative justices have a tendency to 
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support the Chamber of Commerce when they are either party to a case or have filed on 
behalf of a business interest and liberal justices do not.   
This pairwise data support what many newspapers and media outlets have been 
reporting about the relationship between these two entities.  And even if the media and 
the data are wrong about the influence of the Chamber on Supreme Court decisions, the 
perception by much of the media and the public at large is that they are supporting 
business interests over those of the American people.  If this argument is accepted, then 
the question shifts to why the court may act in this manner.  Are they “in the pocket” of 
business interests, automatically agreeing with the Chamber’s position or do the justices 
simply happen to agree with what the Chamber believes?   
The issue of the perceived favoritism of the Supreme Court towards corporations 
was such an issue during the Elana Kagan hearings that the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont held a hearing in 2011 titled “Barriers to 
Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect 
Corporate Behavior.”  The idea that hearings were held on such a topic supports two 
concepts.  First, that Leahy felt strongly enough about the perceived influence of business 
cases on the court is consistent with the idea that he believes that the Court is serving 
business interests at the expense of the public.  Why else hold hearings unless he believed 
that the public was on his side?  Second, that hearings were held suggests that the court 
has done something that led to a negative response from another branch of government.  
From Senator Leahy’s opening statement: 
This morning, we will highlight several recent Supreme Court decisions to 
examine the impact on the lives of hardworking Americans. Each of these 
decisions gives corporations additional power to act in their own self-interest, 
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and each limits the ability of Americans to have their day in court. This hearing is 
a continuation of previous hearings about how Supreme Court rulings affect 
Americans' access to their courts. Especially in these tough economic times, 
American consumers and employees rely on the law to protect them from fraud 
and discrimination. They rely on the courts to enforce those laws intended to 
protect them. Unfortunately, these protections are being eroded by what appears 
to be the most business-friendly Supreme Court in the last 75 years. 
 
Last week, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, five men on the Supreme Court disqualified 
the claims of 1.5 million women who had spent nearly a decade seeking justice 
for sex discrimination by their employer, Wal-Mart. They ruled that the women 
did not share enough in common to support bringing a class action. Perhaps more 
troubling, they told those women that Wal-Mart could not have had a 
discriminatory policy against all of them, because it left its payment decisions to 
the local branches of its stores. 
Leahy’s populist tone was designed to question the judgment of the Supreme Court 
members.  He went on to say: 
The cases we are discussing today are just a few examples of how the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions will hurt individual Americans and benefit large corporations who 
engage in misconduct. A study by Lee Epstein, William Landes and Richard Posner, 
entitled "Is the Roberts Court Pro-Business?" illustrates this phenomenon. It found that 
the Supreme Court ruled in a pro-business fashion in 29 percent of cases under Chief 
Justice Earl Warren. Under Warren Burger the figure was 47 percent. Under Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, it was 51 percent. Now, under Chief Justice Roberts it has risen to 61 percent. 
The point of today's hearing is to put these statistics in context by examining some of the 
most troubling pro-business rulings from the Supreme Court's term and to consider the 
lasting effect of these divisive rulings. 
 
Over the past few years, the American people have grown frustrated with the notion that 
regardless of their conduct some corporations are too big to fail. The Supreme Court's 
recent decisions may make some wonder whether the Supreme Court has now decided 
that some corporations are too big to be held accountable. You get the unfortunate feeling 
that many of the Justices view plaintiffs as a mere nuisance to corporations. We cannot 
ignore that sex discrimination in the workplace continues, that corporations continue to 
deceive consumers and that fraud continues on Wall Street. I believe that the ability of 
Americans to band together to hold corporations accountable when these things occur has 
been seriously undermined by the Supreme Court. These decisions have been praised on 
Wall Street, but will no doubt hurt hardworking Americans on Main Street.
124
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During the hearing (which was not the first one of its kind; Leahy also held hearings on 
Citizens United and the Ledbetter case), there were also invitees who defended the 
Supreme Court’s handling of business cases.  Included in this defense was the statement 
of Andrew Pincus of the law firm Mayer and Brown, who has argued cases before the 
Court.  He disagreed with Senator Leahy saying:   
The logical way to assess the impact upon corporate behavior of the Court’s recent 
decisions is to examine the outcomes in all of the cases involving private plaintiffs 
seeking damages from businesses. Business parties lost just as many times as they won 
such cases. Indeed, in the cases involving substantive interpretations of employment law, 
business parties lost every case decided by the Court. There simply is no basis for 
concluding that the Court’s decisions, taken as a whole, favored business defendants over 
plaintiffs seeking damages. 
 
A review of the Court’s decisions in which business parties prevailed reveals that the 
positions of the plaintiffs in those cases departed very substantially from existing law. It 
is not at all surprising that the Court refused to embark on the radical courses urged by 
the plaintiffs and instead adhered to the principles recognized in the Court’s prior 
precedents. 
 
The scope of the Court’s rulings will be debated in dozens, if not hundreds, of cases 
before the federal district courts and courts of appeals, and it will take several years for 
the lower courts to render a sufficient number of decisions to determine what the impact 
of the rulings will be. One thing is certain, however: predictions made today about the 
reach of the Court’s decisions are highly likely to be incorrect.  
 
The Court’s decisions will have significant positive effects on corporate behavior, 
avoiding an increase in the drain on companies’ resources from unjustified litigation and 
leaving funds available for business expansion and job creation; preventing new 
disincentives to foreign investment in the United States; and preserving the availability of 
arbitration as a fair, efficient dispute resolution system that provides the only avenue of 
relief for the small injuries suffered by the vast majority of consumers and employees. 
Moreover, the Court’s rulings leave undisturbed the principal deterrent of wrongdoing— 
the threat of government enforcement action. 
The larger point of the discussion is that there is important and substantive disagreement on 
the extent to which the Supreme Court sides with business interests.  While arguments both 
for and against the Chamber having influence on the Supreme Court have supporting 
evidence, the data presented here suggests that, at least among cases that register in polls, the 
court’s decisions are consistent with the side that the Chamber of Commerce takes in cases.  
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Further study might reveal whether this pattern will remain consistent over time.   But the 
larger question perhaps is not whether the Supreme Court is sympathetic to business interests, 
but why might that be?  Is the 5-4 pattern that has developed in many business cases simply 
the result of conservatives being more pro-business?  The fact that the four liberal justices 
were the lowest four on the consistency scale and the five conservatives were the top five is 
telling.  Also, the gap between the highest consistency rate (77% for Kennedy and Roberts) 
and the lowest (0% for Stevens) is striking.  The court may argue that it looks at cases 
through the legal lens only, but when faced with the fact that the conservatives appear to be 
more pro-business and the liberals seems to be anti-business, it does suggest that ideology is 
not too far away in Chamber of Commerce cases.    In any event, if the court finds itself 
being accused of being in the “pocket” of big business, an accusation the court may have to 
live with.   
 Taken as a whole, the three models of indirect mentions, the pairwise method and the 
Chamber of Commerce model all suggest that the Supreme Court does reflect public opinion.  
The fact that there were so few cases that were able to be matched in the pairwise method 
makes causation impossible at the moment, but as the Roberts Court continues, it seems 
likely that the Roberts Court reflects public opinion at the same or similar rate to that of 
earlier Courts.  Both the indirect mention and Chamber of Commerce model suggests that 
this may be the case, but more definitive data points are needed before that conclusion can be 
reached.   
 Even with limited data, this paper does provide some opportunities for further study.  
One thing that the Roberts Court has done is been unafraid in the last few years to wade into 
the cultural and political wars.  As a result, many high profile cases have come before the 
court, ones that will certainly put the court under the public microscope.  Will this glare 
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somehow force the court to operate in a middle-of-the-road approach?  Or will the court rule 
on cases based strictly on the merits or the law?  As more and more cases are added to the 
database, the Roberts Court has the opportunity to join earlier courts as being judiciously 
mindful of public opinion.     
 It is certainly possible that the Supreme Court does take mass opinion or more narrow  
public opinion into some cases and not others.  This chapter hints at the fact that when cases 
are high enough profile that the issue or the case is asked about in polls, the court at least 
understands the political fallout that might ensue.  At times they may decide to go along with 
public opinion, either as individuals or as a whole, and at other times, they may decide that 
their job is to, in fact, go against public opinion.  The future will be ripe for a continuation of 











Chapter 8:  When the Court Goes Against Public Opinion 
 In this chapter, I will explore both the ramifications and reaction of society when 
the court rules against public opinion and when they follow it.  There are several cases 
where the court has acted boldly in the face of overwhelming public opinion.  Some of 
these classic examples include Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and most of the religion-in-schools cases.   Despite generally 
remaining within the mainstream (Marshall 2008) the Rehnquist Court defied public 
opinion in several instances including Lawrence v. Texas, Johnson v. Texas and Bush v. 
Gore.  Likewise, in these early years of the Roberts Court, there have been several high 
profile cases that suggest that the Roberts Court is willing to buck public opinion.  As 
Justice Stevens reported in an interview just before he retired, “sometimes the job of the 
court is to go against public opinion”
125
.  Citizens United is one example of such as case.  
The second, U.S. v Stevens, placed the court decisively in conflict with public opinion.  
The court upheld the right of film producers to compile and distribute videos which 
depicted animal cruelty.  As with Citizens United, politicians and the public were 
outraged, and immediately looked for ways to reverse the ruling of the court. Only days 
after the ruling, members of Congress rewrote the statute that was declared 
unconstitutional.   
 Justice Roberts is acutely aware of how emotionally charged the public can be on 
First Amendment issues and, in his decisions, sometimes suggests ways to circumvent his 
own rulings.  In his majority opinion upholding the right of Westboro Baptist Church to 
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protest military funerals, for example, he proposes that the proper response to the protest 
is the creation of laws that install buffer zones far away from the protests: 
Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not 
beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—it is “subject to reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions” that are consistent with the standards 
announced in this Court’s precedents.  
 
 Roberts’ response is a classic “O’Connorian” strategy in that Roberts wants to 
split the difference, preserving the values of free speech without eroding Court legitimacy 
in the face of potential public outrage.  By doing this, he recognizes the outrage that 
could result from allowing this type of free speech at funerals but on the other, tries to 
mitigate the public rage by providing a road map for states and localities to legislate 
around the issue, thus keeping protesters away from funeral sites.  He notes that forty-
four states have such buffer zones and the facts involved do not warrant a discussion of 
the constitutionality of those bans.  Justice Kagan set the tone for this line of reasoning in 
oral argument, when she asked of Snyder's lawyer: 
... suppose you had a general statute that just said, there will be no 
disruptions of any kind at private funerals. You know, pick your distance, 
500 feet, 1,000 feet, but something that didn't refer to content, that didn't 
refer to ideas, that just made it absolutely clear that people could not 





Legal analysts such as Andrew Cohen of Politics Daily implied that the Court's action 
might have won the war when the court declined to deal with the buffer laws.  In fact, 
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Cohen reports, he may have been encouraging them.
127
  Notable to the discussion is that 
in Roberts’ majority opinion he does not specifically address the right of the Westboro 
Church to protest at funerals; rather he discusses more broadly rights of the public to free 
speech.  “Speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values.”  Such phrases rate very highly when presented in polls.  In contrast, 
support for free speech drops precipitously when the question becomes whether or not 
people have the right to protest military funerals with signs that disparage the dead.  
Roberts argues that because the issues raised by the group are of public concern, they 
belong in the public domain and cannot be restricted.
128
     
8.1 Can the Court Follow Public Opinion Too Much? 
 Have there been times that the Supreme Court could follow public opinion too 
much?  Could the court get caught up in public hysteria that might be sweeping the 
nation?  Four cases come to mind in deciphering the extent to which this is true.  These 
cases hint at how the court can get caught up the mood of the country and rather than 
being a buffer against the majority, they serve to add fuel to the fire. 
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During World War I, the government’s ability to stifle dissent was passed in the 
Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.  The Espionage Act, enacted 
immediately following U.S. entry into World War I, had two components.  It forbade 
anyone from assisting its enemies and from interfering with the success of the United 
States Armed Forces.  Furthermore, it also prohibited individuals from making false 
statements or publishing false reports that would interfere with the success of the armed 
forces.   The immediate effect of this law was that it broadened the definition of 
espionage from passing on information to the enemy to prohibiting individuals from 
expressing negative opinions about the war or the armed forces.  In 1919 the Supreme 
Court found the act Constitutional in Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919), which 
concerned the distribution of leaflets to potential draftees.  Charles Schenck was a 
Secretary in the Socialist Party and was writing and speaking against the draft.  The 
Supreme Court decided 9-0 that Schenck’s actions presented a clear and present danger 
to society, thus affirming the constitutionality of Schenck’s arrest and conviction.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority, argued that free speech was not protected 
because “when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such 
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and 
that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
129
  Moreover, he 
asserted that “the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they 
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
130
  The 
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Supreme Court was defining the constitutional line between protected and unprotected 
speech.   
Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919) was another such World War I-era 
lawsuit dealing with free speech during wartime.  This case tested of a portion of the 
Espionage Act which made it a crime for anyone to attempt to hinder production of war 
materials in an endeavor to subvert wartime activities.  Two protesters had thrown 
leaflets from New York City windows arguing against U.S. involvement in the war.  
They were arrested and sentenced to twenty years in prison for their act.  The decision 
was 7-2 in favor of the arrest and conviction.  Justice Holmes was a dissenter in this case, 
despite its striking similarity to Schenck in which Holmes argued for the constitutionality 
of the law prohibiting speech that would produce or intend to produce a clear and present 
danger.  In Abrams, Holmes contradicted his previous argument, stating that Congress 
did not have the authority to restrict the leaflets in this case because the intent to produce 
a clear and present danger was absent.   
Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951) is a third such example, where 
several Communist sympathizers were arrested for advocating the violent overthrow of 
the government.  Eugene Dennis and ten others were convicted, sentenced and that 
conviction was upheld in federal court before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.   By a 
6-2 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the conviction did 
not violate the First Amendment rights of the defendants.   
The charged mood surrounding the Dennis judgment had an clear impact on its 
decision.  First, the Court was likely aware that the prosecution was operating within the 
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anti-communist atmosphere that was climaxing in Congress and throughout the United 
States.  Second, despite the fact that the prosecution's case was largely based on hearsay, 
there was a conviction.  The Vinson Court took the case believing that anti-American 
groups should be prosecuted before their plans came to fruition.  The subsequent grave 
and probable danger rule that came out of this ruling was a bending of the clear and 
present danger concept that appeared earlier in the century.   
 In dissent, Justice Black focused on the free speech element of the case: 
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the 
Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed 
to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying 
anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The 
charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain 
ideas at a later date: The indictment is that they conspired to organize the 
Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications 
in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the 
Government. No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior 
censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment 
forbids. I would hold 3 of the Smith Act authorizing this prior restraint 




He goes on to say; 
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of 
these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer 
times, when present pressures, passions, and fears subside, this or some 
later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high 
preferred place where they belong in a free society.
132
   
 
While public opinion polling was largely in its infancy, at this early point in time 
of the Cold War, Americans were becoming concerned about the communist threat.  
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While the McCarthy hearings, for example, were just getting underway and his approval 
ratings in 1951 were only 19% favorable and 22% unfavorable.  Certainly as the 1950’s 
went on, however, many more people not only became knowledgeable as to what 
McCarthy was doing, but also were in favor of his actions in investigating alleged 
communists in the United States.  It was likely not an accident that the Supreme Court ’s 
decision in Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overturning the conviction of the 
original 11 who were tried under the Smith Act, was essentially a correction to Dennis v. 
United States.  Where the Dennis case upheld the conviction of Dennis at the outset of 
McCarthyism, the Yates decision came at a time when McCarthyism had run its course.   
 The final example where minority rights were not protected was Korematsu v. 
United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  In this case, US citizens of Japanese decent were told 
to re-locate to internment camps in the western United States.  The concern was that these 
citizens’ default loyalty would be to Japan, not the United States.  This argument was 
certainly couched in racist attitudes prevalent after the attack on Pearl Harbor.  As 
Friedman argues, “…the currents of public opinion against the interned Japanese came to 
be very strong.”  The polling that Gallup conducted on the issue showed that that Court 
was in the mainstream of public opinion on the issue.  Indeed, a plurality of respondents 
answered that the Japanese detainees ought not be released once World War II ended.  In 
a follow-up, popular responses included sending the detainees back to Japan, forcible 
emigration and outright killing.   
 The history of the court with regard to cases such as Korematsu tells an 
interesting story.  With a majority of editorials supporting the detainment, it is not 
entirely surprising that the court would have found in favor of the government, especially 
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in times of war.  It lends creditability to the argument that the Court feels the pressure, 
especially in high profile cases.   
 What is comforting about the Supreme Court is that for each of these cases, the 
court relatively quickly reversed itself.  When Hugo Black argued that Supreme Court 
decisions would be seen in a new light when the immediate passions subsided, he was 
referring to the Smith Act in 1951.  Several years later, on Monday, June 17, 1957, Yates 
and three similar decisions were released.  All four of these denounced the use of the law 
to restrict free speech and free association.  In response, J. Edgar Hoover decried the day 
as ‘Red Monday’.  The Supreme Court, in six short years, had reversed itself.  
Considering the court had only changed slightly from 1951, the logical implication was 
that as public opinion changed on the communist threat, the Supreme Court evolved to 
mirror that public perspective.   
 The Korematsu case has never been overturned at the Supreme Court, but it was 
defacto-ly overturned in 1984 when the U.S District Court for Northern California 
overthrew its original detainment.  In the 1980’s the government officially apologized for 
the internments and paid out over $1.2 billion in reparations to the survivors and their 
descendants.  And while the decision remains on the books, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, 
ruling on the case forty years later said,  
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a legal 
precedent it is now recognized as having very limited application. As historical 
precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared 
military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional 
guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military 
necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental 
actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in 
times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, 
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executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect 
all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused. 
In chapter 8, the study swings to discuss what the ramifications are when the court goes 
against public opinion and to see examples of where the Court has been caught up too 
much in the heat of public opinion.  Cases are presented that reveal that the Court 
sometimes goes along with the majority of opinion, even when those opinions ended up 















Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
  The relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court is complicated.  
It is impossible to conclude definitively that public opinion directs or even impacts 
decisions of the court, yet the literature suggests that the court likely does not stray too 
far from it.  Scholars disagree on the extent public opinion, either in its mass or business 
forms, has on its members, some arguing that decisions generally fall within a zone of 
acceptable outcomes while others believe that it is largely a spurious association.  Some 
members of the court are to be more willing to reference it than others. This study aimed 
to research whether the Roberts Court is following the Rehnquist Court’s propensity to 
follow public opinion.  Thomas Marshall (2008) found that the Rehnquist Court, as well 
as courts since the 1930’s, has largely reflected public opinion between three-fifths and 
two-thirds of the time.  Marshall uses a methodology known as the pairwise model, 
where cases were matched up with polls on the same issue.  The methodology I employed 
uses Marshall’s model as a foundation, but added two additional aspects.  It also studies 
indirect mentions in opinions, and added an examination of the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the Chamber of Commerce.  The goal of this last section was to see if 
the court is responding to business opinions in some way.  In all, I expected to improve 
Marshall's model to show that public opinion continues to be followed in the halls of the 
Supreme Court.   
 While I hoped to show a robust relationship between the Roberts Court and public 
opinion, the data remains inconclusive.  Marshall's work leads me to believe that since 
most courts' have reflected public opinion, the Roberts Court will be no different.  After 
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all, the Supreme Court not only enjoys its high approval ratings, but also needs the other 
branches of government and the public to enforce its rulings.   And yet, uncertainty about 
the Roberts Court continues.  Adding to the ambiguity are the new additions since 2005: 
John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor and Elana Kagan.  This study stands at the 
cusp of this major transformation, looking for among other things, how changes in the 
membership may be impacting how the court operates.  And while I would still argue that 
the court continues to follow public opinion, it is with the caveat that the different 
personalities may play a role in the extent to which it plays a role. 
 Each of this study’s three models suggests an association between Roberts Court 
decisions and public opinion.   Evidence of this was seen in the indirect mention model, 
where court members were at times making an argument on behalf of the American 
people.  By invoking the American people (or citizenry), the justices often were arguing 
that they were on the "side" of the American people.  I found that regardless of ideology, 
justices were likely to mention public opinion indirectly when it helped bolster their case.  
It is not entirely surprising that members of the court would do this, but what was 
unexpected was that even members who have openly rejected the influence of public 
opinion were willing to argue that their views were in the majority.   
 The pairwise method was largely inconclusive based on the small number of cases 
that were able to be matched.  The number of matches was only 12% of the total number 
of cases decided by the Court during the 2005-2010 terms.  Certainly, the naked numbers 
showed that when public opinion was measured before decisions were made, the 
Supreme Court, more often than not, fell in line with those decisions more than sixty 
three percent of the time.  It showed that the court might have been following public 
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opinion, but the small sample size makes finite conclusions difficult.  It is promising for 
future study to find that some individual members of the court seemingly were more 
willing to follow public opinion.  Despite the small sample size, there were some nuggets 
of information that are helpful in understanding the Roberts Court.  Descriptive statistics 
did reveal that the Roberts Court was following the Rehnquist Court in following public 
opinion, right between the sixty and sixty-six percent that Marshall found.  Not 
surprisingly, twelve out of thirteen unanimous cases (9-0 or 8-0) were consistent with 
public opinion while thirteen out of thirty 5-4 decisions were consistent with public 
opinion.  With 43% of 5-4 decisions being consistent with public opinion and 57% being 
inconsistent, the Supreme Court is indeed on some level reflecting the nation's increasing 
polarization.   Notably, while the court's consistency rate with public opinion went up and 
down during the terms studied, the 2010 term was striking in that it had such a low rate of 
consistency with public opinion.  Perhaps an outlier, the 38.46% rate was very low in 
contrast to the other years studied.  All six of the 5-4 decisions in that term went against 
mass public opinion.  Perhaps the Roberts Court in 2010-2011 is the start of a time where 
the court acts in the countermajoritarian mode that the lifetime tenure allows for them.  In 
all, the pairwise method allows for a unique look back at the Roberts Court's early years 
and intimates that future study will provide for a more complete conclusion of the judicial 
branch's relationship with public opinion.   
 The final model made the argument that the court responded to narrow interests 
over those of the masses.  I argue that business interests can be considered such interests, 
as most surveys reveal that the masses do see the business community as being against 
their own populist interests.  Taking that argument to the next logical level, the Chamber 
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of Commerce is different than the general public in that they are narrowly tuned to issues 
that impact the business community and are in a unique position to show policy 
preferences of business.  As a result, they are influential on decision makers, including 
the Supreme Court.  So the question is whether or not the court responds favorably to the 
Chamber of Commerce when they are either a party in a case or have filed an amicus 
brief.  The data again was inconclusive, largely due to the small number of cases during 
the early years of the Roberts Court, but revealing nonetheless.  As several journalists and 
scholars have suggested, the court does have a consistent record voting with the 
preferences of the Chamber of Commerce, rarely disagreeing with them when they are 
party (or have an interest) in a case.  My data supports their findings, but since my study 
only covers the first six years of the Roberts Court, the results are not yet conclusive.    
But as was asked before, why is this the case?  Is the Roberts Court really tuned to 
business interests over those of the mass public?  This line of study is promising, and as 
the numbers of cases increase, a more thorough study can be undertaken.   
 Many authors highlighted in this paper argue that the Supreme Court will always 
have a robust relationship with public opinion because the court will be kept in line by 
the public if they stray too far.  Consider Friedman’s take on the Roberts Court:  “….its 
decisions will fall tolerably within the mainstream of public opinion, or the Court will be 
yanked back into line.”
133
 While this concept of being "yanked-back" into line makes for 
good prose, how exactly is this done on the court?  Indeed, what power do Americans 
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hold over the court?  Is this power overstated?  The most important idea that holds the 
court to the mainstream is legitimacy in that the court is essentially powerless without it.  
And while this desire for acceptance is a powerful adherent, there are other ways that the 
court can be ‘punished’ for going outside the mainstream.  The most obvious of these is 
for the court to make an unpopular ruling, for Americans en mass to pressure their 
members of Congress, and for Congress to pass a measure that contradicts the ruling.  
The Kelo case was one such example of push back and Citizens United continues to have 
reverberations in the political world.  In this scenario, Americans are outraged by the 
court’s action in Citizens United as they see more and more money in the form of 
independent expenditures flood the election cycle.  They put enough pressure on 
Congress to pass a law which restricts the kind of corporate giving that the United 
decision allows without infringing on free speech (if that is even possible).  The president 
signs the bill and the court’s decision is overridden.   
 The first challenge with the above setting is that the outrage over the court must 
be mobilizing enough for the average American to pressure their member of Congress.  
Even if outrage bubbled over at the time of the decision, in order for the court to be 
publically rebuked, the anger must be sustained over a long period of time.  The 
indignation in response to Bush v. Gore is a good example of how anger against the Court 
is difficult to sustain and the court, much like a Senator who occasionally votes against 
the wishes of her constituency, generally has enough reservoir of goodwill that it can 
sustain short term hits to its popularity.  The American public appears to move past their 
temporary outrage, as they did in Kelo and Bush v. Gore.  Is Citizens United the tipping 
point?  Hard to say at the moment.  As the court takes on more and more difficult and 
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challenging cases, perhaps people through their state or federal legislators will find ways 
to get around court rulings, as was attempted throughout the South after Brown v. Board 
of Education desegregated the schools. 
 The other possibility is that the president can channel the public’s disapproval of 
the court through appointments.  Using Citizens United as an example, President Obama, 
would "hear" the anger of the people and nominate someone who would surely be against 
such rulings.  This anger would lead to the selection of, for example, Elana Kagan.  
Considering that Kagan herself argued the case before the Supreme Court gives credence 
to this theory, but as Politico’s Kenneth Vogel argued in a piece, "Neither Elena Kagan's 
oral argument in the case, which the court rejected in its sweeping January decision, nor 
her limited scholarly writings on the subject, have given supporters of strict campaign 
finance rules much confidence that she shares their views -- or Obama's -- on the 
subject."  In other words, there is little evidence that Kagan in fact was nominated in 
order to take on Citizens United, or to somehow punish the court for that ruling.  As Yale 
professor Bruce Ackerman noted, "I would be very surprised if she would vote with the 
majority [on behalf of Citizens United]. She is, on most of these matters, in the 
mainstream of legal opinion, and I think that decision took a lot of people by surprise. It 
was quite a striking decision attacking settled practice. But certainly, in this and in many 
other cases, she hasn't spoken to it. I know her as a person and she is certainly a person 
with her feet on the ground and who is alive to what I'd call real-world constitutionalism. 
But I don't think we have a smoking gun."
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 It is far more likely that the President 
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Obama nominated Elana Kagan because she shared a variety of views with him, not just 
on Citizens United, but on a whole host of others.  To conclude that one single issue was 
the reason behind the nomination fails to take a whole host of other issues into account.   
 This is not to say that the President does not try and "punish" the court for its 
rulings.  I would argue that to get a public rebuke by the President in his State of the 
Union Address was an attempt by President Obama to do just that for its actions in 
Citizens United.  The implication was that the president had the bully pulpit to “call out” 
the court at a time in which many people were watching and the court could not respond.   
Historical punishments that have been attempted by members of Congress and the 
president include the infamous Roosevelt Court Packing plan and a justice being 
impeached in 1888.  Moreover, there have been attempts by Congress to threaten 
impeachment for justices who have seemingly voted against the wishes of the American 
people.  But by and large, these punishment attempts have either failed or not have been 
enacted.  The process would certainly run out of steam before real action ever really took 
place.  In essence then, it is difficult to see how the other branches or the American 
public are actually able to yank the court back into line.  And yet, despite this, the court 
does generally stay within the mainstream of public opinion.   Indeed, the legitimacy 
argument is an esoteric one in that it is difficult to empirically support, but many court 
watchers subscribe to it.  After all, they argue, the court members are human, have 
families, and need to function in the real world.  I agree that this is one aspect that the 
court takes into account as it goes about its decision making.  The challenge here, as with 
many other situations, is that is virtually impossible to support this argument without the 
justices' confirming what we believe about them.   
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 The aversion to cameras in the Supreme Court is an interesting look at how the 
Supreme Court views themselves.  From the beginning of the Roberts Court, there was 
the hope that the Chief Justice would be more amenable to having the Courts oral 
arguments broadcast on television, but to date, there remains sizable opposition within 
the court.  The resistance can be largely summed up by Justice Scalia, who has 
vehemently argued that for the many people who might watch on C-Span, there will be 
millions more who will only see the court through thirty second sound bites.  Obviously 
he is concerned about how the court members may look in this way, being politicized by 
the media.  The fact that the members are concerned about how the American public may 
view them in sound bites supports the idea that the Supreme Court enjoys its relatively 
high standing amongst the public and does not want to damage this reputation or 
corresponding legitimacy.  Having the court operate publically but exclusively to the 
audience present on any given day creates a sense of mystery surrounding the court.  This 
mysteriousness of the Supreme Court is something, I would argue, that the court 
members enjoy.  In that way, they can tightly control their public appearances and stay 
out of the public arena when they choose to do so.  Notably, the aversion to the spotlight 
does not make the Supreme Court less willing to take on controversial cases.  Indeed, 
there have been many recent cases where the media has pleaded for cameras, all to no 
avail.  This roadblock may continue for some time, but eventually, with younger, more 
media savvy justices taking their place on the court, it is only a matter of time before the 
court will allow cameras.  
 Taken as a whole, we finish where we began in this study;  there is anecdotal and 
some statistical evidence that the Roberts Court reflects public opinion more times than it 
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rules in opposition.  The issue remains whether the justices are influenced more by mass 
or narrow public opinion or if the justices do ignore all the noise in their decisions.  This 
study hints at the probability that the Roberts Court will continue down the well worn 
path of earlier courts.  Indeed, as the Roberts Court matures, there will be more and more 
opportunity for scholars to study this question.  Each year brings new cases, high and low 
profile ones alike that provide a window into the justices' thinking.  As a result, there are 
lots of areas for further study.  Thomas Marshall (2008) found that the Rehnquist Court 
was consistent with public opinion about two-thirds of the time.   The data presented here 
found almost the same number, slightly below two-thirds.  While this number is 
unsurprising in that there was an expectation of finding consistency, the more cases 
introduced into the pairwise method will likely strengthen these initial findings.  Another 
area of further study should include further examination into the indirect mention model 
to see if there is an increase in the number of cases where justices argue that they are 
speaking on behalf of most Americans.  Perhaps, justices will refer directly to a poll or 
survey.  Finally as more and more cases that the Chamber of Commerce has taken a side 
in come before the court, research ought to be conducted to see if these preliminary 
results about the influence of narrow interests can be reinforced 
 Beyond what is presented here, the relationship between public opinion and the 
Supreme Court might take on new meaning when and if cameras are allowed into the 
courtroom.  When the justices are faced with the same pressure of being on camera day in 
or day out, will they change how they decide cases?  Will the public reaction to 
unflattering snippets and sound bites from oral arguments sway opinions between oral 
argument and final opinions?   With direct access to the justices, there is no doubt that the 
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dynamic between the justices and the public will change.  Research should be able to 
track these changes to see if and how the justices decide cases pre and post camera.  
Moreover, as justices take on celebrity status, will they play up to the public?  Perhaps 
one day soon, maybe with cameras in the courtroom or not, the public will have the 
chance to know whether the most insular branch ever take their opinions into account as 
they decide the issues of the day.    
9.1 Epilogue 
 As I complete this study in the fall of 2014, the data this study examined came 
from the 2005-2006 to 2010-2011 terms.  During this six year period, the Supreme Court 
seemed to become more polarized, largely reflecting the country at large.  Indeed, in the 
four terms since, there has been little change in this equation.  In an article published in 
The New York Times in May of 2014, called The Polarized Court, Adam Liptak makes 
the argument that is being made in this paper, that the court is a product of its times, and 
the current political polarized climate is being reflected in the court.  He argues that the 
court, for the first time, is divided along party lines.  The court is reflecting the society in 
which it operates.  As he says: 
The perception that partisan politics has infected the court’s work may 
do lasting damage to its prestige and authority and to Americans’ faith in 
the rule of law.  “An undesirable consequence of the court’s partisan 
divide,” said Justin Driver, a law professor at the University of Texas, “is 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to contend with a straight face that 
constitutional law is not simply politics by other means, and that justices 
are not merely politicians clad in fine robes. If that perception becomes 
pervasive among today’s law students, who will become tomorrow’s 
judges, after all, it could assume a self-reinforcing quality.”
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 The court in the years since 2010 has taken on an even larger identity in several 
high profile cases, most particularly the Obamacare case and the gay marriage cases.  For 
the health care case, the court held an almost-unprecedented three days of oral arguments 
on the merits.  Despite the increase in cries for cameras in the courtroom, the Supreme 
Court left the country with its method of releasing oral transcripts a few hours after the 
case was heard.  The fact that President Obama's health care mandate made it to the court 
at all is not surprising, but the pattern that is emerging about other cases before the court 
is somewhat alarming.  Issues are no longer being solved at the congressional level as 
Congress continues to be paralyzed by infighting.  Congress was unable to come to an 
agreement on the debt ceiling and when the super committee met to solve the issues that 
came up, they admitted failure. The government shut down for several days in the fall of 
2013 because Congress could not agree on budget resolutions.   The 2012 campaign 
turned out to be the most expensive and one of the nastiest campaigns in recent memory.  
The saga of Senator Richard Lugar, one of the most prominent and accomplished 
Senators of the modern era, where he lost his primary to an opponent promising less 
bipartisanship in Congress, is a stunning and sad reflection of where the country is 
politically.  And in this atmosphere, the Supreme Court operates.  If they in fact do reflect 
the times, then issues not solved at the Congressional and Executive levels will 
eventually end up at the Supreme Court.  These large scale issues will force the Supreme 
Court to get involved at a political level they may be increasingly uncomfortable with.  
The continued slide in the court's approval rating may be reflecting this reality.   
 Public opinion may have played a role in two areas where the Supreme Court held 





 vote, voting for Congress’s ability to mandate that Americans buy health 
insurance or pay a fine.  Most court watchers believed that it was Justice Kennedy who 
was going to be the swing voter, but it turned out to be Roberts.  This turn of events was a 
little surprising given the information gathered from oral arguments.  The six-hour debate 
in October of 2011 hinted at the law being declared unconstitutional. The more 
conservative justices were skeptically asking whether Congress could make people eat 
their broccoli in the same way they could force them to buy health insurance. From that 
line of questioning many court observers believed that there were five votes to overturn 
the healthcare law.  Throughout the winter of 2012 into the spring of 2012 it seemed a 
foregone conclusion that the healthcare law would be overturned. In fact Democrats were 
trying to figure out the best way to respond once the individual mandate was overturned. 
Likewise, Republicans strategists told people not to gloat when the mandate was 
overturned. So when Roberts read the decision and agreed to uphold the law, there was 
sizable shock in both liberal and conservative circles.  Many observers after-the-fact were 
flabbergasted by Roberts’s decision to join the liberals in this case. Several prominent 
Republicans were left wondering whether Roberts had turned into a trader or was not as 
conservative as they once believed.  A quick Internet search turns up a myriad of 
accusations that Roberts is a traitor to the conservative cause.  Certainly, leaving for 
Malta as the decision was being released was curious.  As Jan Crawford reported for CBS 
News, Roberts;   
…pays attention to media coverage. As chief justice, he is keenly aware of his 
leadership role on the court, and he also is sensitive to how the court is perceived 
by the public. There were countless news articles in May warning of damage to 
the court - and to Roberts' reputation - if the court were to strike down the 
mandate. Leading politicians, including the president himself, had expressed 
confidence the mandate would be upheld. Some even suggested that if Roberts 
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struck down the mandate, it would prove he had been deceitful during his 
confirmation hearings, when he explained a philosophy of judicial restraint. It 
was around this time that it also became clear to the conservative justices that 
Roberts was, as one put it, "wobbly," the sources said.
136
 
The reasons why Roberts chose to uphold the law is purely speculative, but some 
politicians and scholars have surmised that Justice Roberts is no stranger to the political 
environment in which he operates.  He himself admitted as much when he concluded his 
Senate confirmation hearings by claiming "I'm not an ideologue.”  “It’s enormously 
gratifying that the chief justice, who once was one of my star students in constitutional 
law, saved the day — and perhaps the court,” said Harvard professor and constitutional 
law expert Laurence H. Tribe, who said the court’s “place as a legal institution had begun 
to fall into dangerous disrepute.”
137
   
The other possibility is that his vote on the health care law was an O’Connorian 
vote.  If Crawford is to be believed, then Roberts understands the role of the courts in 
modern society and is concerned about its legitimacy. So much so that he is willing to 
vote or uphold the law that was legitimately passed. If he had been an associate justice, 
perhaps he would have voted that the law was unconstitutional, but being in the position 
he was meant he had to vote differently.  And yet in reading the decision, it also becomes 
clear that Roberts upheld the law, but did so in a way that limited its potential impact.  In 
being the one to write the opinion, he found a way to thread the needle between 
upholding the law passed by the Congress and the president and understanding the limits 
of federalism at the same time. By restricting the potential penalties to the states for who 
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did not want to expand Medicaid, Justice Roberts was trying to find common ground 
between the two positions. He accomplished the same thing in the Arizona immigration 
cases, where he upheld most of the law, struck down most of the law, but upheld one 
significant provision.  In defining his role as Chief Justice role, perhaps Roberts 
understands that operating in a political world means that he needs to be apolitical at 
times.   
 The other case that deserves mention is United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 
___ (2013) where the Supreme Court declared the Defense of Marriage Act to be 
unconstitutional.  This case split along familiar ideological lines, with Anthony Kennedy 
joining the four liberal justices in deciding that the federal government could not prevent 
marriage because of 5
th
 Amendment and Due Process issues.  What is notable about this 
case and the Hollingsworth v. Perry 570 U.S. ___ (2013) case was that the Court, once 
again, threaded the needle between an outright ban on states outlawing gay marriage and 
allowing it to proceed in those states where it was already allowed.  The significance of 
this ruling again has to do with the role that public opinion has played.  Rarely has there 
been the chance to examine how public opinion has played a role on a specific issue, if 
not on the case itself.  The basic argument of this paper is that the Robert Court reflects 
public opinion.  The fact that now fifty percent of the country polled agree that gays 
ought to be allowed to marry has to have weighed heavily on the minds of the justices as 
they made their decisions.  When DOMA was passed in the mid-1990’s, the support for 
gay marriage was quite low.  Is it reasonable to conclude that times have changed, the 
public has changed and the Supreme Court has changed as a result?   Further research 
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here is warranted, but there can be little doubt that society’s increasing acceptance of gay 
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